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ABSTRACT 
In England, schools with self-management responsibility compete to be 
chosen by parents, for whom information on exam/test results is available, and 
student numbers as a result of parental choice decide the allocation of school 
budgets. This quasi-market system, introduced by the Education Reform Act 
1988, has survived the changes of government and premiership. There has also 
been a continuing controversy between the advocates and critics of the quasi-
market. 
Strangely, both the advocates and critics agree on a paradoxical view that the 
traditional academic model with rigorous teaching prevails in the quasi-market 
even though parental choice is complex and diverse. The schooling model is 
influenced by parental choice only indirectly through the schools' strategies. 
Based on Basil Bernstein's theory, this thesis proposes a hypothesis that school 
managers in the quasi-market tend to introduce more visible strategies oriented 
towards explicit rules in pedagogy and management, or towards 'conservative' 
pedagogy and 'managerial' management, than invisible strategies oriented 
towards implicit rules, or towards 'progressive' pedagogy and 'collegial' 
management. 
To examine the hypothesis, as a multiple-case study targeting six secondary 
schools in a London borough, semi-structured interviews with headteachers were 
carried out between 1994 and 1995, when the quasi-market system was 'purer' 
than the current one that contains more interventionist mechanisms added by the 
Labour government. The results of the study show that in five of the six schools, 
the headteachers were adopting more visible strategies than invisible ones and 
therefore, lend support to the hypothesis and its theoretical framework. 
Thus the framework can be a solid basis for the systematic analyses of the 
effects of the quasi-market forces on school strategies. In discussing the 
implications of the findings for Labour's policies, research on quasi-markets, and 
Bernstein's theory, reviews of recent literature demonstrate the sustained 
relevance of this research to the education system at the time of writing the thesis. 
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Part I Introduction 
Chapter 1 The Aim and Focus of This Research 
Research on school strategies in the quasi-market 
This piece of research work is intended to contribute to the continuing debates on 
the market-oriented system of education in Britain through theoretical and 
empirical analyses of schools' strategic responses to the system. 
The market-oriented system was originally created by the Education Reform 
Act 1988 under the then Conservative government led by Margaret Thatcher in 
her premiership, who was succeeded by John Major. The reformed system has 
been called the education quasi-market by some researchers (Bartlett, W. & Le 
Grand, J., 1993, etc.) because it involves putting market pressure on schools 
through the competition between them but it differs from conventional markets in 
some points including public ownership and non-profit organisations. Despite the 
change of government, Labour's policies have basically let the quasi-market 
mechanisms remain largely intact, and basic structures of controversy over the 
education quasi-market have been rather stable although the Labour government 
led by Tony Blair and now Gordon Brown has introduced a number of new 
initiatives in the education policy. 
There has been great controversy over the education quasi-market. The 
controversy has been educational, academic and political. The advocates (Pirie, 
1988 & 1992, etc.) of the quasi-market have argued that the reform had replaced 
the monopolistic system with inefficiency, bureaucratic control and uniformity by 
the competitive system with efficiency, choice and diversity, and that the 
reformed system was raising educational standards. The critics (Bowe and Ball 
with Gold, 1992a, etc.) of the quasi-market have judged that what the new system 
has brought about is not choice and diversity but inequality and hierarchy, and 
denied that the quasi-market system has improved educational standards. 
One of the focal points of the controversy is that there seems to be an 
interesting inconsistency in both the advocates' and the critics' arguments. The 
advocates, on the one hand, have emphasised the diversity of schools for parents 
8 
to choose from; however, on the other hand, some of them have expected that the 
traditional academic model with rigorous teaching and discipline will be dominant 
in the quasi-market. The critics, on the one hand, have emphasised the 
complexity of parental choice and denied the dominance of academic performance 
as a factor of choice; however, on the other hand, they have predicted the 
formation of a hierarchy of schools and the increase in inequality among pupils. 
The predicted hierarchy and inequality are based on the assumption that the 
competition between schools for parental choice will be significantly driven by 
the academic performance as measured by examination and test results. 
Why does the traditional academic model seem so predominant while parental 
choice seems so complicated? In this question, there seems to be a key to the 
academically productive discussion on the above-mentioned inconsistency. 
Whether or not schools pursue the traditional model is influenced by parental 
choice not directly but indirectly through the schools' strategies. We need to 
distinguish the strategies of schools as 'providers' from parental choices as voices 
of 'consumers'. Parental choices influence schools' practices only through their 
influence on the schools' strategies. Therefore, it is very important to investigate 
what kind of strategies schools adopt and implement in response to not only 
parental choices but also other conditions, including strategies of neighbouring 
schools, in the local quasi-market. The focus of this research is on school 
strategies in the education quasi-market. 
Research question and empirical work 
In this thesis, a hypothesis of school strategies is expected to explain why the 
academic model of schooling seems to be predominant in the quasi-market system 
of education, despite the apparent complexity of parental choice. The hypothesis 
is that, in the quasi-market, school managers have increasingly adopted school 
strategies oriented towards more explicit rules in pedagogic relations between 
pupils and teachers and/or in organisational relations between school managers 
and teachers. In order to make their school survive and prosper in the competitive 
environment, the managers seem to seek more explicit and formal control over the 
various aspects of school including teaching, assessment and reporting, discipline, 
and organisation and staff. 
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In the thesis, the above-mentioned strategies are named visible strategies, 
oriented towards explicit rules as stated above, as opposed to invisible strategies, 
oriented towards implicit rules, on the basis of Basil Bernstein's (1990) theory of 
pedagogies and the organisational theories of ambiguity and loose coupling. 
Visible strategies are basically school strategies for more conservative pedagogy 
and/or more managerial management. The conservative modality of pedagogy, 
which visible strategies are oriented towards, can be rephrased as the traditional 
academic model with rigorous teaching and discipline. Invisible strategies are 
those for more progressive pedagogy and/or collegial management. The more 
precisely rephrased hypothesis is that school managers in the quasi-market system 
have introduced more visible than invisible strategies. 
To examine the hypothesis, an empirical work was conducted to investigate 
how secondary schools in a London borough were strategically responding to the 
development of a market-oriented education system as created by the education 
reform since the Education Reform Act 1988. The hypothesis is to be empirically 
examined through the analysis of school strategies as presented in the interviews 
with the headteachers of the secondary schools. The interviews were carried out 
in 1994 and 1995. Therefore, the subject for the empirical work is the education 
system reformed by the Conservative government and not yet modified by the 
succeeding Labour government. 
Relevance and originality of this research 
The uniqueness of this research lies in examining the hypothesis through the 
analysis of school strategies in the quasi-market education system in its original 
form before being modified by Labour's more interventionist policy initiatives, 
which are centrally forced rather than being realised through market mechanisms. 
For example, the Labour government has directly promoted more visible 
modalities of pedagogy in literacy and numeracy. As schools are affected by the 
central policy initiatives as well as the quasi-market mechanisms, it is more 
difficult to judge the effects of the latter mechanisms through school strategies. 
Nevertheless, because the continuity of the quasi-market system between the 
Conservative and Labour governments is generally agreed upon, the research 
findings and theoretical framework of this thesis are still relevant, and have 
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significant implications for the current arena of education policy under the Labour 
government. 
Furthermore, because policy proposals in the controversial White Paper (DfES, 
2005), advocating power and choice for parents and freedom for schools, 
launched by the former Prime Minister Tony Blair and the then Education 
Secretary Ruth Kelly in October 2005 have been implemented 1, the importance of 
the education quasi-market and school strategies in it has been re-enhanced. 
The current Prime Minister Gordon Brown has been following his 
predecessor's policy on education and doing nothing to change the quasi-market 
system. In July 2007, both the Prime Minister's statement2 to the House of 
Commons and the statement3 to the House from Ed Balls, Secretary of State for 
Children, Schools and Families, outlined their education policies that include 
raising the education leaving age from 16 to 18 and focus upon raising standards 
and promoting discipline and leadership as continual themes. In their statements, 
there was no hint that they might undermine the education quasi-market. 
Therefore, the relevance and significance of this research have been kept, as the 
quasi-market with parental choice and school autonomy has survived the changes 
of government and premiership. 
The above-mentioned hypothesised predominance of visible strategies and the 
related movement towards uniformity, rather than diversity, will have significant 
implications for the current policy issues. In this regard, the rhetoric of 'choice 
and diversity', inherited by the Labour government from the Conservative 
government, deserves doubt if the hypothesis is confirmed. This means that 
choice may not result in diversity. 
Moreover, although there has been accumulating research on the education 
quasi-market, including some valuable works of a descriptive nature and a 
grounded approach, this thesis is unique in demonstrating systematic and 
consistent analyses of orientations of school strategies in the quasi-market within 
1 Many of the proposed policies became law in the Education and Inspection Act 2006 that received Royal 
Assent in November 2006. 
2 From the Parliament's website, http://www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/cm200607/ 
cmhansrd/cm070711/debtext/70711-0004.htm (Last accessed on 10 August 2007). 
3 From the website of the Department for Children, Schools and Families, 
http://www.dfes.gov.uklspeeches/search_detail.cfm?ID=666 (Last accessed on I 0 August 2007). 
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a theoretical framework. Thus, the thesis, with its continuing relevance and 
originality, is intended to make a meaningful contribution to the current debates 
on market-oriented policies of education. 
Outline of the organisation of this thesis 
This thesis consists of five parts. In the next part, Part II, the research question of 
the thesis will emerge in the course of the review of literature in relation to the 
education quasi-market. Part III will provide a theoretical framework and 
hypothesis with regard to school strategies. Both Parts II and III set the stage for 
the empirical study and therefore, use the literature that was available by the time 
the empirical study was conducted between 1994 and 1995. Part IV will be a full 
description of the empirical study as a multiple-case study of six schools, 
including methodology, data analysis and findings. In Part V, the implications of 
the findings will be discussed, and the summary and conclusions will be made 
with a view to further developing the theory and empirical research. This part 
uses recent literature available in the 2000s to re-examine the focal issues in the 
thesis, and demonstrate the sustained relevance and significance of this research 
to the education system at the time of writing this thesis. 
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Part II Quasi-Market and School Strategies: Place for the 
Research Question 
Chapter 2 The Education Quasi-Market: An Academic Controversy 
This chapter is regarding the review of the literature that was available by the time 
the empirical work was carried out in 1994/5. The review was conducted to 
establish the design of this research on the education quasi-market and explicate 
the context for the empirical work. 
In this chapter, after a brief introduction of the quasi-market reform 
implemented by the then Conservative government, the economic analysis of the 
education quasi-market will be presented because the concept and definition of 
quasi-market is economic. The advocacy and criticism of the quasi-market will 
follow it. Naturally, there were different points of view on the quasi-market as a 
controversial device for reforming the education system. 
The Conservatives' education reform: The creation of the quasi-market 
Since the Education Reform Act 1988 (ERA)4 , the Conservative government, led 
by Margaret Thatcher and then John Major in their premiership, implemented the 
education reform, which was regarded as the most important change in the 
education system based on the Education Act 1944. The reform contained, as its 
main elements, the policies of the National Curriculum and Assessment, Local 
Management of Schools (LMS), Open Enrolment, and Grant-Maintained (GM) 
Schools. The principles of the reform could be summarised as parental choice, 
autonomous schools, reduction of the Local Education Authorities' (LEAs) 
powers, strengthened control by the central government, and the market principle. 
While the idea of a National Curriculum was not restricted to the Conservatives, 
the National Curriculum and Assessment5 stipulated by the ERA was the result of 
4 On the theme of the ERA, there exist a number of books, including a detailed description of the ERA by 
Stuart Maclure (1992), a focused discussion on the most important aspects of the ERA in the historical and 
ideological background by Denis Lawton ( 1992), and a collection of papers on the ERA and its origins and 
implications within a broader socio-political context, edited by Michael Flude and Merril Hammer ( 1990). 
5 On the National Curriculum and Assessment, see the writings of Maclure ( 1992, pp.l-29), Lawton (1992, 
pp.49-51 & pp.77-9), GeoffWhitty (1990) and Roger Murphy (1990). 
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two different motives of the Conservative government and its supporters. One 
motive was that of the neo-conservatives who criticised the so-called progressive 
or child-centred education and wanted to restore traditional standards and values 
in schools through a centrally prescribed curriculum. The other was that of some 
neo-liberals who thought that the nationally standardised curriculum would be a 
good basis for providing information to be used for parental choice in the form of 
test and examination results. There were, however, other neo-liberals who 
disliked the idea, and believed that market forces would effectively improve the 
curriculum without bureaucratic prescription. The mixture of these motives for 
the National Curriculum and Assessment resulted in standardised curriculum and 
a testing and examination system to make schools accountable to both the central 
government and the parents. 
The ERA stipulated that the core subjects in English secondary schools were 
mathematics, English and science, and that the other foundation subjects were 
history, geography, technology, music, art, physical education, and a modem 
foreign language6 . All schools, except independent or private ones, were required 
by the ERA to provide all pupils with the National Curriculum. The National 
Curriculum documents contained 'programmes of study' to set out what pupils 
should be taught and 'attainment targets' to set out the expected standards of 
pupils' performance in each subject and for each key stage7 . The pupils' progress 
through the National Curriculum was to be assessed at the end of each key stage. 
Based on an expert group's report, the assessment was originally designed to be 
formative and diagnostic drawing heavily on teachers' observations as well as on 
'standard assessment tasks', which could also take the form of a defined activity 
within the teaching programme as well as that of testing. The complex nature and 
the central role of teachers' judgement in the original assessment system aroused 
suspicions among Conservative politicians who preferred paper and pencil tests. 
The then Secretary of State for Education, Kenneth Clarke, himself was said to 
have condemned the standard assessment tasks in 1991 as 'elaborate nonsense' 
6 The current lists of the core and foundation subjects, as revised by the Labour government, are slightly 
different from these original ones. Now, information technology is a core subject, and design and 
technology is a foundation subject. 
7 The years of compulsory schooling were divided into Key Stage I, up to age 7 (Years I and 2); Key Stage 
2, up to age II (Years 3-6); Key Stage 3, up to age 14 (Years 7-9); and Key Stage 4, up to age 16 (Years 
10 and 11). 
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(Lawton, 1994, p. 79). After the first assessment of 7 -year-o1ds (Key Stage 1) in 
1991 caused widespread complaints from teachers about the amount of work and 
time spent on the assessment, the Conservative government changed the complex 
and elaborate 'tasks' into simpler short-written 'tests'. The simplified system of 
assessment consisted of a combination of standardised national tests and teachers' 
assessment at the end ofKey Stages 1, 2 and 3 and the GCSE at the end ofKey 
Stage 4. 
LMS 8 consists ofthree elements-'formula funding', 'financial delegation' and 
'staffing delegation'. Although a number of LEAs had voluntarily been 
experimenting with their schemes of local financial management (LMF) to 
delegate budgets to schools, the ERA required all the LEAs to draft their scheme 
of financial delegation and submit it for the Secretary of State's approval. The 
LEAs were required to distribute most of their education budget to individual 
schools, holding back only specific items such as loan charges, central 
administration and some support services. The governing bodies of schools 
became responsible for the use of the delegated budget, which was not specified 
item by item. Moreover, the ERA further extended the powers of the governing 
bodies over staff appointments, suspensions and dismissals, which had already 
been increased under the 1986 Education Act. This meant a further reduction in 
the LEAs' powers to intervene in staffing issues. The ERA enabled the governing 
body of each school to decide the number of teaching and other staff to be 
employed and who should be employed while the LEA remained the employer. 
In short, all secondary schools became entitled to the power of decision making 
regarding their own budget and staffing. The amount of budget available for each 
school depended largely on the number of pupils enrolled at the school through a 
formula for the distribution of the LEA's budget to all schools within the LEA's 
jurisdiction. This mechanism of formula funding, in which a single formula had 
to be applied to all schools under the LEA, was designed to diminish the scope for 
political distribution by the LEA in favour of some schools over others. It was 
also expected to encourage schools to compete for pupils or their parents. 
8 On LMS, see the writings ofMaclure (1992, pp.41-60), Lawton (1992, pp.52-3) and Hywel Thomas 
(1990). 
15 
In this regard, the reformed system of education needed to empower parents to 
choose a school for their child. Open Enrolment9 was the device for this purpose. 
The ERA stipulated that all schools were required to accept pupils up to the limit 
of their physical capacity rather than up to that set by the LEA's discretionary 
planning and catchment-area policies. It was no more possible for the LEA to 
allocate pupils to schools against parents' preferences on the grounds of the 
provision of efficient education or the efficient use of resources. 
Although schools under LMS became nearly self-managing, the LEA still had 
jurisdiction over them. The ERA created a new category of self-managing 
schools, called GM schools 10 , by allowing schools to 'opt out' of the LEA control 
and be funded directly by the central government. All secondary schools became 
eligible to apply for GM status although only a minority did so 11 . The decision to 
apply rested with a secret postal ballot of parents. Once a school opted out, the 
property and staff were transferred to the governing board of the GM school as the 
new owner and employer. 'No provision in the Act aroused stronger feelings than 
those on grant-maintained schools' (Stuart Maclure, 1992, p.61). The LEAs and 
the Labour Party among others were hostile to the introduction of GM status 12 . 
The market principle seemed to make it possible to compose the reform as an 
integrated package of the above-mentioned policies. The thinking behind the 
policy package was as follows. Open Enrolment encourages parental choice as 
consumer power, and schools are forced to endeavour to attract parents and their 
children, who bring implicit vouchers through formula funding. Financial and 
staff delegation enables schools as autonomous providers to try and do their best 
to improve and differentiate their education based on their own decisions with 
little administrative interference from their LEA. GM status is expected to make 
the LEA's interference zero and further the diversity between schools from which 
parents choose. The National Curriculum and Assessment also has its place in the 
9 On Open Enrolment, see the writings ofMaclure (1992, pp.30-40), Lawton (1992, pp.51-2) and Andrew 
Stillman (1990). 
10 On GM schools, see the writings ofMaclure (1992, pp.61-84), Lawton (1992, pp.54-5) and Flude and 
Hammer ( 1990). 
11 As of 1995, GM schools accounted for just above 15 percent of all (about 4,500) maintained secondary 
schools. 
12 By the 1998 School Standards and Framework Act, the Labour government changed the status of GM 
schools into that of 'foundation' schools, which came back under the LEAs' jurisdiction, in 2000. 
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whole package of the market -oriented reform. The results of examinations and 
tests based on the common curriculum are expected to provide important 
information on the performances of schools from which parents choose and a 
common forum where schools have to compete. The publication of 'performance 
tables' or 'league tables' clearly show such policy-makers' expectations. The 
education quasi-market is the education system as created by the package of the 
reform policies. 
The economic analysis of the quasi-market 
The education system, reformed by the then Conservative government, became a 
subject of economic analysis. In such an analysis, the system was regarded as a 
quasi-market system in the public sector. 
Definition of the Quasi-Market 
LeGrand and Bartlett (1993a) defined quasi-markets as follows. 'They are 
"markets" because they replace monopolistic state providers with competitive 
independent ones'. They are 'quasi' because they differ from conventional 
markets in characteristics such as non-profit organisations, public ownership and 
consumer purchasing power through state funding mechanisms. The authors said, 
'what the non-profit enterprises do have as their objectives is often unclear'. In 
conventional markets, private enterprises have clearer profit-making objectives. 
Glennerster (1993) argued that the education system created by the reforms fell 
short of a full market solution for at least four reasons as follows. First, no money 
could escape to the private sector. Secondly, there was no free entry for new 
providers. Thirdly, choice was limited because all state schools were required to 
follow a common curriculum, that is, the National Curriculum. Fourthly, 
teachers' salaries were still set on a national salary scale limiting the freedom of 
each school to arrange its budget. 
Economic research on market mechanisms in education 
While the education quasi-market established by the ERA was not a conventional 
market as such in economic terms, it was the case that both the advocates and 
critics of the quasi-market system often developed their arguments on the basis of 
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the perceived merits and demerits of the market and its mechanisms. Here, some 
economic discussions on market mechanisms in education are introduced. 
Although the advocacy ofthe market in education was constructed from some 
concepts of economics, economists' analyses of market mechanisms did not 
necessarily support the advocacy. 
Some economists analysed market mechanisms in education generally, and 
others focused on a voucher scheme specifically. Vouchers 'became an important 
symbol ofmarket ideas in education' (Lawton, 1992, p.38) although the 
Conservative Party never adopted them as its official policy. With regard to the 
ERA, it was pointed out that 'the combination of open emolment and per capita 
funding in effect produced the same result as the voucher systems' (Lawton, 1992, 
p.53). However, voucher schemes in theory need not be confined to the state 
school system, and may cover private schools as well as state schools. The results 
from the economic research on market mechanisms, including vouchers, were not 
necessarily in favour of these market alternatives. Questions were raised 
concerning efficiency, responsiveness, choice and especially, equity. Some of the 
results were applicable to the quasi-market system while others were not. 
LeGrand, Propper and Robinson (1992, Chap.3) admitted certain advantages of 
a market system, rather than a quasi-market one, in education including the 
freedom of choice. However, they concluded that the system would not achieve 
either of the two main objectives of efficiency and equity and that some form of 
state intervention was necessary. They argued that the attainment of efficiency 
was likely to be impeded because of capital market imperfection, imperfect 
information, externalities and spatial monopoly and that equity was unlikely to be 
achieved when access to education was determined by the ability to pay. Such 
factors as imperfect information and spatial monopoly seem applicable to the 
quasi-market. Maurice Peston (1984) also concluded that the optimum decision 
would be some mixture of privatisation and the maintained system. Barr and 
Whynes (1993) seemed a little more pro-market when they argued that even the 
best-designed package of intervention had limitations where market failures were 
serious because market could be very efficient. 
LeGrand, Propper and Robinson (1992, Chap.3) noticed that the voucher 
scheme and the quasi-market shared many features and attracted similar criticisms 
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that they would fail to achieve equity and efficiency because of imperfect 
information and spatial monopoly. They considered the voucher supporters' 
claim that it would offer a wider choice through a diverse education system, and 
regarded the claim as not yet proven. They also mentioned that schools with 
substantial investments would find it costly to expand or contract in response to 
short-run changes in parents' tastes. Peston (1984) raised the question of whether 
a privatised system would be biased in favour of the immediate and clearly 
discernible consequences such as the inculcation of 3Rs type and the obtaining of 
diplomas rather than the long-term and qualitative kind of consequences such as 
personal development and an ability to cope with society. These questions 
regarding responsiveness, choice and diversity were more or less relevant to the 
quasi-market system as welL 
LeGrand, Propper and Robinson (1992, Chap.3) referred to the fear that a 
voucher scheme to cover both private and state schools would lead to a hierarchy 
of schools based on fees. On the other hand, however, they also noticed the 
argument that the system of state provision was hierarchical as welL Then, the 
authors said, 'the relevant question becomes: would the introduction of a voucher 
scheme reduce or increase inequality?' They implied that the question depended 
on how far better schools had creamed off the more able pupils. They referred to 
the criticism that the publication of examination results could be misleading 
because it rarely took account of the starting ability levels or social backgrounds 
of different school populations and that it might act as a mechanism for attracting 
more able, middle class children to apparently successful schools while 
consigning lower achievers to 'sink' schools. Peston (1984) also noticed that the 
quality of the output from education partly depended on demanders, that is, pupils 
and in that sense, a school was similar to a club. He argued that a high spending, 
lower-achieving school might be more effective if it had more difficult pupils and 
an adverse environment In these discussions, the pupils' baseline achievements 
and socio-cultural environments constituted an interrelated issue. 
Efficiency, responsiveness, choice and inequity in the education quasi-market 
While the reviewed economic research on the education quasi-market mentioned 
above did not seem to submit decisive conclusions, some researchers were 
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positive regarding the possibility of improving efficiency, responsiveness and 
choice while they pointed out the danger of increasing inequity. 
Bartlett and LeGrand (1993) proposed that efficiency, responsiveness, choice 
and equity should be the criteria against which the quasi-market reforms could be 
judged. In contrast with the other three criteria, equity 13 'rarely appears explicitly 
as one of the policy objectives of the quasi-market reforms'. They pointed out 
that a number of conditions concerning the 'market structure', 'information', 
'transactions costs and uncertainty', 'motivation', and 'cream-skimming' had to 
be satisfied if the reforms were to achieve the ends of increased efficiency, 
responsiveness and choice without adverse consequences in terms of increased 
inequity. 
The above conditions were assessed as follows by Bartlett (1993) in his case 
study of a county LEA. 
He said that the 'market structure' was broadly competitive. He exemplified 
that in the past, open enrolment already had pronounced effects on the pattern of 
admissions. Although there was no provision for a school to go bankrupt and the 
opening-up of new schools remained an administrative decision to be taken by the 
LEA, there was a developing competitive spirit between the headteachers in open 
enrolment. The author referred to a case wherein a 'gentlemen's agreement' 
between headteachers had been broken. However, he indicated that the enrolment 
system was far from being completely open with limits on admission numbers 
imposed centrally. 
Concerning 'information', Bartlett pointed out that a 'bandwagon effect' on 
parental choice might develop as a consequence of lack of adequate information. 
Glennerster (1993) also argued that parents would get misleading information 
about the efficiency of the schools because they were not in a position to know the 
value added by different schools. 
13 The empirical and theoretical research work on 'equity' in formula funding by Tim Lee (1996), which is 
beyond the literature review coverage, revealed the complex and problematic nature of equity in practice. 
His findings indicated that although the LEAs' formulae were required to ensure the equitable allocation of 
resources, the LEAs adopted myriad versions of equity in terms of additional educational needs including 
special educational needs, social deprivation and other types of needs, with some changes in many LEAs' 
formulae over time, but without any great convergence between the LEAs. In his view, the diversity and 
churning in the LEAs' policies were at least partly because of confusions and uncertainties generated by 
the concept of equity itself with no more meaning than consistency and proportionality of treatment. 
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With regard to 'transactions costs and uncertainty', Bartlett, based on the case 
study, indicated that the numbers of oversubscribed schools and parent appeals 
had increased and that allocating pupils and dealing with the appeals had become 
more costly. 
Concerning school managers' 'motivation', Bartlett argued that the individual 
school in the case study was concerned with both the generation of the best 
overall results for the children and the maximisation of its budget, which implied 
maximising the level of admissions. He also pointed out that LMS had brought 
about underspending by the schools in the case study because of a cautious 
approach adopted by headteachers and governing bodies in contrast with the 
consistent pattern of overspending, which had characterised the previous system. 
He said, 'Headteachers have responded to the new system of delegated budgets 
with enthusiasm, and there appear to be no headteachers who have indicated that 
they would wish to return to the previous financial regime'. With regard to 
parents' 'motivation', Bartlett insisted that parents had responded to the new 
system by taking increasing advantage of the possibilities to exercise a greater 
degree of choice of school. 
Bartlett and Le Grand ( 1993) explicated cream-skimming as follows. While 
conventional markets are not equitable in a sense because the ability to pay is not 
correlated with need, quasi-markets do not suffer from this problem since 
consumers receive services free of charge. However, if inequity is to be 
completely avoided, there must be no incentive to cream-skimming, which is 
discrimination by providers against the more expensive users. If schools received 
larger funding weights per pupil for potentially expensive children through 
formula funding, they would have no incentive to cream-skim. In reality, 
however, Bartlett (1993) insisted that the more popular schools were becoming 
increasingly selective through such measures as interviews and examples of a 
child's work. He indicated that, while the cost of educating children differed 
according to their educational needs, the funding formula did not count enough 
the difference in the needs including special educational needs. Glennerster 
(1993) also pointed out that in a quasi-market, there would not only be efficiency 
competition but also selection competition where schools would seek to exclude 
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pupils who would drag down the overall performance score, and insisted that the 
quasi-market would produce a selective system. 
Bartlett (1993) referred to the fact that it was difficult and costly for pupils to 
switch schools if the quality did not meet up to the expectations. Propper (1993) 
pointed out 'a danger that those pupils who remain in low-resourced schools will 
receive a poorer education than those in high-resourced schools'. Glennerster 
( 1993) also mentioned that the decline and bankruptcy of a school would cause 
considerable educational and social costs to the pupils caught up in its demise. 
Indecisive conclusions: Improvements in efficiency and responsiveness and 
increased inequity 
The above-mentioned analysis by Bartlett (1993), as a whole, seemed to regard 
the 'market structure' with open emolment as increasing 'responsiveness' and the 
'motivation' by school managers with LMS as enhancing 'efficiency' while 
expressing concern about increased inequality through 'cream-skimming' with 
admission limits and formula funding. Bartlett (1993, p.l52) concluded that the 
reformed system had brought about a number of improvements in the areas of 
efficiency and responsiveness through the mechanisms of delegated management 
and open emolment, and that the main problem areas were associated with the 
way in which formula funding generated inequality and the way in which 
centrally established admission limits restricted a free choice of school. On 
another page (p.126), however, he criticised open emolment, which, he said, with 
formula funding tends to increase inequality. He proposed changes in the funding 
formula to reflect children's different initial educational abilities and 
empowerment of the LEA rather than that of the central government to determine 
admissions limits. 
LeGrand and Bartlett (1993b) were more cautious when they appraised quasi-
market reforms in various welfare services and said, 'we have not been able to 
assess directly whether the quasi-market changes have actually improved 
efficiency, choice and responsiveness and equity'. 
Overall, the above-mentioned economic analyses did not seem to provide 
decisive conclusions to the issues of efficiency, inequality and other important 
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aspects of the education quasi-market, although the issue of efficiency tended to 
be assessed positively and that of inequality, negatively. 
Then, let us review the quasi-market advocates' argument on its supposed 
benefits and the critics' focus on its expected dangers. 
The advocacy of the quasi-market 
Criticism of public monopoly and advocacy of the market 
Advocates of the market principle, based on the public choice approach, criticised 
monopolistic supply by bureaucracies in the public sector including education as 
lacking efficiency and accountability. 
For example, Madsen Pirie (1988, Chap.2) listed the problem areas for the 
public sector such as high costs, inefficiency, producer interests, less innovation 
and flexibility. He (Pirie, 1988 & 1992) contrasted the supposed weakness of the 
public sector with the supposed strength of the private sector as follows. First, 
competition and profit-making keep private businesses leaner and more efficient 
than their public counterparts. Secondly, while private firms need their customer 
choices and are controlled by the public, state industries financed from taxation 
are not controlled by the public but by their administrators and workforce. 
Thirdly, private markets provide variations for consumers to choose from, 
whereas the public sector tends to offer standardised services. 
He (Pirie, 1992, p.14-15) argued that the Conservative government had 
introduced three policies to overcome the problems in the public sector-
privatisation, internal markets and the Citizen's Charter. He said, 'The common 
thread linking the three policies is Public Choice Theory'. According to his 
account, the public choice theory applies the methods of economics to social 
affairs, and is based on the premise that politicians, civil servants, interest groups 
and ordinary electors tend to behave as if they were economic participants who try 
to maximise their advantages and act rationally to secure their objectives. James 
Buchanan ( 1991 ), summarising a result of research in public choice, says, 'the 
government alternative is inherently inferior to the market'. Let us see how 
advocates of the market described the inferiority of the government in the 
provision of education. 
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Pirie ( 1992, p.56-57), blaming comprehensive schooling as not being of a high 
standard, insisted that education had been captured by its producers and that the 
quality of education had been measured not by output but by input. According to 
Glennerster (1993), the public choice approach contended that education spending 
had been pushed up by public sector workers and bureaucrats who had 
manipulated the democratic process to increase rewards for themselves without 
producing gains in output. Michaelsen ( 1989) also took a public choice approach 
to education and says, 'Large, centralized public school districts are very much 
like centrally planned economies'. He insisted that these large systems afforded 
little incentive for the discovery of the knowledge regarding particular facts that 
are necessary for effective and responsive education. His view showed that he 
was an advocate ofboth the market and the traditional education with an emphasis 
on teaching knowledge. 
James Tooley (1994) presented a philosophical 'thought experiment' to 
examine whether there could be any principled objections to markets as such, 
rather than quasi-markets in the real world, with regard to educational provision. 
He invented an abstract market model where the state did not provide schooling, 
which should be provided by private businesses, charities and other agencies in a 
civil society. In the model, as a funding safety-net, the state only provided 
bursaries to those families who could not afford schooling for their children. His 
argument was to deny two main areas of objection to the market model. He 
claimed that it was not sustainable to object to the market model on the grounds 
that education is a 'public good' and therefore, schooling should be provided 
publicly. He also argued that the market model satisfied equality of educational 
opportunity. According to his account, the thought experiment with this extreme 
and abstract model of the market would allow us to distinguish between the 
objections to the markets and those to something else in the actual reforms' 
contingencies 14• In his view, 'very often writers from the political "left" ... move 
14 From a completely different viewpoint, Lawton ( 1992, pp.83-l 05) discussed six theoretically possible 
options in terms of relations between the state and the market in education: (i) a completely free market-
no state intervention; (ii) a market constrained and regulated by the state; (iii) a school system, which is 
wholly private but subsidized or paid for by the state; (iv) a system where schools-state and private-are 
all in competition with each other (mixed economy, quasi-market); (v) state and private schools 
complementing, and co-operating with, each other (mixed economy, planned); and (vi) only state schools 
permitted. His judgment was to exclude options (i), (ii), (iii) and (vi), and his preference was option (v) 
rather than (iv). 
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very quickly from discussion about the "internal markets" (with recall, state 
funding, state regulation and state provision of schooling) to making sweeping 
judgments about "free markets"' (Tooley, 1994, p.149). He concluded, 'The 
question I want to prompt is the wisdom of allowing states into areas of our lives 
where they have no business, where the agencies of civil society can manage very 
well without them. My defence of markets against some criticisms is one step 
forward that nobler aim' (ibid, p.l50). 
Quasi-market rather than privatisation 
Some advocates of the market principle regarded the outright privatisation of 
education as politically infeasible and showed the internal market, that is, the 
quasi-market realised by the education reform as a realistic option to introduce 
market forces into education. Their view, as follows, was that the internal market 
would make education more efficient, responsive, diversified and even equitable 
than the traditional public provision criticised by them as above. 
According to Pirie (1988, Chap.21 & 1992, Chap.1&5), the Conservative 
government privatised the public industries and utilities but did not attempt the 
outright privatisation of human services covering education, health and welfare 
because it was politically infeasible in the UK where these services were very 
firmly established as state responsibilities. Instead, the government introduced 
internal markets in which the consumers continued to enjoy free services but the 
producers were under the pressure to compete for consumer choices. He, like the 
others, argued that the internal market in education had been realised by three 
measures of parental choice, independence of schools from the LEAs and funding 
based on enrolment, which comprised the invisible or virtual voucher. He 
claimed that each of the components was supported by specific interest groups 
such as parents and headteachers and together, constituted a novel system. 
Pirie insisted that internal markets had succeeded in making the human services 
responsive. He (Pirie, 1988, p.232-233 & 1992, p.58) stated that the internal 
market in education provided a greater variety for parents to choose from. On the 
other hand, however, he (Pirie, 1992, p.60) said, 'Schools, which impart 
knowledge and skills in a structured way within an orderly environment are the 
ones which parents have overwhelmingly preferred. The others have to copy this 
25 
formula or risk going under'. As Michaelsen did above, Pirie showed his 
preference for the traditional education with an emphasis on rigorous teaching and 
discipline. Although equity was not a topic that advocates of the market often 
mentioned, Pirie (1988, p.232 & 1992, p.56) criticised the former education 
system before the reform as the one in which the comparatively wealthy had the 
choice of changing residence or choosing a private school. EG West (1970, p.xl-
xli) also criticised the state school system's inequality based on catchment areas 
that largely reflected the different socio-economic backgrounds of the populations. 
When the debate on the market-oriented education reform was proceeding in 
the aftermath of the ERA, one of the most influential works for the promotion of 
choice and school autonomy was John E Chubb and Terry M Moe's (1990) 
empirical research with recommendations based on the research findings although 
their research and recommendations were on the US' system of high schools. As 
very few comprehensive empirical works for the advocacy of market-oriented 
education reform were available in the debate, their work deserves a slightly 
lengthy summary here. Based on the analysis of a large-scale data set of more 
than five hundred schools including both public and private ones, their findings 
were presented in a rather simple flow of logic as follows. First, they claimed to 
have found that school organisation and academic performance were related. 
'High performance schools differ in goals, leadership, personnel, and educational 
practices from low performance schools. Their goals are clearer and more 
academically ambitious, their principals are stronger educational leaders, their 
teachers are more professional and harmonious, their course work is more 
academically rigorous, and their classrooms are more orderly and less 
bureaucratic'.(Chubb and Moe, 1990, p.99) The authors' view was that these 
organisational characteristics were highly interdependent and worked together as 
'organizational syndromes' (ibid, p.139). Secondly, according to their findings, 
school organisation was not only associated with performance, but also was its 
cause. In their analysis, school organisation is the second most significant cause 
of student achievement while student ability is the first and family background, 
third. Thirdly, the authors argued that school autonomy from external influence, 
including administrative and personnel constraints, was the most important 
prerequisite for the effectiveness of school organisation. Fourthly and finally, 
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although bureaucracy is bad for effective school organisation, they concluded that 
'the root of the problem' was not bureaucracy that accompanied democratic 
control by the state and district governments but direct democratic control itself. 
Their conclusion, here, meant that private schools tended to have more effective 
organisation than public schools; In their words, 'When all else is average-
average student achievement and behavior problems, average parent SES 15 and 
school contacts, average school size-schools subject to market control tend to 
have highly effective organizations while schools subject to direct democratic 
control have organizations that are merely average' (ibid, p.181). 
On the basis of their empirical findings mentioned above, the authors proposed 
a new system of public education to be built on school autonomy and parent-
student choice. In such a system, public schools would be legally autonomous, 
and parents and students would be legally empowered to choose their school, 
though the funding of schools would continue to be the responsibility of the 
government (federal, state and district governments) without allowing parents and 
students to supplement public money with personal funds. Therefore, it can be 
said that their proposal was to create quasi-markets in American public education. 
While they denied that their proposed reform would privatise public schools, the 
reform would replace democratic control by market control. This proposal was 
natural for the authors, who claimed, 'Clear academic goals, strong educational 
leadership, professionalized teaching, ambitious academic programs, teamlike 
organizations-these effective school characteristics are promoted much more 
successfully by market control than by direct democratic control. The kind of 
qualities that contemporary school reformers would like public schools to develop, 
private schools have developed without external reform at all. . .. They are 
products of school competition and parental choice'(Chubb and Moe, 1990, 
p.182). The authors predicted that the American educational reform movement 
led by state and federal governments since the 1980s was 'destined to fail' (ibid, 
p.2). In their view, despite the fact that the most fundamental cause of the 
problem was the institutions of direct democratic control, including school boards, 
superintendents and bureaucracies at both state and district governments, the 
15 Socioeconomic status 
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reformers continued to rely on the very institutions in planning and implementing 
their reform initiatives including tougher academic requirements, newly 
introduced tests, raised certification requirements for teachers, merit pay, school-
based management and magnet schools. The authors argued that even when 
choice and autonomy were part of the reform package, the result was 'a more 
decentralized version of the traditional system of democratic control' (ibid, p.216). 
Although the above-mentioned authors' arguments were on the US' education 
system, essential points in their arguments seem to be relevant to the British 
context of the debate on the market-oriented reform. 
Let us now tum to the criticism of the market or the quasi-market in education. 
The educational/sociological criticism of the quasi-market 
Financial efficiency and educational standards 
On the one hand, equality was a topic on which the advocates of the quasi-market 
did not often comfortably talk and critics of the quasi-market often pointed out 
problems. On the other hand, efficiency was a topic on which the advocates 
preferred to talk and the critics defended their position. This review will discuss 
the arguments by the critics of quasi-markets first on efficiency and later on 
equality. Many researchers worked on LMS, taking the issue of efficiency into 
consideration. 
Leonard (1988, p.213) referred to the concern that LMS would make 
headteachers senior administrators who had increased financial responsibilities. 
Cave (1990) argued that it was a common complaint among headteachers that 
they spent an increasing amount of time in management and a decreasing amount 
of time in teaching and contacting their colleagues. Bowe and Ball with Gold 
(1992b) said that the early perception among many senior staff members and the 
head, particularly, in the case study school they had investigated was that LMS 
had offered an opportunity for schools to become self-determined, free from the 
inefficient constraints of the LEA. However, the authors concluded, 'far from 
releasing people from the burdens of bureaucracy, LMS may well increase the 
internal administrative load'. Their argument was that LMS often distracts 
schools from the world of educating students. They pointed out that senior staff 
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had difficulties in finding time to pursue both entrepreneurial management and 
educational issues. 
Bowe and Ball with Gold (1992b) indicated a contradictory effect of LMS on 
micro-situations within each school. In contrast with decentralisation regarding 
the relations between schools and the LEA, each school's decision making 
increasingly rested with a small group of senior staff in a hierarchical 
management style, making many non-senior teachers feel excluded from their 
working situation. 
The authors emphasised constraints on self-management from the budget sum 
decided by the level of the LEA expenditure and the allocation via the formula 
over which schools had no or little control. It was suggested by them that under 
LMS, the schools' flexibility was restrained by lack of financial stability, 
predictability or continuity. They also indicated a difficulty for schools in 
carrying out the cost-benefit analysis of activities. Bash (1991) described the 
negative effects ofLMS with resources, staffing and training being underfunded 
though he acknowledged the value of the increased autonomy of individual 
schools. 
Halpin, Fitz and Power (1993) accepted that GM status and LMS helped some 
school managers to make more effective and efficient use of resources, but they 
questioned whether such financial effectiveness and efficiency contributed to 
educational effectiveness or raising educational standards. 
Bowe and Ball with Gold (1992a), based on their case study, provided an 
intensive analysis of the actual work of quasi-market mechanisms. In their view, 
the quasi-market reform had created much tension between professional and 
enterprise cultures and had not contributed to raising the educational standards. 
The authors insisted that their case study schools worked with many doubts, 
concerns and uncertainties with regard to competition and market. Their 
argument was that, although some schools and some teachers clearly embraced 
the new 'enterprise culture' wholeheartedly and governors from industry, 
consultants and bursars were bringing in the new values, the educational reform 
confronted historical cultures and went through the complex process of adaptation. 
According to the authors, certain aspects of marketing and competition were 
reacted against but others were incorporated into normal practice. However, they 
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stressed a value conflict between business methods and education or the idea of 
comprehensive education. In their view, the relationships between educational 
objectives and marketing could be contradictory. The authors also insisted that 
the wishes of parents would have to be balanced against the professional 
judgements of the teachers. It was implied by them that educational needs were 
not well reconciled with the demands of efficiency. They submitted an example 
of the tension between teachers' professionalism and the market forces in the 
case of mixed ability teaching. Based on the interviews with senior teachers, the 
authors argued that 'the more time and resources devoted to market activities 
mean less time and resources available for direct educational activities'. After 
quoting a head, they said, 'if managing educational expenditure "efficiently" and 
being less "slovenly" are seen as one positive result ofLMS, linking it to the 
market has only added new, unwelcome pressures and given rise to new 
dilemmas'. Adding another comment to mention the time-consuming market 
activities, they continued, 'Here, the market does not raise standards, it threatens 
them .... It does not lead to productive self-evaluation but to an unhealthy 
concern with what the competition is offering, with mimicry, with faddish 
attention-seeking'. According to the authors, earlier agreements between schools 
were being reneged up on in response to competitive pressures. They said, 'The 
market is seen to be destroying a beneficial educational collaboration'. Their 
conclusion was that the market was not value-free, the education quasi-market 
presented difficult ethical issues, and unproblematic relationships between market 
forces and educational standards were far from clear-cut. To summarise, the 
authors focused their critical analysis on competition and marketing rather than 
LMS, and raised a question about market mechanisms' effects on efficiency in 
terms of educational standards. 
The researchers on educational management suggested more optimistic views 
as follows. Marren and Levacic (1992), based on their case study of a county, 
indicated that all the schools including financial losers under the formula, 
welcomed the freedom given by LMS. They also argued that concern regarding 
efficiency had been found in all the schools with the exception of one. Bush, 
Coleman and Glover (1993), based on their research on the first 100 GM schools, 
argued that GM status had been effective in raising the morale of the staff and 
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governors and said, 'heads, staff and governing bodies are well able to decide 
their own priorities and target resources effectively'. 
To summarise, autonomous school management realised by LMS got 
ambivalent responses from many educationalists and sociologists of education 
who were critical of the quasi-market reform. They alleged the negative features 
of the autonomous management such as administrative burden and the dominance 
of economic calculation over educational consideration. Even when they 
admitted the improvement of financial efficiency, they did not confirm that the 
improved financial efficiency contributed to educational effectiveness or 
educational standards. Some of them referred to the tension between professional 
and enterprise cultures, the waste of resources and time on marketing, and the 
destruction of educational collaboration with other schools. Researchers on 
educational management tended to be more optimistic about the possibilities of 
autonomous management. 
Inequality among pupils and hierarchy of schools 
Many educational and sociological researchers expressed their concern about the 
education quasi-market on the grounds of a danger of increased inequality among 
schools and among pupils. In the related context, the researchers often denied that 
the quasi-market reform would raise educational standards. Most of these 
researchers argued that the competition between schools for parental choice would 
be significantly driven by the academic performance as measured by examination 
and test results, and that schools wanted to admit academically more able children. 
They insisted that the mechanism of such a combination of the competition and 
admission would facilitate the formation of a hierarchy of schools and the 
inequality among the pupils in these schools of different hierarchical positions. In 
their view, the above-mentioned hierarchy and inequality were not only 
educational but also social because the examination and test results of pupils were 
correlated to their socio-economic backgrounds. 
Walford (1990) predicted, 'Parental choice within a market of diverse schools 
will ensure that inequality and selection will soon become the major 
characteristics of British education'. His argument was that examination success 
would dominate parental choice without information about 'added value' and that 
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it would lead to a development of pupil selection by schools because examination 
success was related to the ability of the school intake. Edwards and Whitty 
(1992) stated that the value-added analysis was not only very difficult but also not 
necessarily likely to influence parental choice more than the absolute level of 
performance, and doubted 'whether greater choice works inexorably to raise 
educational standards'. 
Coulby (1991) said that the labelling process for children who failed in the 
national test results would lower those children's educational standards and life 
chances. He argued that these children would be from black and white working 
class groups as until now and that the national testing was likely to reinforce 
failure among them. His prediction was that streaming and class groups based on 
attainment levels would be used as strategies to institutionalise the labelling 
process, and that competition between schools would increasingly be conducted 
based on national test results. The author then argued that inner-city and 
predominantly working-class schools with those parents who could not send their 
children anywhere else would suffer from underfunding under the assessment 
arrangements, open enrolment and formula funding while the middle-class parents 
could manage to transfer the children to neighbouring schools. He concluded that 
the reform to bring competition and control had done nothing to raise the 
educational achievement ofthe majority of pupils. Chitty (1992) was also 
straightforward in expressing his anti-market view when he insisted that 
privatisation and the infusion of market values would do nothing to raise the 
educational standards, nor was that their true purpose, and said, 'The free market 
philosophy underpinning the 1988 Act has everything to do with competition and 
unequal treatment'. 
Walford (1990) said, 'The market principle means that those children already 
from disadvantaged homes will probably find themselves at an even greater 
disadvantage, while those already having considerable advantages will probably 
be rewarded with further privileges'. He insisted that schools would become 
more class differentiated and segregated on ethnic lines. Cave ( 1990) also 
referred to the danger that parental choice would reinforce social division and 
create racial segregation. 
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Whitty (1990) argued that little stress on the socio-economic factors in formula 
funding with parental choice to guarantee privileged parents to escape from poor 
schools would result in increasing disadvantages for children in inner-city schools. 
Whitty and Menter (1991) pointed out that the simple funding formulae, 
particularly by using the take-up of free school meals as a measure for special 
educational needs, could have striking effects. Leonard ( 1988, p.217-8) argued 
that schools with their own budget would focus attention on 'the relative costs of 
providing for different kinds of pupils'. According to the author, the most 
attractive to schools would be the large band in the middle because of their cost-
benefit, and the most able would be equally valuable owing to their examination 
successes. 'But pupils with learning difficulties have no such advantages to bring 
with them'. 
Bowe and Ball with Gold (1992a) argued that both the advocates and critics of 
the social markets had probably overestimated the individual schools' intention to 
grow and maximise income, and indicated that all their case study schools had a 
sense of their optimum or preferred size. They referred to a tension between 
quality (or effectiveness) and size mentioned by senior deputies. Edwards and 
Whitty (1992) argued that successful schools might choose not to grow but to 
select whom they teach, mentioning the very high correlations between current 
and prior attainment and between attainment and social background. Whitty and 
Menter ( 1991) argued that the popular schools, denied the opportunity to expand 
beyond their standard number, were faced with the temptation of becoming 
covertly selective. 
Edwards and Whitty (1993) argued that successful schools were likely to 
become more selective rather than to expand, referring to economic reasoning 
'that any surplus of demand over supply enables the producer to choose and may 
thereby disadvantage some consumers, and that educational choice is not marginal 
because the exercise of choice by some may adversely affect the choices available 
to others'. They predicted that such selection would result in a high correlation 
between the socio-economic status and the schools' 'success' or 'failure'. 
Although they admitted that that the situation was not new, they said, 'What is 
new is the policy of deliberately increasing the differences between schools and 
types of schools, in status and in resources'. They expressed their concern 'that 
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far too much is being left to the market' and that 'the outcome is likely to be more 
stratified and unequal educational provision'. They concluded that democratic 
accountability based on public debate and collective responsibility remained a 
necessary complement to choice. 
Walford (1990) predicted a hierarchy of schools based on academic selection 
and fees. In the hierarchy, the Headmasters' and Headmistresses' Conference 
(HMC) and Grammar School Association (GSA) schools would be at the top, GM 
schools and lower-ranking private schools would come next, and other schools 
would be last. Whitty ( 1990) also predicted a more hierarchical system in which 
independent schools would be at the top, CTCs 16, GM schools and voluntary 
aided schools below them, and county maintained schools at the bottom. 
Ball ( 1993) argued that the ideology of the market had failed 'to carry over the 
assumptions about rational self-interest from their critique of"monopoly public 
professionals" into their idealisations of "educational entrepreneurs"'. Based on 
his review on the studies in the UK and the US, he concluded that the market 
reforms in the two countries were bringing about more social stratification and 
differentiation in the education systems through differences in the cultural capital. 
He argued that choice and the market enabled the middle classes to reassert their 
reproduction advantages in education, which had been threatened by the 
increasing social democratic policies. Brown and Lauder (1992) also blamed free 
market education in which, they said, 'education will be increasingly a means to 
translating material capital into cultural capital'. 
However, Fitz, Halpin and Power (1993) indicated that in their case study there 
was no clear class dimension to the frequency with which the parents were able to 
secure a place at the school of their choice, and that there was no evidence of the 
effect of opting-out on this matter. They said, 'there appears to be no inevitable 
correlation between the status of the school, whether LEA, GM, comprehensive or 
16 Fourteen city technology colleges (CTCs) and one city college for the technology of arts (CCTA) were 
opened as publicly funded independent schools with a technological emphasis for inner city children aged 
JJ-18 in the period from 1988 to 1993. The ERA established a specific legal basis for the scheme of 
CTCs and CCT A to encourage the industrial and commercial sponsors although the scheme was possible 
without the ERA's provision. Later, the Labour government allowed these colleges to keep their status 
while providing choices to change their status into that ofthe maintained school or Academy, which was a 
similar type of independent school, with a focus on one or more subject areas, initiated by the Labour 
government. There are twelve CTCs and one CCT A as of March 2006. 
34 
selective, and its social class composition. Nor are there any statistically 
significant shifts in the social class composition since opting-out'. 
Some critics of the market-oriented reform referred to the existent inequality in 
the previous system before the reform, though they blamed the reform for 
increasing the inequality. Walford (1990) indicated that 'the educational system, 
which existed prior to the 1988 Education Reform Act, was far from offering 
equality of opportunity'. According to the author, catchment areas ensured each 
school to have a relatively homogeneous social class intake and that the Solihull 
LEA's proposal to reintroduce selection was effectively rejected by middle-class 
parents in the south of the borough who feared a risk of not being chosen for the 
selective schools. Edwards, Fitz and Whitty (1989) pointed out the under-
representation of working-class children in grammar schools, in the Assisted 
Places Scheme 17 and, 'even more disconcertingly, in the upper ability bands of 
comprehensive schools'. Although Whitty and Menter (1991) said that the 
predominantly working-class and black populations had never gained an equitable 
share of educational resources under the past policies, they insisted that the 
Education Reform Act was likely to increase inequalities rather than challenge 
them. They expressed their preference for planning approaches as compared to 
market approaches in saying, 'Any government genuinely committed to social 
justice would then have to find new ways of planning the education system so that 
it served the needs of the least advantaged members of society rather than merely 
those well-placed to play the market'. 
Edwards and Whitty (1992) considered the view that the market would diffuse 
the choice reserved for the wealthy and articulate and realise distributive justice, 
referring to the contradictory empirical researches in the US and the UK both to 
confirm and to deny that the competence of choosing schools 'wisely' was 
distributed along social class lines, and concluded that equality of choice had to 
be doubted where demand so exceeded supply that schools could choose their 
intakes. Although they stated that traditional social democratic approaches, which 
favour the idea of a common school would have to find ways of responding to the 
17 The Assisted Places Scheme was created by the 1980 Education Act, whereby the central government paid 
part or all of the tuition fees, on a means-tested basis, for children who had been in maintained schools to 
attend selected independent day schools. Later, the 1997 Education (Schools) Act, the first education act 
introduced by the Labour government, abolished the scheme. 
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changes in contemporary societies, they believed that giving priorities to 
individual rights might provide additional escape routes for some of the relatively 
advantaged while undermining the reform of those schools, which the least 
advantaged attended. 
The traditional academic model being predominant in the quasi-market 
Most ofthe critics of the quasi-market, as mentioned above, argued that the 
competition between schools for parental choice in the reformed system would be 
significantly driven by examination and test results. Some of the critics referred 
to the traditional academic model of education, and they insisted that the model 
would be predominant in the quasi-market system as much as or more than in the 
previous system. In their view, the quasi-market would not result in a positive 
diversity of schools, which were different but equal, but result in a hierarchy of 
schools whose degree of success was measured by examination and test results. 
They supposed that the hierarchy of schools was, as stated above, accompanied by 
the social inequality among pupils. 
The focus here in the literature review is not on the inequality among pupils but 
upon schools' responses to the market pressure expressed as parental choice. One 
response could be, as stated above, the movement of their admission towards 
covert selection. Another response could be regarding the nature of their 
educational practices. Some researchers expressed their concern that the quasi-
market would enhance more examination/test-oriented education and thereby 
tempt schools to concentrate on measurable knowledge and skills and impoverish 
unmeasurable aspects of education. 
Edwards and Whitty (1992) mentioned that the Right, including the neo-liberal 
and neo-conservative, associated greater choices not only with more differentiated 
provision but also with the defence of traditional academic standards, and judged 
that the market-oriented reform would continue the long history of hierarchy in 
English education rather than promoting the positive diversity with the 
alternatives as being different but equal. They referred to the conventional 
sociological view that the parity of esteem was unlikely between schools, which 
were related to the access to different levels in higher education and different 
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segments of the labour market, and also referred to the empirical researches on 
American and British education. 
Edwards and Whitty (1993) furthered their research on 'diversity or hierarchy', 
and argued that a 'less tangible but hardly less powerful constraint on diversity' 
than the National Curriculum was 'the continuing predominance of a traditional 
academic model of "good" secondary education'. In contrast with the market 
advocates' argument that a public monopoly imposed uniformity or 'majoritarian' 
constraint, the authors indicated that the leading private schools in England were 
less socially diverse and more academically homogeneous than state schools. 
They pointed out that their campaigning in defence of the traditional academic 
standards was also campaigning to keep their position in the market. Referring to 
the Assisted Places Scheme as an example of the dominance of the English 
traditional academic model, they insisted that the scheme had resulted in boosting 
those private schools' examination results that were vital to their market appeal. 
The authors considered the TVEI 18 and CTCs as the Government's efforts to 
sponsor alternative versions for diversity. Their argument was that the TVEI 'ran 
up against the long English tradition' and 'so failed to establish its suitability for 
the "top fifteen percent" of the ability range'. They indicated that the motives for 
choosing CTCs were conspicuous and said, 'More influential seemed to be a 
sense of CTCs as being selective schools, generally better resourced, and likely to 
uphold traditional values and discipline'. In their view, the connotations of 
vocationalism were of 'second best' provision. They pointed out that the 'able' 
students were 'worth' more than the others in the emerging market conditions and 
that schools claiming good academic results in league tables and good future 
chances to higher education and to privileged occupations were likely to be over-
chosen and in short supply in the market. 
Whitty and Menter (1991) implied that GM schools would be pursuing a 
traditional secondary schooling image with such characteristics as being selective, 
voluntary and single-sex. They concluded that the reform would not produce the 
18 The Technical and Vocational Education Initiative (TVEI) was a scheme in which LEAs, some GM 
schools and colleges of further education participated to receive grants for technical and vocational 
education programmes for 14-18-year-olds. The TVEI was introduced in 1983 as pilot projects, and was 
extended in 1987 to cover the whole country. However, it was phased out, and its funding finally ceased 
in 1997. 
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positive diversity but would generate greater differentiation between schools on a 
linear scale of quality and esteem. 
Walford (1990) gave great importance to the role of examinations and tests in 
the new system of market principle. He argued that choices between schools had 
to be made on a restricted range of evidence such as numerical data, and said, 
'This can lead to a greater concentration on examination results at the expense of 
less quantifiable social and personal development issue'. Murphy (1990) also 
presented concern that simple information through national testing on a restricted 
set of basic skills to represent a market indicator could create both confusion 
among users and a distortion of good practice in schools. Cave (1990) seemed to 
have concerns about the means to measure educational standards by a narrow 
range of academic achievement and by examination success while education was 
a process the outcomes of which were difficult to measure. Coulby (1991) 
predicted that under the competitive pressures headteachers and teachers were 
likely to prioritise those subjects which were tested and focus their lessons on the 
answers which would be required in the tests, and that the curriculum could be 
impoverished in terms of its breadth. 
Bowe and Ball with Gold (1992a) showed an ambivalent criticism of the quasi-
market system. On the one hand, they criticised the rhetoric of the market 
principle as oversimplifying in spite of the complexity of local quasi-markets with 
specific conditions and histories. The authors pointed out the continuity from the 
past as well as the impact of open enrolment and formula funding. Their 
emphasis was on the importance of proximity in parental choice and the diversity 
and complexity of the choice. On the other hand, they indicated that competitive 
relationships in terms of academic performance had been enforced, and regarded 
it as a negative impact. Describing the marketing endeavours made by their case 
study schools, the authors noticed that reputation could be both made and lost. It 
could be seen that the senior staff in their study were enough aware of the impact 
of parental choice reinforced by open enrolment and formula funding. They 
quoted a senior deputy's saying that neighbouring schools were introducing 
streaming and top ability sets, and that the school of the deputy itself established 
an Academic Attainment Monitoring Group to monitor the 28 most able students 
to stop losing 'the aspiring middle class stereotypes'. According to the authors, 
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one effect of competition was that schools would become far more sensitive to 
parental concerns and especially to academic performance. Referring to 
Bourdieu's metaphor, they said, 'schools are competing to attract greater cultural 
capital hoping for higher yielding returns'. They raised the questions regarding 
who benefited and what was measured ('value added' was not measured) in 
examination league tables. The authors referred to a teacher's concern about the 
possibility that examination results might control the whole exercise of schools. 
To sum up the above arguments, these critics of the market-oriented reform 
predicted that competition in the quasi-market would encourage schools to 
concentrate on exam-oriented teaching, and enhance the traditional academic 
model of education, reinforcing the hierarchical differentiation between schools 
based on their examination results and their ability to attract academically able 
children often from the relatively privileged backgrounds 
The complexity of parental choice 
While the above-mentioned arguments seemed to assume that parental choice 
rested primarily on schools' academic performances measured in terms of exam 
and test results, the empirical studies of parental choice revealed both the 
complexity of choice and the methodological difficulty in finding real motives of 
choice. 
Johnson (1990) presented a comprehensive summary of the major studies of 
parental choice not only in state schooling but also in private schooling. Her 
review of the studies in state schooling before the market-oriented reform 
confirmed the complexity of parents' reasons for choosing their children's schools. 
It also revealed considerable differences in the findings between the studies with 
different approaches and methodological difficulties in researches on such 
complex actions. She said, 'Research into the exercise of choice in the 
maintained sector has so far done no more than scratch the surface'. The 
Edinburgh study claimed to have found that the majority of parents chose their 
child's school at both primary and secondary stages from a humanistic or pastoral 
perspective than a technological or academic perspective. It echoed Elliott's 
study which claimed that 'process' rather than 'product' criteria were more 
important to the parental choice of secondary schools. The NFER study, however, 
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indicated that a bare majority of parents listed an academic or product reason to be 
as important to their choice of secondary school though about ninety percent of 
the parents included process reasons. Johnson pointed out that parents tended to 
rate highly the personal happiness of their child, but she naturally raised a 
question regarding what exactly parents meant by 'happiness'. In short, her 
review of those studies in state schooling showed that the features of parental 
choice were not so simple as a single-minded determination to concentrate on 
academic criteria. 
The author's review of the studies in private schooling seemed to offer a less 
complicated situation in which parental choice seemed more purposeful and gave 
more importance to such aspects as academic performance and discipline. 
Although she indicated that the studies concerning private schooling made contact 
with 'educational families', she argued that the social origins and the lifestyles of 
these families were varied and that it might therefore provide some evidence that 
the desire to make choices was not confined to a particular social class. The 
author insisted that 'the motivation or lack of motivation to make choices might 
be linked to local educational circumstances rather than social class', quoting a 
finding by Whitty, Fitz and Edwards (1989) that the willingness to express a 
choice seemed to increase with the scope of the choice available. Her argument 
was that, if parents felt that they had a genuine choice, they would put time and 
effort into making that choice. She also argued that, if the choice was successful, 
family commitment to the school of choice seemed high. According to the author, 
a heightened atmosphere of choice might lead parents to evaluate schools on the 
basis of examination results in the future, along with many of the other criteria, 
quoting a finding by Edwards, Fitz and Whitty (1989) that, where variety was 
available, not only was parents' sense of choice generally increased but they also 
began to set more store by particular criteria such as high-quality academic 
teaching. 
In the book that detailed the results of the comprehensive research work, known 
as the Edinburgh study, on parental choice in Scotland that was enabled much 
earlier than in England and Wales by the Education (Scotland) Act 1981, the 
authors (Michael Adler, Alison Petch and Jack Tweedie, 1989) presented not only 
their often quoted finding of an apparent non-significance of educational 
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outcomes or teaching quality for parental choice in parents' own accounts, but 
also another finding, seemingly inconsistent with the former finding, of a 
migration of pupils from secondary schools with poorer examination results and 
lower staying-on rates to those with better examination results and higher staying-
on rates. In the 1980s, actual admissions into secondary schools in both the 
Scottish cities of Bums and Maxton showed 'the emergence of a number of highly 
sought-after and a number of very unpopular secondary schools' (ibid, p.208). 
Most of the former schools were in mixed inner-city areas, and most of the latter 
schools were located in areas of the least prosperous housing. According to their 
data, parents across the entire social class spectrum and not merely middle class 
minority made placement requests. The inner-city, previously selective schools 
were better situated to attract pupils from adjacent schools than were the suburban 
schools with more affluent catchment areas. The result was 'the migration of 
pupils from "less effective" to "more effective" secondary schools, i.e. from 
schools in which attainment measures are lower to schools with similar social 
class intakes in which attainment measures are higher' (ibid, p.200). The authors 
continued, 'It does not, of course, follow from this that parents chose to send their 
children to these schools because they were more effective. . .. The reasons 
parents gave for rejecting their local catchment-area school (where they did so) 
and for choosing the school which their child attended, referred most frequently to 
concerns with where the child would be happiest, to the child's own preferences, 
and to the state of discipline at the school. In fact, parents made very few 
references to examination results, other educational outcomes, or the quality or 
content of what was provided at the schools in question. If parents were aware of 
an instrumental connection between happiness, their child's preferences and 
discipline on the one hand and school effectiveness on the other, they were most 
reluctant to express it' (ibid, p.201). A fuller interpretation of the apparent 
contradiction between the individual parents' accounts of their choice of school 
and the aggregate data of the actual moves between schools was not available in 
the authors' writing. 
Regarding the parental choice in England, an empirical study by Anne West, 
Miriam David, Jean Hailes, Jane Ribbens and Audrey Hind (1993) indicated 
possible examples of greater importance being placed on academic performance 
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by parents in a heightened atmosphere of choice. During the academic year 
1991-92, they carried out interviews with 70 parents of Year 6 children in London 
Boroughs of Camden and Wandsworth. The results showed that the three 'P's, 
consisting of performance or academic results, pleasant atmosphere/ethos, and 
proximity to home, were the most frequently mentioned factors in choice of 
secondary school (West, David, Hailes, Ribbens and Hind, 1993, p.44). Among 
the factors spontaneously mentioned as important in the choice of school, good 
academic results (mentioned by 34% of the parents), atmosphere/ethos (31 %), and 
near-to-home location (26%) were the top three factors (ibid, pp.33--4). Asked an 
open-ended question regarding what they liked about their preferred school, 41% 
of the parents mentioned subjects/facilities, 27% atmosphere/ethos, and 27% 
academic results, which were the three most common categories of their responses 
(ibid, p.l8). As the most important reason for their choice of secondary school, 
27% of the parents gave academic record/good education, 20% the child's 
wishes/happiness, and 14% location, that is to say, the three reasons given most 
frequently (ibid, p.36). Asked what sort of information they were looking for 
about secondary schools, 50% of the parents spontaneously mentioned academic 
side/subjects offered, 33% A level results, 30% GCSE results, 30% general 
atmosphere/feel, 24% specific subjects, and 21% discipline/behaviour/bullying, 
which were the types of information mentioned by more than 20% of the parents 
(ibid, pp.24-5). 
Edwards and Whitty (1992 & 1993) referred to various empirical studies. The 
results of those surveys were far from confirming that the academic performance 
of a school was a single dominant factor of parental choice, but showed 
complexity and indecisiveness. Some surveys confirmed that most parents 
declared themselves as satisfied with the local school while a small minority of 
parents actively considered several alternative schools. The authors claimed that 
proximity remained a very significant factor not only because of the convenience 
but also because of the feeling of continuity and the child's wish to move with 
his/her friends. They (1992) said, 'Parents own criteria also range far beyond 
strategic calculations about their future life chances'. Their argument ( 1993) was 
that more general, less utilitarian judgements about school ethos and about the 
child's happiness appeared prominently. However, the same authors (Edwards 
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and Whitty, 1993) also said decisively, 'We see the traditional academic model of 
secondary education as retaining its market dominance'. These seemingly 
contradictory statements were not unique to these authors. 
For example, Ball (1993) said, 'All the evidence in the UK from parental 
choice research indicates a distinct mismatch between the Government's imposed 
indicators and the assumption of market theorists, and parents' actual preferences', 
while he insisted that parental choice was increasing the inequality between 
classes as described above. 
All the above-mentioned literature review in this chapter was carried out in 
order to set the stage for the design of the empirical study, which was conducted 
in 1994/5. The reviewed literature was available by that time. The literature 
appearing in the next chapter is of the same nature. The key issues raised here 
will be re-examined with the recent literature available in 2000s towards the end 
of this thesis in Part V in order to demonstrate that the relevance of this research 
has not diminished, and that the research findings have significant implications for 
the education system at the time of writing this thesis. 
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Chapter 3 School Strategies as a Key Concept 
Inconsistency in both sides' arguments 
As explicated in the last chapter, now there seems to be an interesting 
inconsistency between the findings of the researches on parental choice and the 
critical arguments about the quasi-market. On the one hand, it is said that parental 
choice is complex, and that a humanistic perspective seems more predominant 
than academic performance or, at least, the latter is far from a single dominant 
factor. On the other hand, most of the critics of the quasi-market argue that the 
competition between schools for parental choice will be significantly driven by 
the academic performance as measured by examination and test results, and that 
the competition will result in the formation of a hierarchy of schools and an 
increase in the inequality among the pupils. They assume that the traditional 
academic model of education will be predominant in the quasi-market. 
More interestingly, a similar inconsistency can also be seen in the arguments by 
the advocates of the quasi-market. On the one hand, they emphasise the freedom 
of parental choice, and insist that the quasi-market provides a diversity of schools 
for parents to choose between. On the other hand, some of them expect that 
parents prefer the traditional academic type of schools with rigorous teaching and 
discipline. 
Moreover, the same people on both sides often make such inconsistent 
statements. 
Choice and diversity versus inequality and hierarchy 
As indicated above, there seems to be a paradoxical inconsistency in both the 
arguments by the advocates of the quasi-market and those by its critics. 
The former arguments, on the one hand, emphasise the complexity of parental 
choice. On the other hand, these arguments predict that school competition for 
parental choice will be driven by exam results and bring about a hierarchy of 
schools and an increase in the inequality among pupils. The latter arguments, on 
the one hand, emphasise the freedom of parental choice and the diversity of 
schools. However, on the other hand, some of them expect that the traditional 
academic model will be predominant. 
44 
Both the advocates and the critics seem illogical in making such inconsistent 
arguments as mentioned above. Let us devote a little space below to examining 
why there is such an inconsistency in both sides. 
Going back to the traditional academic schooling is a theme of neo-
conservative thought, and choice and diversity in the market is that of neo-liberal 
one. Thus, the advocates of the quasi-market reform containing both the neo-
conservative and neo-liberal elements are obliged to assert the two themes 
contradicting each other. On the one hand, the advocates expect parental choice 
to be increasingly driven by academic performance as measured by performance 
or league tables and the competition between schools for the academic-oriented 
parental choice to raise the educational standards. On the other hand, they assert 
that the quasi-market system will enhance the freedom of parental choice and the 
positive diversity of schools. 
Then, the critics of the quasi-market feel obliged to deny both the above-
mentioned arguments. On the one hand, they emphasise the complexity of 
parental choice to deny the mechanism of raising educational standards though 
they may regard the standards in the advocates' usage as having a narrow sense. 
On the other hand, they predict the hierarchy of schools with the inequality among 
pupils to deny the positive diversity. 
The predominance of the academic model, despite the complexity in parental 
choice 
Although the arguments by the advocates of the education quasi-market are 
seemingly contrary to those by the critics, there is a paradoxical similarity in both 
sides' inconsistency as mentioned above. Both of them seem to assume that the 
traditional academic model will be predominant in the quasi-market while 
parental choice is complex and/or diverse. The apparently illogical arguments by 
both sides can be logically explained by introducing the concept of 'school 
strategy' as mentioned below, which mediates the schooling system's response to 
parental choice. 
Providers' strategies and consumers' choices 
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Why does the traditional academic model seem so predominant while parental 
choice seems so complicated? This question might be a key to the constructive 
discussion on the apparent inconsistency found in both the advocates and the 
critics ofthe quasi-market. 
Whether or not schools pursue the traditional academic model is influenced by 
parental choice not directly but through the schools' strategies. In more general 
terms, schools formulate their strategies in response to the quasi-market, and 
parental choice influences schools' practices through its influence on their 
strategies. Therefore, we need to consider the strategies of schools as 'providers' 
in response to the market pressures expressed by parental choices as the voices of 
'consumers' and their readings of their competitors' strategies. School strategies 
in the quasi-market are the focus of this research, and whether or not these 
strategies seek to pursue the traditional academic model will be examined later in 
this chapter. 
School strategies 
I define strategies of a school as plans that the school management team headed 
by the headteacher adopts and implements in the quasi-market education system. 
The management team usually includes the deputies and other senior teachers. 
School strategies are institutional strategies at management level, as opposed to 
pedagogic practices at classroom level, but include strategies in pedagogic fields 
such as teaching, assessment, reporting and discipline as well as those in 
managerial fields such as organisation, staffing and marketing. These strategies 
are not necessarily written down or publicised as such. Therefore, this research 
aims to identify school strategies in the internal structures of managerial discourse. 
Here, the term 'strategy' is used in accordance with the customary usage in the 
management literature. The following is a review of the management literature 
that was available by the time the empirical work was carried out in 1994/5. 
According to James Brian Quinn ( 1980, p. 7), 'A strategy is the pattern or plan 
that integrates an organization's major goals, policies, and action sequences into a 
cohesive whole' (Original emphases). The concept of strategy developed in 
theories of corporate management, without any major transformation, was applied 
to school management. For example, Brian Fidler (1989, pp.20-1), based on 
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Quinn's definition of strategy, described 'strategic plan for the school' as 'the 
plan, which integrates all the actions of the school'. 'Strategic Planning' was 
defined, by John West-Burnham (1994, p.84), as 'A process operating in an 
extended time-frame (three to five years), which translates vision and values into 
significant, measurable and practical outcomes'. Adapting John Bryson's 
approach to strategic planning for public and non-profit organisations (Bryson, 
1988), Brian Caldwell and Jim Spinks (1992, pp.92-104) presented a detailed 
account of a process for strategic planning for schools. The process included the 
stage of' generating a list of strategic issues, in order of priority, on the basis of 
strengths, limitations, opportunities and threats' and that of 'formulating strategies 
for action for each of the strategic issues' (Caldwell and Spinks, 1992, p.93). 
Strategic issues might arise from changes in 'context' (political, economic, 
demographic, etc.), 'curriculum' (including approaches to teaching and learning, 
etc.) and 'community' (including matters related to competitors and collaborators) 
(Caldwell and Spinks, 1992, p.102). 
In England and Wales, before the Education Reform Act 1988, the planning 
role in primary and secondary education was largely assumed by LEAs, and 
schools have little power or responsibility in planning for their own future. 
Strategic management became an important issue just as the local management of 
schools was introduced together with other elements of the quasi-market reform 
including parental choice and league tables. As early as 1989, Fidler declared, 
'Schools now more than ever will be in a position where they will be largely 
responsible for their own destiny. . .. Thus, strategic management at school level 
will be crucial and require new ways of thinking and acting' (Fidler, 1989, p.20). 
The school-based planning in England Wales was disseminated through the 
'school development plan' (SDP) approach. Being initially promoted by the then 
Department of Education and Science (DES)/Department for Education (DFE) 
and later required in the inspection process by the Office for Standards in 
Education (Ofsted), most schools made their SDP. 
However, whether the SDPs were strategic was in question. Corrie Giles 
(1995), on the basis ofhis empirical research on some hundred experienced 
teachers enrolled on a university postgraduate course, argued that within the 
sample schools, planning seemed 'ad hoc, with little strategic planning taking 
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place' (p.6). The survey results revealed little link between resource allocation 
and priorities in the SDP (70% answered that resources were not allocated to clear 
costed priorities identified in the SDP) and weakness in the systematic evaluation 
of progress (67% answered that schools lacked a systematic approach to 
monitoring and evaluating progress) (p.6). 
In the mainstream of management theory, Henry Mintzberg (1994) already 
declared the fall of strategic planning. In his judgement, the term 'strategic 
planning' was an oxymoron because strategy formation was synthesis while 
planning was analysis. Furthermore, as early as 1980, Quinn (1980) reached a 
paradoxical finding that 'formal planning systems rarely formulated a 
corporation's central strategy' (p.38) although the corporate planning systems 
contributed to the implementation of strategic changes and decisions including 
budgeting, evaluation and information sharing. Formal planning frequently 
results 'primarily in either formless wordy statements of principle or detailed 
budgetary plans, neither of which meets the most basic criteria-like 
concentration of forces, concessions of positions, and planned flexibility-that 
effective strategies demand' (p.154). In his view, one of the disturbing tendencies 
developed in formal planning within major enterprises is that 'planning activities 
in such enterprises often become bureaucratized, rigid, and costly paper-shuffling 
exercises divorced from actual decision processes' (p.ix). 
While a rather optimistic, and sometimes simplistic, endorsement of strategic 
planning and other business-sector approaches seemed to be a dominant discourse 
in the school management literature, the above-mentioned and other developments 
in the corporate management literature were not fully introduced. 
In short, the above-mentioned review demonstrating the elusive nature of 
strategy, of which management theorists had different understandings, suggested 
that the literature of school management imported the basic theories and concepts 
of strategy, without major modifications and with some immaturity in both theory 
and practice, from that of corporate management, and pointed out that it was too 
na"ive to regard some written documents-like school development plans-as 
strategies. The methodological strategy adopted in this research, that is, the 
analysis ofthe discourses in the interviews with the headteachers of the case 
schools as being discussed in detail in the chapter for methodology, is justifiable 
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in the context of the management literature. In the search for strategies, entities 
elusive enough as discussed above, this methodological strategy is at least as good 
as, in my judgement, as discussed later in Chapter 5 better than, the analysis of 
written information in school development plans and other documents. 
Now, we should go back to the issue of the orientation of school strategies in 
the quasi-market education system. 
Strategies oriented towards the academic model 
Why should we assume that the quasi-market system encourages schools to adopt 
and implement strategies oriented towards the traditional academic model? We 
now need a tentative answer to this question in order to establish the theoretical 
framework for this research. The tentative answer or reasoning is as follows. 
Even if parental choice in general is a complex issue, what is important for a 
school is to secure enough choices by floating consumers or parents of the 
shopping-around type in addition to core families who choose the school for such 
reasons as proximity, siblings and friends. Parents who are committed to sending 
their children to their local school will do so anyway. In other words, schools 
need to target parents who are motivated to choose their child's school for 
educational reasons. 
However, choosing a school for educational reasons does not necessarily mean 
favouring the traditional academic model of education. As stated in Chapter 2, 
the studies of parental choice present humanistic or pastoral reasons such as the 
happiness of the child as well as utilitarian or academic reasons such as 
examination results. Therefore, the progressive or child-centred model of 
education can be attractive to some choosy parents who are highly motivated 
towards education. Nevertheless, at least a part of the choosy parents or floating 
consumers are those who are determined to choose their child's school for such 
reasons as academic performance and discipline. The traditional academic model 
is their choice. 
Then, why should we assume that school strategies are oriented more towards 
the traditional academic model than towards the progressive or child-centred 
model? This is because the quasi-market reform was designed to promote the 
academic model. As stated in Chapter 1, the results of examinations and tests 
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based on the common curriculum are expected to provide parents with important 
information on the performances of schools from which they choose. The 
publication of performance tables or league tables has such a policy objective. 
This means that the examination and test results constitute a linear scale on which 
the schools are positioned and compete with one another for higher positions. 
With this mechanism for performance measurement, the reformed education 
system provides more explicit information on the schools' academic performances 
than the previous system. The academic model focuses on such measurable 
performances or results while the progressive model places the emphasis on 
learning processes, which cannot be easily measured and compared. Therefore, 
the education reform has enhanced the availability and explicitness of information 
that is useful for some parents who are attracted to the academic model that is 
supposed to be successful in raising the examination and test results. On the other 
hand, with regard to other parents who are attracted to the progressive model, the 
reform has not helped them to find useful information on schools. All this means 
that the schools are encouraged to pay attention to those parents who are attracted 
to the academic model, which is supposed to raise the examination and test results. 
It is reasonable that such parents become a prime target group for school 
strategies to secure a sufficient number of pupils. 
Furthermore, what matters for a school is not just the number of its intake. 
Performing well in league tables not only contributes to increasing or maintaining 
the numbers of applications and admissions, but also is in itself important for the 
perception of the school's social status in the local community and the pride of the 
staff and governors. The pride of the staff seems to be a mixture of professional 
pride in their performance and pride in the status of their school. Performance 
tables provide a linear scale on which schools are positioned, and their position on 
the scale is regarded as an indicator of their status. It is too naive to regard only 
the economic reasons as motives of the providers in the quasi-market. Their 
economic incentives are limited by some conditions of the quasi-market. The 
number of emolment is inevitably limited by the school's physical capacity when 
enough capital grants are not available. More importantly, if the managerial staff 
and governors of an oversubscribed school feel that its viability is secured, they 
may not be motivated to expand the school. The expansion will not produce 
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significant economic benefits because schools are non-profit-making 
organisations and teachers' salaries are basically prescribed by law. With or 
without being concerned about the number of its intake, it is understandable for a 
school to have strategies to raise its status indicated in league tables. It is 
reasonable that such strategies are oriented towards the traditional academic 
model that is supposed to focus on and be successful in raising the examination 
and test results. 
The academic ability and discipline of the intake is important for the school's 
apparent performance in these tables. The quality of input heavily influences the 
quality of output. As some researchers fear, some schools may become rather 
interested in overt or covert selection to raise the apparent academic performance. 
Furthermore, many people worry that the competitive system is encouraging 
schools to exclude more children with behaviour problems and discouraging some 
schools from admitting children with special educational needs. As stated in 
Chapter 2, Johnson (1990) presents a review of the studies of parental choice in 
private schooling, and the review seems to offer a less complicated feature in 
which parental choice is more purposeful, giving more importance to such aspects 
as academic performance and discipline. According to her, private schools' 
customers are often from educational families that consist of parents and children 
who are highly motivated towards education and perhaps, with much 'cultural 
capital'. She recognises that a majority of these families are from middle-class 
backgrounds. Such families have crucial significance for the strategies of state 
schools to survive and succeed in the quasi-market although state schools 
generally provide their education to a wider variety of parents and children than 
private schools. The quasi-market prompts schools to seek to attract those 
families who seem to have higher motivation and potential for academic success. 
The traditional academic model of education seems attractive to a substantial part 
ofthese families. In short, it seems reasonable to assume that the quasi-market 
presses schools to pursue strategies oriented towards the academic model in order 
to secure their intake of good quality in terms of the potential for higher 
performances in league tables. 
The above reasoning assumes that the motives of school strategies in the quasi-
market are not only economic but also social. Schools aim for a good or better 
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position in league tables not only to secure a large enough number of intake for 
their economic viability or prosperity but also to keep or improve their perceived 
status for their social pride. To raise the examination and test results, schools may 
adopt strategies oriented towards the traditional academic model, which is 
supposed to focus on academic performance, and which is attractive to at least 
some of those families who have the potential for contributing to good or better 
academic results. Although not all schools pursue the model and not all parents 
favour the model, the quasi-market system with performance measurement tends 
to encourage schools to adopt and implement strategies oriented towards the 
academic model. For parents who are attracted to the model, choosing a school 
for their child is not making a choice between 'different but equal' ones but trying 
to get a place at a school as good as possible. For the schools that pursue the 
model, they compete for higher positions on a linear scale rather than for unique 
positions on diverse scales. These schools' perceptions of the criterion for the 
parents judging the quality of a school is basically the same as that for the schools 
measuring their position, that is, the academic performance. What is important 
here is that the academic performance is the performance of consumers (pupils) 
rather than that of providers (schools) in a strict sense. The academic 
performances of pupils affect their future life chances. In other words, education 
has the function of social selection as well as that of socialisation, and the 
academic performance is the criterion for the selection. The linear hierarchical 
nature of school positions as mentioned above reflects that of social stratification. 
The hierarchical nature itself is not economic but social, and existed in the 
previous system before the quasi-market reform. However, it seems to be the case 
that the quasi-market tends to encourage schools to compete for better positions 
on the hierarchy, which has become more explicit with such information as 
performance tables. The important question here is whether school strategies are 
really responding to the competition with each other for more explicitly indicated 
positions on the hierarchical scale. 
Not only the economic but also the sociological analyses reviewed in Chapter 2 
do not seem to emphasise enough the above-mentioned social motives of schools 
and the social nature of the schools' hierarchy in the education quasi-market. 
Both the advocates and critics of the quasi-market tend to focus their arguments 
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on the operation of economic market mechanisms-the former praising its 
benefits and the latter denouncing its harmful effects. We need to be aware that 
everything in the quasi-market is not necessarily the product of market 
mechanisms, and that the motives of school strategies are social as well as 
economic. 
Implications of school strategies for inequality, efficiency and standards 
If school strategies tend to be oriented towards the traditional academic model of 
education, these strategies will have significant implications for social inequality, 
financial efficiency and educational standards, which are the focal points of the 
controversy over the quasi-market system of schooling. Based on the literature 
review, the following are the preliminary discussions on these implications. 
Social inequality 
With regard to the issue of social inequality, the question is whether or not the 
inequality among pupils from different socio-economic backgrounds will be more 
in the quasi-market than in the previous system before the quasi-market reform. 
The danger of increased social inequality is an issue which the critics of the quasi-
market refer to most often. Even some economic researches regard it as the most 
important defect. 
It is quite natural that Ball (1993) blames 'market theorists' for applying double 
standards. As argued by him, the advocates of the market often avoid applying 
critical consideration to markets, which they apply to public monopolies. 
However, the critics of the market are often more or less to blame for the same 
tendency. The critics have presented examples of inequality and mechanisms of 
generating inequality in the quasi-market system of education, but they have not 
succeeded in fully comparing the inequality in the quasi-market system with that 
in the previous system. It would be unfair not to compare the reformed system 
with the previous system or any other real system but with a fictitious ideal 
system (See LeGrand and Bartlett (1993b)). 
There are a few questions to be answered when concern about the increased 
inequality in the quasi-market is addressed. The first question is whether or not, 
as discussed above, the quasi-market is strengthening the hierarchy of schools 
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with different positions 'on a linear scale of quality and esteem' (Whitty and 
Menter (1991)). We should not forget that the education system before the quasi-
market reform was not free from the hierarchies of schools. As mentioned by 
Edwards and Whitty (1992), the education system in England has a long history of 
the hierarchy of schools. Therefore, the hierarchy should not be regarded as 
unique to the quasi-market system. The point is whether or not the quasi-market 
system is more hierarchical than the previous system. In this regard, it might be 
the case that the quasi-market enhances 'a linear scale of quality and esteem' 
(Whitty and Menter (1991)) if school strategies tend to be oriented towards the 
traditional academic model of education. Even in that case, however, whether the 
hierarchy of schools with different positions on such a scale is stable or unstable 
is a different question as the schools compete to improve their own position. 
Nonetheless, ifthe quasi-market system enhances such a hierarchical scale, it will 
have a significant implication for the debate on the issue of school hierarchies in 
the quasi-markets. 
The second question is whether the correlations between the socio-economic 
backgrounds of pupils and the hierarchical positions of schools are stronger in the 
quasi-market system than in the previous system. The previous system had long 
preserved social inequality. The non-market administrative system of admission 
including the catchment areas had its own mechanism of generating social 
inequality on the basis of different populations in different areas. It is not 
irrational to consider the possibility that the mobility enhanced by parental choice 
may contribute to decreasing the projected inequality. At the same time, we 
should also pay attention to the argument that more and more schools have been 
tempted to covert selection and that more selection can lead to more inequality 
between the socio-economic groups. If school strategies tend to be oriented 
towards the traditional academic model of education, these strategies will have a 
potential implication for this second question as well. The implication depends on 
whether or not such strategies have a particular appeal to certain socio-economic 
groups as some researchers have argued as mentioned above. These issues should 
be addressed empirically. 
Financial efficiency 
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Economic researchers tend to be cautious about drawing conclusions from their 
studies on the educational quasi-market. As mentioned in the previous chapter, 
there has not been enough direct proof of the improved efficiency in schools for 
the researchers to provide a decisive conclusion on the issue of efficiency in the 
education quasi-market. Nevertheless, they often seem positive or at least not 
negative to the possibility that the quasi-market will improve the efficiency in 
schools. 
Many educational and sociological researchers seem reluctant to admit that the 
quasi-market will improve efficiency though they have not succeeded in 
disproving it persuasively. They attack the negative by-products of the quasi-
market such as marketing costs and internal administrative burden, especially in 
the transitional period. 
Concerning the internal administrative burden, Bowe and Ball with Gold 
(1992b) vividly describe the real life of schools with frustrating difficulties. They 
present many negative constraints on school management such as 'not enough 
money', 'not enough time' and 'contradicting demands'. However, these features 
seem to be relevant not only to schools but also to any kind of organisation. It 
should be remembered that real life is not so easy and that managers have to 
endeavour to devise creative responses to difficult circumstances. Although 
constrained budgets, rapid transition and changing government policies seem to 
make the circumstances of schools more difficult, the lives of the school's senior 
staff described by the authors can be interpreted partly as such creative 
endeavours in response to difficult situations. Despite these difficulties and 
hardships, these senior staff members do not want to go back to the old system 
according to Bartlett (1993) and Bullock and Thomas (1994, p.89). 
A more fundamental issue might be the tension between professional and 
enterprise cultures, which is pointed out by Bowe and Ball with Gold (1992a). 
This tension can be interpreted as resistance by many teachers to market pressures 
which push them to adopt practices against their educational ideals such as 
equality, equity and child-centredness. 
In that regard, the critics of the quasi-market reform fear the dominance of 
economic calculation over educational consideration. Moreover, some of them 
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even imply that the educational needs are not well reconciled with the demands of 
financial efficiency. 
However, we should be careful not to confuse the two concepts of efficiency as 
explained by Bartlett and LeGrand (1993). One ofthe concepts refers to the total 
costs of service. The other concept, 'productive efficiency', refers to the costs of 
providing any given quality or quantity of a service. Cheap service of very low 
quality can be efficient in the first concept but inefficient in the second concept. 
This means that 'productive efficiency' can, in principle at least, be compatible 
with educational purposes. 
Nevertheless, the critics of the quasi-market also tend to question how much 
financial efficiency contributes to educational standards. 
Educational standards 
The ultimate question on the quasi-market is whether or not the quasi-market 
system will raise educational standards. Needless to say, it is very difficult to 
give a definitive and conclusive answer to the question. First, what is the 
definition of educational standards? Secondly, how can we measure the 
standards? Thirdly, how can we distinguish the effects of the quasi-market from 
the effects of other causes? The question is inevitably accompanied by not only 
educational but also philosophical and political implications. 
Both the advocates and critics of the quasi-market sometimes make decisive 
assertions on this ultimate question. 
The advocates optimistically assume that the quasi-market system will raise the 
educational standards by making schools more efficient in providing education 
that is more responsive to parents. While they insist that parents enjoy the 
freedom of choice from a diversity of schools in the quasi-market, some of them 
expect that the market forces expressed by parental choice will press schools to 
orient their education towards the traditional academic model of schooling with 
rigorous teaching and discipline, implying that this orientation will contribute to 
educational standards. 
The critics of the quasi-market deny that the quasi-market will raise the 
educational standards because they believe that market forces are not reconciled 
with educational values and will be harmful to the interests of those people who 
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are already educationally and socially disadvantaged. They either question 
whether the quasi-market will improve efficiency, or argue that the financial 
efficiency in the quasi-market will not contribute to the educational standards. In 
their view, the predominance of the traditional academic model in the quasi-
market will result in the hierarchy of schools and impoverish the education for the 
pupils from lower socio-economic groups who tend to be admitted to the schools 
of lower hierarchical positions. 
From the above-mentioned arguments, it is evident that the advocates of the 
quasi-market expect the traditional academic model to raise the educational 
standards while the critics regard the same model as having negative effects or, at 
best, no positive effects on the educational standards. The advocates and critics 
find a common ground in assuming that the academic model is to be predominant 
in the quasi-market system of education although the two sides take opposite 
views on the effects of the predominance. The difference seems to lie in what 
should be the criteria for educational success. However, the predominance of the 
academic model is not self-evident, as the advocates claim the diversity of schools 
for parents to choose between in the quasi-market while the critics emphasise the 
complexity of parental choice and deny the dominance of academic performance 
as a decisive factor of choice. Therefore, whether or not school strategies tend to 
be oriented towards the academic model will have a significant implication for 
this debate. 
Rationale for the use of Bernstein's theory in research on school strategies 
To enter the discussion on whether or not school strategies tend to be oriented 
towards the traditional academic model, we need to consider what the traditional 
academic model means. What characteristics do the schools pursuing the model 
have? The model connotes traditional education set in contrast to progressive 
education and academic education set in contrast to practical or vocational 
education. Theoretical elaboration is required for further discussions on this issue. 
Can the school management literature be the basis for such theoretical 
elaboration? Does the literature provide a theoretical framework for researching 
school strategies in this thesis? The answer is 'no'. Why? The reason lies in the 
literature's apparent indifference, as to be discussed soon, to the broader policy 
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i. 
context or the societal, political and economic environments including the quasi-
market forces and government interventions, and to the conflicting values and 
ideals in education. This thesis is about schools' strategic changes as responses to 
such macro-level environments, and these changes inevitably have significant 
implications for educational values and ideals. The main question in the thesis is 
whether or not under quasi-market pressures, the schools were moving towards 
the traditional academic model of schooling, and away from, or at least not 
towards, the progressive or child-centred model. 
Jenny Ozga (1992) concisely and Lawrence Angus (1994) extensively 
addressed the above and other deficiencies and absences in the education 
management literature. According to Ozga ( 1992, p.279), 'The missing 
dimensions in these texts relate to the external policy context-almost never 
discussed, and ifbriefly reviewed then taken for granted; the absence of 
connection between management practice and broader theoretical or theorised 
frameworks; the lack of intellectually demanding argument, or of considerations 
of principles, values and ethics'. Angus (1994, pp.81-2) echoed, 'most 
publications that are targeted to inform and assist participants in school-level 
management and decision making tend to reduce the complexity of contested 
educational debates and policies to simplistic how-to-do-it manuals for school 
administrators'. The nature ofthe management literature described above might 
be summarised as 'decontextualised and de-politicised' (Angus, 1994, p.80). 
Basically, the context of education itself was not very significant in the school 
management literature. As the brief review of the literature's treatment of 
'strategy' illustrated as above, fundamental concepts and theories were originated 
in the corporate management literature, and then applied to school management. 
'Good school management, then, is just like good management in business' 
(Angus, 1994, p.84). 
Due to the above-mentioned reason, the school management literature is not 
used as a theoretical framework for this research on school strategies. 
This thesis formulates its theoretical framework in the use of Basil Bernstein's 
theory of 'visible/invisible pedagogies'. In contrast with the school management 
literature, Bernstein's sociological theory focuses on specific aspects of education, 
and links the micro-level of classrooms and schools and the macro-level of the 
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educational system and social structure in the historical context. It also has a 
potential for linking pedagogy and management. Moreover, importantly, the 
theory confronts contesting values in education, and interprets them in the light of 
the broader social structure. 
In the school management literature, this kind of ideological conflict tends to 
find no or little place. The literature also tends to pay little attention to the macro-
micro linkage. It focuses on the micro-level of individual schools without paying 
due attention to, or critically reviewing, the context of the macro-level education 
policies and system, which has been reformed into the quasi-market. These two 
tendencies, namely being 'decontextualised and depoliticised' (Angus, 1994, 
p.80), seem to be interrelated to each other. With regard to school strategies and 
other issues, the management literature often provides normative principles and 
guidelines and, in extreme cases, 'how-to-do-it manuals' (Angus, 1994, p.82). In 
the literature, educational values and ideals tend to be hidden behind practicalities 
and technicalities. This feature is related to the fact that basic concepts and 
theories are imported from the corporate management literature into the school 
management literature. 
In the meantime, sociological and other criticism of the education quasi-market 
pays attention to the peculiarities of education and its historical, systemic and 
ideological context. However, an integrated theory does not seem to be emerging 
from the criticism. Such criticism is generally descriptive in analysing its defects 
and harmful effects against the market theory rather than being theoretically 
constructed, that is, presenting its own theory. 
As introduced in the next chapter, his terms 'visible pedagogy' and 'invisible 
pedagogy' are defined concepts to replace 'traditional academic education' and 
'progressive or child-centred education' respectively. With the defined concepts, 
the meanings are clarified, and the criteria for judging the orientations of 
pedagogy are established. It also has a potential for linking pedagogy and 
management; the potential is to be developed to the substantial linkage in this 
thesis. Hence, his theory provides a very productive basis for the theoretical 
framework with conceptually defined dichotomies to clarify the orientations of 
school strategies. 
The rationale for the use of Bernstein's theory lies in these points. 
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Part III Visible Strategies in the Quasi-Market: Theory 
Development 
Chapter 4 Visible/Invisible Strategies in Pedagogy and Management: 
Theoretical Framework 
The use of Bernstein's theory of visible/invisible pedagogies 
Visible/invisible pedagogies with explicit/implicit rules 
Here, I want to introduce Basil Bernstein's theory of pedagogies into my research 
context. According to Bernstein ( 1990), visible and invisible pedagogies are 
'usually referred to as conservative or traditional and progressive or child-centred' 
(ibid, p.63). We may be able to use the visible pedagogy instead of the traditional 
academic model of education and the invisible pedagogy instead of progressive 
education. 
We shall now look into his theory ofpedagogies. The following five 
paragraphs are a summary of the theory. 
Bernstein (1990) analyses the three kinds of rules ofthe 'pedagogic relations' 
between 'transmitters' (teachers) and 'acquirers' (pupils), that is, 'hierarchical 
rules', 'sequencing rules' and 'criteria rules'. Hierarchical rules are the rules of 
social order, character and manner which are a prerequisite of the pedagogic 
relations. Sequencing rules mean 'Something must come before and something 
must come after' in learning and teaching process. Sequencing rules imply pacing 
rules. Pacing can be expressed by how much a pupil has to learn in a given 
amount of time. Criteria rules represent what kind of criteria the pupils are 
expected to take over and apply to their practices. The criteria can be used to 
assess pupils' practices. Visible pedagogies are one of the two generic types of 
pedagogic practice which have explicit hierarchical rules, explicit 
sequencing/pacing rules and explicit criteria rules. Invisible pedagogies are the 
other generic type with implicit hierarchical, sequencing/pacing and criteria rules. 
The hierarchical rules of visible pedagogies are explicit and the power relations 
between teachers and pupils are very clear. The relationship is that of 'explicit 
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subordination and superordination' (ibid, p.67). 'If the child disobeys, then 
privileges are withdrawn and explicit rules are articulated. In the extreme, 
strategies of exclusion and physical punishment may be used' (ibid, p.83). In the 
implicit hierarchy of an invisible pedagogy, 'power is masked or hidden by 
devices of communication' (ibid, p.67), and 'control lies almost entirely in inter-
personal communication' (ibid, p.83). In this case, the children are expected to 
learn actively and play creatively, and the role of the teacher is to facilitate and 
accommodate the process of acquisition. 
Visible pedagogies have the strong pacing rules of academic curriculum, which 
'tend to reduce pupils' speech and privilege teachers' talk' (ibid, pp.77-8). 
'Curriculum cannot be acquired wholly by time spent at school' (ibid,p.77), and 
pupils are expected to do homework. The sequencing rules of the visible 
pedagogies are explicit and a pupil can be 'aware of what her/his expected state of 
consciousness is supposed to be' (ibid, p.67). In the case of invisible pedagogies, 
the pupil's own time and development are given priority, but the pupil initially 
cannot be aware of the signs of his/her development process of which only the 
teacher is aware. 
In visible pedagogies, the criteria are explicit and specific, and pupils are often 
aware of the criteria, although the awareness differs between pupils and between 
the criteria. In the case of invisible pedagogies, the criteria are implicit and only 
teachers are aware of them. According to Bernstein (1990, p.70), 'It is as if this 
pedagogic practice creates a space in which the acquirer can create his/her text 
under conditions of apparently minimum external constraint and in a context and 
social relationship which appears highly supportive of the "spontaneous" text the 
acquirer offers'. Visible pedagogies place emphasis on the 'performance' or 
external product of a pupil against explicit, external common criteria, and produce 
stratifying differences between pupils. On the other hand, invisible pedagogies 
focus on procedures internal to a pupil, that is, cognitive, linguistic, affective and 
motivational procedures of acquisition or learning, regard the procedures as 
shared by all pupils, and interpret the differences between pupils as 'uniqueness' 
produced by shared 'competences', not as a basis for comparison between the 
pupils. Bernstein ( 1990, p. 71) summarises, 'invisible pedagogies emphasize 
acquisition-competence and visible pedagogies transmission-performance'. 
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Bernstein (1990) introduces a dichotomy in the rules ofthe pedagogic relations. 
The hierarchical rules are called 'regulative rules', and the other rules of 
sequencing/pacing and criteria are called 'instructional or discursive rules' (ibid, 
p.66). This dichotomy is based on his concepts of pedagogic discourse, that is, 
'instructional discourse' 'concerned with the transmission/acquisition of specific 
competences' and 'regulative discourse' 'concerned with the transmission of 
principles of order, relation, and identity' (ibid, p.211 ). 
What is the essence of the typology of visible/invisible pedagogies? It is 
explicitness/implicitness. Bernstein defines that visible/invisible pedagogies have 
explicit/implicit 'regulative' and 'instructional' rules. The former rules can be 
regarded as hierarchically regulative rules of social relations between teachers and 
pupils. These rules are concerned with how explicitly the hierarchical regulations 
are seen in the social relations. The latter, that is, instructional rules, which 
consist of selection, sequencing, pacing, and criteria rules, seem to mean, in less 
esoteric terminology, 'prescriptive' rules ofthe contents ofknowledge and skills 
to be transmitted, methods of transmission and acquisition, and assessment criteria. 
The issue is how explicitly these contents, methods and criteria are prescribed, 
and therefore the term, 'prescriptive' rules, instead of 'instructional' rules, will be 
used in this thesis. 
Now, we can use visible and invisible pedagogies instead of the traditional 
academic model of education and the progressive or child-centred education 
respectively. The concept of visible/invisible pedagogy is operationally defined 
by explicitness/implicitness in the regulative and prescriptive rules, and therefore 
is suitable for the empirical study that will be pursued later in this thesis. 
Autonomous and market-oriented visible pedagogies? 
Bernstein ( 1990) argues that there are two forms of visible pedagogies. One is the 
'autonomous visible pedagogy', and the other is the 'market-oriented visible 
pedagogy'. 'The autonomous visible pedagogy justifies itself by the intrinsic 
worthwhileness and value of the knowledge it relays and by the discipline its 
acquisition requires' (ibid, p.87). The market-oriented visible pedagogy is 
justified by its market relevance, and 'a truly secular form born out of the "context 
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of cost-efficient education", allegedly promoting relevant skills, attitudes, and 
technology in an era of large-scale chronic youth unemployment' (ibid, p.86). 
The term, autonomous visible pedagogy, may sound as if pupils could enjoy 
autonomous learning. The terminology is especially misleading when schools and 
other educational institutions are expected to manage themselves autonomously in 
the quasi-market system of education. However, it is relatively easy to understand 
the concept of the autonomous visible pedagogy. Although it is not definitely 
stated by Bernstein, it seems that the autonomous visible pedagogy is the 
prototype of visible pedagogy as defined above. 
I would not be satisfied with the concept of the market-oriented visible 
pedagogy, without substantial modification, which could seem to me a jumble of 
different elements of the education reform. He exemplifies the various elements 
of the market-oriented visible pedagogy as follows. 'New forms of assessment, 
profiling, criteria-referenced rather than norm-referenced assessment, allegedly to 
recognise and liberate individual qualities, allow of, and mark, greater control of 
assessment. At the same time periodic mass testing of pupils concentrates new 
distribution procedures for homogenizing acquisition and, at the same time, 
creates performance indicators of its effectiveness. Vocationalism appears to 
offer the lower working class a legitimation of their own pedagogic interests in a 
manual-based curriculum, and in so doing appears to include them as significant 
pedagogic subjects, ... ' (ibid, p.87) 
These elements of the market-oriented visible pedagogy are not necessarily 
consistent with each other in terms of their ideological bases as follows. The 
education policies under the Conservative government were products of the 
mixture of three ideologies of the neo-conservative, the neo-liberal and 
vocationalism. Although most of the policies seem to be in favour of visible 
pedagogies, not all the policies simply endorse these pedagogies, and some of the 
policies, especially the ones based on vocationalism, seem to encourage a 
compromised mixture of visible and invisible pedagogies. Vocationalism 
emphasises the importance of pupils' practical work on their initiative, which 
seems to be compatible with invisible pedagogies. Furthermore, the assessment 
criteria for such work cannot be as explicit as that for academic knowledge that 
can basically rely on pencil-and-paper type tests. He seems to be aware of the 
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point but still believes in the consistency of the market-oriented visible pedagogy. 
He says, 'Even the pedagogic regimes are mixed, drawing on features of invisible 
pedagogy, e.g. in the "negotiation" of pupils' profiles, life skill programmes. The 
new pedagogic discourse recontextualizes and thus repositions within its own 
ideology features of apparently oppositional discourses' (Bernstein, 1990, p.88). 
It seems to me that treating a mixture as a mixture is more appropriate than 
treating a mixture as a single substance. Vocationalism, which does not 
necessarily fit into visible pedagogies, is far from amalgamated with the neo-
conservative and the neo-liberal. 
There seems to be a confusion regarding the education quasi-market and the 
economic market in Bernstein's argument. He almost presumes twin relations 
between the market-oriented education system and the perceived needs of the 
economy. It is too simplistic to presume 'market-relevance', that is, alleged 
relevance to the economy, of a pedagogy which the education quasi-market 
endorses. The quasi-market may just endorse a 'back-to-basics' type of the 
traditional visible pedagogy, that is, the autonomous visible pedagogy in 
Bernstein's terminology, which is advocated not by vocationalism but by the neo-
conservative and part of the neo-liberal. As stated in the previous chapters, a lot 
ofliterature argues that the quasi-market system will enhance the traditional 
visible pedagogy which aims at high academic performance in well-disciplined 
environments. Vocationalism may just provide the second best for people who 
are not given access to the traditional academic education. 
In short, the education quasi-market does not necessarily endorse the so-called 
market-relevance, and it is more appropriate to regard the education reform as a 
mixture of various policies with different ideological bases rather than as a series 
of consistent policies to enhance the market-oriented visible pedagogy. 
However, it should be noted that Bernstein appreciates the existence of more 
than one modality of visible pedagogy in the market-oriented education system. 
His dichotomy between autonomous and market-oriented visible pedagogies 
provides an important inspiration, which enables me to develop a different 
dichotomy more relevant to the realities of the education quasi-market as follows. 
Directive and responsive visible pedagogies 
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I provisionally suggest the dichotomy between directive and responsive visible 
pedagogies. I provisionally define the directive visible pedagogy as a modality of 
visible pedagogy, which has explicit regulative and prescriptive rules, and the 
responsive visible pedagogy as a modality of visible pedagogy, which has implicit 
regulative rules and explicit prescriptive rules. I repeated the word, provisionally, 
for emphasis, because my research is primarily not regardingpedagogies at 
classroom level but regarding strategies at management level, and therefore the 
concepts of the pedagogies are treated as tools for developing the concepts of the 
strategies in the course of my research. 
Table 4.1 shows the above-mentioned definitions of the directive visible and 
responsive visible pedagogies as well as the invisible pedagogy in a diagram. 
Table 4.1 Definitions ofthe modalities of pedagogy 
Regulative Rules Prescriptive Rules 
Directive Visible Pedagogy Explicit Explicit 
Responsive Visible Pedagogy Implicit Explicit 
(Oppressive Visible Pedagogy?) (Explicit) (Implicit) 
Invisible Pedagogy Implicit Implicit 
Note that there is another possible modality of pedagogy, that is, oppressive 
visible pedagogy, in the above diagram. I have inserted a question mark in 
brackets next to it because I doubt that this modality will have any relevance to 
my research. Although it is logical to fill in the blank row that has explicit 
regulative rules and implicit prescriptive rules, it is not easy to imagine it as a 
sustainable modality of pedagogy because of its oppressive and unnatural nature. 
It is not only oppressive but also unnatural to sustain a pedagogic regime in which 
teachers expose pupils to explicit power relations but do not explicitly show them 
what they should learn. Therefore, I provisionally exclude this modality of 
pedagogy from the set of the concepts as tools for my research. 
The directive visible pedagogy is directive because it means that the teacher 
directs the pupils' learning under the explicit regulative and prescriptive rules. 
The responsive visible pedagogy is responsive because the teacher and the pupils 
are expected to be responsive to each other under the explicit prescriptive rules 
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and the implicit regulative rules. In the responsive visible pedagogy, as in the 
case of invisible pedagogy, the teacher tries to avoid exposing the pupils to the 
power relations between them. In the case of the responsive visible pedagogy, 
however, the teacher expects the pupils to learn in accordance with the explicit 
selection, sequencing and pacing rules. The pupils can be aware of the 
expectation and the rules, and are expected to respond properly. Then the teacher 
is expected to respond to each pupil's conduct and performance in accordance 
with the explicit criteria rules of which the pupils can also be aware. The 
responsive visible pedagogy is visible because the explicitness, rather than the 
implicitness, is dominant in the rules of the pedagogic relations as a whole. 
There is a similarity between the responsiveness in the responsive visible 
pedagogy and that in the market economy. The market economy depends on the 
responsiveness of the actors including the consumers and producers, and the 
direction or coercion is not a primary measure to operate the system. The 
directive visible pedagogy seems more traditional than the responsive visible 
pedagogy. It is possible to-perceive some similarity between autonomous and 
directive visible pedagogies as well as between market-oriented and responsive 
visible pedagogies. Bernstein (1990, p.87) mentions that the market-oriented 
visible pedagogy is a complex construction, or 'a new pedagogic Janus', which 
incorporates some of the criticism of the autonomous visible pedagogy. Similarly, 
the responsive visible pedagogy has two faces, one of which originates from the 
directive visible pedagogy-the traditional modality-and the other from the 
invisible pedagogy. The former face is the explicitness of the prescriptive rules 
and the latter is the implicitness of the regulative rules. 
My assumption is that most parents and many teachers in the education quasi-
market do not dare to rely on invisible pedagogy, which apparently does not seem 
to ensure the children's success in tests and examinations. While some of them 
may be in favour of the strictness of the directive visible pedagogy, others may 
not be happy with its rather old-fashioned image. The responsive visible 
pedagogy may be attractive to the latter group of parents and teachers who have 
been socialised in a society where autonomy, independence, individuality and 
other liberal and democratic values are publicly endorsed. After undergoing a 
certain degree of the dissemination of invisible pedagogy, the education system 
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may be unable to encourage just the directive visible pedagogy. A kind of 
amalgamation ofpedagogies, which forms the responsive visible pedagogy, may 
be happening in the quasi-market system. 
Although the similarity between Bernstein's dichotomy and mine is not 
accidental and the latter dichotomy owes much to the former, the differences 
between the two dichotomies, which I hope will be clear from the above 
explanations, should be emphasised as well. Probably I should state definitely 
that the responsive visible pedagogy does not imply being more relevant to the 
quasi-market education system than the other modality of visible pedagogy as 
Bernstein's market-oriented visible pedagogy by definition does. It should be 
judged by empirical research rather than by definition which modality of visible 
pedagogy is encouraged more than the other in the quasi-market system. My 
dichotomy, with the definitions in reference to Bernstein's theory, is more 
operationally defined than his own dichotomy for the purpose of the empirical 
research on the education quasi-market. 
Here I would like to make it clear that the purpose of this research is not to 
work on Bernstein's theory but to theoretically and empirically analyse school 
strategies in the quasi-market system of education although my theoretical 
framework for the research is inspired by his theory of visible/invisible pedagogy. 
Therefore, while this part of Bernstein's theory is used as an essential basis for my 
thesis, I do not claim that the thesis discusses his theory in its integrity. 
The quasi-market reform in favour of visible pedagogies 
Visible pedagogies promoted by the quasi-market reform 
The quasi-market reform by the Conservative government seems to have aimed at 
attacking progressive or child-centred education-the invisible pedagogy-, and 
reinforcing conservative or traditional education-the directive visible pedagogy. 
In Chapter 3, it has been briefly explained that the quasi-market reform is 
expected to promote the academic model of education, which can now be replaced 
by visible pedagogy. We can expand on this topic as follows, using the concepts 
of regulative (or hierarchical) rules and prescriptive (or selection, sequencing, 
pacing and criteria) rules and those of explicitness and implicitness. 
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M Pirie ( 1988 & 1992), like others, describes that the market forces in 
education have been realised by the three measures of parental choice, the 
independence of schools from the LEAs, and funding based on enrolment. 
However, there is another important element of the quasi-market. This element is 
performance indicators including the results of national tests based on the 
National Curriculum and the results of public examinations including GCSEs. 
The government publishes the performance tables or league tables of the public 
examinations, and truancy. It is correct for H Thomas ( 1990) to count the 
'assessment of performance' as one of the elements in LMS package or the 
implicit voucher system in addition to financial delegation, formula funding, open 
enrolment, and appointment and dismissal of staff. The introduction of national 
tests and the publication of performance tables represent the government's policy 
orientation towards more explicit criteria rules, which the quasi-market needs and 
enhances. It is expected by the government that many parents as consumers 
attach importance to the above-mentioned performance indicators when they 
choose a school for their child and that the schools competing for parental choice 
then endeavour to raise their standards in the indicators. 
We can easily understand that the National Curriculum clearly shows the policy 
orientation towards more explicit selection, sequencing and pacing rules. The 
government's approaches to truancy and other disciplinary issues seem to have 
shown their favour for traditional social order advocated in the 'Back to Basics' 
campaign. In other words, the orientation of the disciplinary policies seems to be 
towards more explicit hierarchical or regulative rules. 
In short, it seems that the above-mentioned policies have been in favour of the 
directive visible pedagogy, which has explicit regulative and prescriptive rules. 
What I want to emphasise here is that the planners of the education reform seem 
to have expected that market forces press schools to follow these policy 
orientations towards the explicit rules. These various policies are part of the 
policy package of creating the quasi-market system in which at least some of the 
policy-makers expect the conservative or traditional education to flourish. In their 
view, parents would prefer the rigorous teaching of specific knowledge and skills 
in a disciplined atmosphere, that is, the directive visible pedagogy, and market 
pressures would push schools to meet the parents' preference. 
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However, it seems that the Conservative government's orientation towards 
stricter discipline was more an advocacy than a policy. By contrast, its policy of 
the National Curriculum and Assessment was very real. The responsive visible 
pedagogy can be attractive to some parents who attach importance to autonomy, 
independence, individuality and other progressive values as well as to 
examination and test results. Therefore, we should provisionally expect that the 
quasi-market system of education would promote visible pedagogy, which might 
be directive or responsive. 
Some tensions between the reform elements 
However, it is not appropriate to conclude the discussion on the government 
policies without some reservations. Not all advocates of the market have 
necessarily been satisfied with the compromise between the market-oriented 
policies and the policies for more central control including the National 
Curriculum and Assessment. Some would accept any results which parental 
choice produces even if those results do not enhance the traditional type of 
education with emphasis on structured teaching and social order, that is, the 
directive visible pedagogy. 
More obviously, there has been some tension, as G Whitty (1990) points out, 
between the neo-liberal as the advocacy of the market-oriented system and 
vocationalism as the advocacy of the needs of industry and commerce. It is 
somewhat ironical to note that business people in the real markets are often more 
interested in the practical usefulness of education for business than in the market 
principle in education or the quasi-market system, and they do not hesitate to want 
government interventions to realise desirable results. 
Moreover, they are often endorsing more vocational-oriented education 
relevant to the technological economy than the traditional academic education. 
Vocationalism, which the business lobby recommends, is not necessarily 
compatible with the directive visible pedagogy with the emphasis on the 
traditional teaching, which the neo-conservative and part of the neo-liberal 
endorse. The responsive visible pedagogy may be more easily in harmony with 
vocationalism than the directive one. It is possible that the implicit regulative 
rules in the responsive visible pedagogy allow pupils to do practical work on their 
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initiative, which is supposed to be important in vocational ec,iucation. However, 
the difficulty of standardising vocational curricula and, in particular, assessments 
may imply that vocationalism is more compatible with invisible pedagogies, 
which have implicit instructional rules, than with visible pedagogies, which have 
explicit ones. 
It should be carefully examined whether the implications of the new vocational 
and technological initiatives including CTCs and GNVQs are in favour of visible 
or invisible pedagogies. 
In the case of TVEI, it seems to have been half compromised with progressive 
education. According to M Hickox and R Moore ( 1990), 'it is probably true to 
say that today many of those same liberal teachers are expressing considerable 
support for TVEI and fear the possible consequences which the National 
Curriculum and the GCSE might pose for it'. They say, 'as far as TVEI is 
concerned, the "technicist" approach can be seen as having more sympathy for 
aspects of progressivism than for traditional liberal-humanism. This is 
particularly so in terms of the progressive interest in experimental and process 
learning'. 
The advocacy ofCTCs seems to present some elements of invisible pedagogy, 
although the reality of the pedagogic practices in CTCs is a different topic. G 
Whitty, T Edwards and S Gewirtz (1993) describe the 'new vocationalism' of 
CTCs as follows, 'It is under that heading the apparent "progressivism" of CTCs' 
emphasis on (for example) more practical, investigative and collaborative forms 
of learning can be reconciled with the expectation that they should provide a form 
of secondary education directly relevant to the personnel requirements and the 
culture ofmodern industry'. However, according to them, 'Much ofthe CTC 
rhetoric about pedagogic innovation is more about prospect than practice'. 
Edwards and Whitty (1993) point out that the motives to choose CTCs are 
conspicuous and say, 'More influential seemed to be a sense of CTCs as being 
selective schools, generally better resourced, and likely to uphold traditional 
values and discipline'' which are the elements of visible pedagogies. 
Although the education reform as a whole seems to endorse visible pedagogies, 
it does not mean that the individual policies are unproblematically coherent with 
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each other. This is an important point because it may increase the complexity of 
the education quasi-market. 
School strategies oriented towards visible pedagogies 
It has already been explicated in Chapter 3 that the quasi-market system with the 
performance measurement is assumed to encourage schools to adopt and 
implement strategies oriented towards the academic model although not all 
schools pursue the model and not all parents favour the model. Now we can 
replace the academic model by visible pedagogy. To raise examination and test 
results, schools may adopt strategies oriented towards visible pedagogy, which 
focuses on academic performance, and which is attractive to at least some of those 
families who have the potential for contributing to good or better academic results. 
Schools aim for a good or better position in league tables not only to secure a 
sufficient number of their intake for their economic viability or prosperity but also 
to keep or improve their perceived status for their social pride. These mechanisms 
for school strategies oriented towards the academic model, that is, visible 
pedagogy, have been examined more thoroughly in Chapter 3. Here I just want to 
add a supplementary discussion on what Bernstein has said in this regard. 
Bernstein (1990) relates the different fractions of the middle class to visible and 
invisible pedagogies as follows. 'The assumptions of a visible pedagogy are more 
likely to be met by that fraction of the middle class whose employment has a 
direct relation to the economic field (production, distribution, and the circulation 
of capital). Whereas the assumptions of an invisible pedagogy are more likely to 
be met by that fraction of the middle class who have a direct relation not to the 
economic field but to the field of symbolic control and who work in specialized 
agencies of symbolic control usually located in the public sector' (p. 74). These 
social-class implications help to account for the conflicts between professional 
and enterprise cultures as pointed out by Bowe and Ball with Gold (1992a). The 
point which I wish to emphasise here is that there are certainly some middle-class 
families who are in favour of invisible pedagogies. 
Nevertheless, it is realistic to think that most parents from middle-class families 
including the supporters of invisible pedagogies are not prepared to sacrifice their 
child's success in examinations and advancement into higher education for their 
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ideal of education. Then they need some visible pedagogies for their own child. 
For a 'visible pedagogy( ... ) will always place the emphasis on the performance of 
the child' (Bernstein, 1990, p.70) and invisible pedagogies' 'focus is not upon a 
"gradable" performance of the acquirer but upon procedures internal to the 
acquirer'(ibid, p.71). In plain speech, visible pedagogies are more exam- or test-
oriented than invisible pedagogies. The supporters of invisible pedagogies may 
want both visible and invisible pedagogies. Bernstein (1990) clearly describes 
this dilemma for the supporters of invisible pedagogies as follows. 'Indeed, this 
fact is explicitly taken into account by many middle class families who favour this 
regime in the early years of their child's life before switching to a visible 
pedagogy at the secondary stage. Such favouring families often run a 
compensatory pedagogic programme dedicated to reading, writing, and counting 
whilst the child's creative potential may be facilitated by the invisible pedagogy 
of the infant school or pre-school' (ibid, p.81 ). 'It is clear that, even for ardent 
sponsors of invisible pedagogies, this practice is generally confined to the child's 
early years; certainly by the secondary level the demand is for a visible pedagogy, 
as it is this practice which leads to professional occupational placement' (ibid, 
p.84). 
Now we have learnt about Bernstein's assumption that visible pedagogies meet 
the demands of middle-class families more often than invisible pedagogies do, 
especially in secondary schooling. This assumption leads to the prediction that 
school strategies targeted towards middle-class families will tend to be oriented 
towards the discourses of visible pedagogies. However, sometimes school 
strategies may be oriented towards the discourses of the mixture ofboth kinds of 
pedagogies, that is, the responsive visible pedagogy. The professional culture of 
the school is more likely to support the responsive visible pedagogy than the 
directive one. In any case, school strategies will be rarely oriented towards the 
discourses of solely invisible pedagogies. 
The extension of the theory of visible/invisible pedagogy to management 
Bernstein's theory and school organisation 
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This research is on school strategies in response to the quasi-market education 
system. In other words, the focus of the research is institutional strategies by 
headteachers and their senior management teams rather than classroom practices 
by individual teachers. School strategies are institutional strategies at 
management level, as opposed to pedagogic practices at classroom level, but 
include strategies in pedagogic fields such as teaching, assessment, reporting and 
discipline as well as those in managerial fields such as organisation, staffing and 
marketing. Bernstein's theory of visible/invisible pedagogy is concerned 
primarily with pedagogic relations between teachers and pupils rather than 
organisational relations between the management team and teachers. In order to 
make a whole theoretical framework for this research, we need to extend the 
theoretical basis to organisational relations between the management team and 
teachers. School strategies are to be implemented through organisational relations 
in the case of managerial fields and through both organisational and pedagogic 
relations in the case of pedagogic fields. 
We should note that Bernstein's theory can be extended over the border of 
pedagogic relations and be brought into organisational relations in school as well. 
The extension is seen only in germ in Bernstein's own writings. His work on 
visible and invisible pedagogies (Bernstein, 1990), which is heavily used in this 
thesis, does not particularly deal with school organisation, while it extends his 
theory of pedagogic discourse to the analysis of society as a whole in terms of 
symbolic control and cultural reproduction. His earlier work (Bernstein, 1977, 
pp.85-115) examines the 'organizational consequences' of 'collection and 
integrated codes', that is, visible and invisible pedagogies. He says, 'the collection 
code within the framework of oligarchic control creates for senior staff strong 
horizontal and vertical based relationships, whereas the work relationship of 
junior staff are likely to be vertical and the horizontal relationships limited to non-
work-based contacts' and 'the integrated code will require teachers of different 
subjects to enter into social relationships with each other which will arise not 
simply out of non-task areas, but out of shared, co-operative educational task' 
(ibid, pp.l 03-4). The definitions of some key concepts used here are introduced 
as follows. The collection code is the type of educational code with explicit and 
strong boundary maintenance in 'classification' and 'frame' while the integrated 
73 
code is the type with implicit and weak one. 'Classification refers to the nature of 
the differences between contents. Where classification is strong, contents are well 
insulated from each other by strong boundaries. Where classification is weak, 
there is reduced insulation between contents, for the boundaries between contents 
are weak or blurred' (ibid, p.88). 'Frame refers us to the range of options 
available to teacher and taught in the control of what is transmitted and received 
in the context of the pedagogical relationship. Strong framing entails reduced 
options; weak framing entails a range of options. Thus frame refers to the degree 
of control teacher and pupil possess over the selection, organization, pacing and 
timing of the knowledge transmitted and received in the pedagogical relationship' 
(ibid, pp.88-9). By the way, against the historical background at the time of his 
this work (Bernstein, 1977), it was suggested that there was some movement away 
from collection to integrated codes. It means the movement towards progressive 
or child-centred education. 
Bernstein (1977, pp.174-200) presents another germ for the extension. Here 
his theory of educational code is applied to production or work. Contrasts are 
made between the codes of education and the codes of production. In the same 
way as the codes of education, the codes of production are indicated with 
'classification' and 'framing'. 'We can ask what are relationships between the 
various agents, unskilled, skilled, technologists, managers, administrators, etc. 
The relationships between these categories can be strongly or weakly classified. 
If the former, then the relationships are stable and sharply distinguished, the 
functions well insulated from each other, and the ag(mts are not interchangeable. 
If the latter, then the relationships between agents are less sharply distinguished, 
there is reduced insulation between functions and agents are more interchangeable 
between categories' (ibid, pp.l81-2). 'Ifthe primary unit ofproduction is a 
repetitive, individually performed, strongly paced, explicitly sequenced divisive 
act, we can say that this is strong framing. If the primary unit of production is 
relatively co-operative, group based, where there is opportunity to vary the 
conditions and perhaps sequencing and pacing, where the outcome is less a 
fraction of the total object of production but bears a more direct relation to it, we 
can say that this represents weak framing' (ibid, p.182). Bernstein's intention in 
this work is to show that there is not necessarily a correspondence or continuity 
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between the codes of education and those of production, and that there is relative 
autonomy of education. He presents examples of discontinuity between school 
and work such as elite secondary schools' collection codes of strong classification 
and framing, irrespective of codes of production of their pupils' destination, and 
less able pupils, leaving secondary schools with integrated codes of weak 
classification and framing, and being destined to workplaces with collection codes 
ofvery strong classification and framing. 
There seems to be no reason why we should not apply the above extended code 
theory to school organisation, which is surely a type of workplace. However, 
Bernstein himself has not explicitly done so. His above-mentioned analysis seems 
to focus on production in the economic field. Furthermore, his work on 
visible/invisible pedagogy (Bernstein, 1990) does not develop the theoretical 
extension to workplace in the above-mentioned way. In order to extend the theory 
of visibility/invisibility from pedagogic relations between pupils and teachers to 
organisational relations between school staff including teachers and managers, the 
school organisation literature may be of some use. 
William Tyler (1988) presents an overview ofthe sociological approaches to 
school organisation and gives special importance to Bernstein's theory as a 
structuralist perspective. He provides us with an abstract but important comment 
that 'the theory of codes suggests that at the deepest level of social organisation 
the relations between the organisation of the curriculum, the methods of teaching 
and the patterns of governance and supervision are tightly related'(ibid, p.l54). 
My extension of the concept of visibility/invisibility or explicitness/implicitness is 
in accordance with this comment. 
Enquiry into the theories of school organisation and management 
It should be emphasised that the purpose of this research is not to work on 
Bernstein's theory although the theoretical framework for the research is inspired 
by his theory of visible/invisible pedagogy. While I never claim that this thesis 
discusses Bernstein's theory in its integrity, the thesis will not be constrained by 
the scope of his theory. For the purpose of building a theoretical framework for 
this empirical research on school strategies, we need to extend the theory of 
visibility/invisibility or explicitness/implicitness to organisational relations 
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between the school management team and teachers. This need will lead us to a 
consideration of theories of school organisation and management that may have 
some relevance to the extension. 
Ambiguity model 
According to Tony Bush (1995), there are six major models of educational 
management. They are 'formal', 'collegial', 'political', 'subjective', 'ambiguity' 
and 'cultural' models. He regards all these six models as partial and 
complementary, and thinks that it is rarely appropriate to label any school as 
typifying a single model and that elements of many or all ofthe models may be 
found in almost all organisations. 
He states that the formal model 'dominated the early stages of theory 
development in educational management' and that the 'other five models ... all 
developed in response to the perceived weakness of the formal model. 
According to Bush, the formal model is an umbrella used to embrace a number of 
similar but not identical approaches, that is, 'structural', 'systems', 'bureaucratic', 
'rational' and 'hierarchical' models. The formal models have several common 
features which emphasise the importance of systems, official structure, hierarchy, 
goal-seeking, rational process, authority ofleaders and accountability. 
Among the contrasts between the formal model and the other models, the one 
between the formal model and the ambiguity model seems to be the most useful 
one for this research. The reason is that the contrast apparently seems to 
correspond to that between visible pedagogy and invisible pedagogy in a sense 
that both contrasts seem to be based on the degree of explicitness in social 
relations. Moreover, as Bush states, the data supporting the ambiguity model 
have been drawn largely from educational settings. 
According to Bush, the ambiguity model has the following features. 
1. There is a lack of clarity about the goal of the organisation. Goals are so vague 
that they can be used to justify almost any behaviour. 
2. Organisations have a problematic technology in which their processes are not 
properly understood. It is not clear how pupils acquire knowledge and skills so 
that the processes of teaching are clouded with doubt and uncertainty. 
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3. Organisations are characterised by fragmentation and 'loose coupling' which W 
K Weick (1976) uses as a term to describe relationships between subunits of 
organisation. The concept of loose coupling was developed for, and first applied 
to, educational institutions. 
4. Organisational structure is regarded as problematic. There is uncertainty over 
the relative power of the different parts of the institution. 
5. Ambiguity models tend to be particularly appropriate for professional client-
serving organisations including educational institutions because of the 
requirement that professionals make individual judgements, rather than acting in 
accordance with managerial prescriptions. 
6. There is fluid participation in the management of organisations. Members 
move in and out of decision-making situations. 
7. A further source of ambiguity is provided by the signals emanating from the 
organisation's environment. 
8. Ambiguity theorists emphasise the prevalence ofunplanned decisions. The 
lack of agreed goals means that decisions have no clear focus. Problems, 
solutions and participants interact and choices somehow emerge from the 
confusion. 
9. Ambiguity models stress the advantages of decentralisation. Given the 
complexity and unpredictability of organisations, it is thought that many decisions 
should be devolved to subunits (for example, departments) and individuals. 
The above-mentioned features show that the ambiguity model is an antithesis to 
the formal model in a way apparently similar to the way in which invisible 
pedagogy is an antithesis to visible pedagogy. While visible and invisible 
pedagogies are concerned primarily with pedagogic relations-social relations 
between pupils and teachers-, formal and ambiguity models are concerned 
primarily with organisational relations-social relations between staff members. 
Both contrasts seem to be based on the degree of explicitness in social relations. 
Behind this apparent similarity, however, there is a significant difference 
between the two contrasts. Invisible pedagogy is not such a chaotic arrangement 
as the ambiguity model is. For example, the ambiguity model mentions the lack 
of agreed goals, without which invisible pedagogy or progressive education would 
not be possible. Before turning to a closer examination of the difference, we must 
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draw attention to other researchers on school organisation and management, 
whose literature seems to have some relevance to the extension of the concept of 
visibility/invisibility or explicitness/implicitness. 
Loose coupling model 
Tyler ( 1988) presents a typology of models of school organisation, which is 
considerably similar to, but considerably different from, the typology of models of 
educational management presented by Bush ( 1995). They are 'functionalist', 
'bureaucracy', 'contingency', 'loose coupling', 'interactionist', and 'structuralist' 
models. He regards 'functionalist', 'bureaucracy' and 'contingency' models as 
parts of the 'formal organisation' theory as an umbrella. He also uses 
'interpretive' approaches instead of 'interactionist' models. Tyler's and Bush's 
typologies are similar in that both regard the 'formal' model as one of the basic 
types. They have another similarity in regarding the ambiguity or loose coupling 
model as one of the basic types, though Bush regards the loose coupling model as 
one of ambiguity models while Tyler regards loose coupling as one of the basic 
types. It is not surprising that different researchers in social sciences use different 
typologies. However, there are two important reasons for the differences between 
Bush's and Tyler's typologies. First, Tyler's interest is in school organisation 
which consists of all social relations including those between pupils and those 
betw.een pupils and staff members, as we can see in his discussion on the 
interactionist model, as well as those between staff members, while Bush's 
interest is in school/college management which deals specifically with social 
relations between staff members. Secondly, Tyler is also interested in the 
relations between education and society or the sociological implications of school 
organisation in society as we can see in his discussion on the structuralist model, 
while Bush concentrates on the internal management of school though external 
environments are not neglected. 
The concept of 'loosely coupled' systems is provided by K Weick (1976). 
According toW Tyler's (1988) summary, loose coupling exists if the common 
variables are weak as compared to other variables that influence the system and 
such systems are characterised by the loose connections between the 'stable 
subassemblies' which are their elementary components. 'Many writers( ... ) have 
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since supported this view that schools consist of constituent parts which are only 
weakly coordinated and controlled', according to Dimmock ( 1993 ). 
In his discussion on the loose coupling model, which is relevant to my research, 
Tyler provides a very important view by saying, 'While there is good evidence 
that the administration of school systems is loosely coupled with instruction, there 
is emerging a view which actually advocates tight coupling as a management 
strategy within school units. This literature seems to be a reaction to the insights 
of Weick and others and takes an explicitly normative and prescriptive approach. 
Much of this commentary and research links the organisational and the "school 
effectiveness" literature in unexpected ways'. According to Tyler, the literature 
says that 'effective' schools have clear goals usually with an academic orientation, 
a regular outcome orientation, tight linkages among variables including 
individuals, units, processes and actions, and consistency in rules, procedures and 
values. 
Tyler (1988) also introduces the empirical criticisms of the above-mentioned 
literature. He quotes Astuto and Clark (1985) 'who question the classical, tightly 
coupled image ofthe instructionally effective school' (Tyler, 1988, p.95), and 
state that their analysis of case studies 'revealed a range of differences in quality 
and quantity of interaction between teachers and principles' (ibid, p.95). He 
refers to the ideological implications of the school effectiveness literature when he 
says, 'One might also see in the definitive pronouncements about tight coupling 
something of an ideological bias that is attuned to the managerialist attempt to 
reassert control over the technical core'. He suggests the necessity of more 
theoretical criticisms in saying, 'The claim that there is a set of universally 
acceptable outcomes rests on a much more questionable assumption that schools 
are consensually based institutions in which diversity of viewpoint and goal is not 
important' (ibid, p.96). 
What is important to my research here is that the school effectiveness literature, 
which Tyler criticises, seems to advocate explicitly normative and prescriptive 
strategies of schools. The difference between that literature and the criticism of 
the literature seems similar to that between visible pedagogy and invisible 
pedagogy. 
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Linkages 
Dimmock (1993) develops the concept of 'linkage' which 'incorporates not only 
Weick's notion ofloose-tight coupling, but other dimensions too', and, based on 
the 'eight dimensions of coupling identified by Orton and Weick ( 1990)', applies 
'each of the eight dimensions to appropriate school situations'. The eight 
dimensions are 'individuals', 'sub-units', 'organizations', 'hierarchical levels', 
'organizations and environments', 'ideas', 'activities', and 'intentions and actions'. 
Concerning the first dimension, 'individuals', 'Teachers have traditionally 
enjoyed a large amount of independence in their classroom behaviour and have 
justified their considerable classroom autonomy by appeal to their professional 
status'. Concerning the fourth dimension, 'hierarchical levels', Dimmock ( 1993) 
argues that research evidence suggests a lack of connectedness in schools between 
senior managers and teachers responsible for the delivery of the curriculum. The 
sixth dimension of linkage is 'between ideas expressed in the form of values, 
missions and goals'. 'Few schools engaged in goal-setting prior to the late 1980s, 
and even fewer did so collaboratively. Nowadays, schools in many countries are 
expected to engage in school development planning'. He says, 'goals are often 
discounted, ignored or misunderstood by teachers'. The final dimension concerns 
the linkage between policy and practice. The exclusion of staff from decision 
making, poor communication and lack of planning may lead to loose coupling 
between intentions (goals, policies and priorities) and actions. 'There may be 
loose linkage between planning and implementation. Educational programmes, 
instructional activities and classroom management may not align with educational 
goals and priorities'. 
However, Dimmock argues, 'with the advent of restructuring and school-based 
management, the effectiveness of loosely coupled schools is seriously challenged'. 
'Faced with new activities to be undertaken, such as school development planning, 
the formation and operation of school decision-making groups, the introduction of 
participative decision-making processes, the appraisal of staff, and greater 
emphasis on school-level curriculum planning within system frameworks, it is 
logical to assume tighter linkages in each of the eight dimensions'. 'This is 
supported by studies on effective schools ( ... ) which emphasise the importance 
of tight linkage and interaction between principals and teachers, especially in the 
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area of instructional leadership'. He concludes that 'If the functional connections 
can be achieved so that autonomy, flexibility, responsiveness, planning, 
participation, collaboration and self-efficacy have maximal impact on learning, 
teaching, climate and curriculum structure and content, then improved student 
learning may be achieved'. 
Value conflicts 
G Campbell-Evans (1993), in her examination of the importance ofvalues in 
school management, indicates some points of value conflict although she takes a 
basically positive view of school-based management as Dimmock does. 
Campbell-Evans says, 'System initiatives may be interpreted in very different 
ways depending upon the thinking of the individual or staff in terms of rational 
and non-rational perspectives. School planning, for example, if seen as a 
prescriptive exercise could be interpreted as a system-level attempt to impose 
rational processes and procedures on to schools'. Based on Greenfield's (1986) 
argument that 'administrators are essentially value carriers in organizations', 
Campbell-Evans considers value conflict of 'the principal who believes in 
educating the whole child by attending to emotional, physical, affective and 
academic development' whereas 'System-level or community pressure is put on 
the school to improve upon student academic achievement in relation to 
neighbouring schools'. 'Any number of value conflicts may emerge between 
individuals or groups of staff, within the overall school community and/or 
between the school and system levels'. Some of these 'value conflicts' seem to be 
between professional values, which are often progressive or liberal, and 
managerial values, which put emphasis on more explicit performance. In other 
words, these conflicts have a significant similarity to those between invisible and 
visible pedagogies. The latter modality of pedagogy is to be promoted by the 
quasi-market reform of education. 'The restructuring movement brings with it 
system-level implications and pressures for open enrolments, competition for 
students, entrepreneurship, marketing, emphasis on exam and test results'. 
Towards tight coupling and less ambiguity 
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Now, from the above-mentioned literature by several researchers on school 
organisation and management, we can identify a few important points relevant to 
this research. 
First, many researchers point out an important aspect of school organisation. 
This aspect is called 'ambiguity', 'loose coupling' or 'loose linkage'. The aspect 
can be found in other kinds of organisation as well. However, school organisation 
usually has more ambiguity and looser coupling or linkage than other 
organisations. I can summarise the aspect as follows. School organisation has 
ambiguous or loose relations between staff members and between subunits, and 
organisational values and processes of control in school organisation are 
ambiguous or loose. 
Secondly, the education reform has brought about some changes into the above-
mentioned nature of school organisation and management. It seems that the 
combination of school-based management and competition, that is, the quasi-
market, is urging school managers to tighten up the coupling or linkages within 
their school organisation. Many headteachers and their management teams seem 
to seek to make relations among staff members and subunits, organisational 
values, and processes of control less ambiguous or more explicit through such 
managerial strategies as school development planning, curriculum planning, the 
formalisation of decision-making process, and staff appraisal. The literature on 
school effectiveness tends to support these strategies of an 'explicitly normative 
and prescriptive approach' (Tyler, 1988, p.93). The market pressures seem to 
push school managers to adopt the managerial strategies that make the rules of 
social relations in their school organisation more explicit so that their school can 
be directed as a unity and can survive and prosper in the competitive 
environments. 
Thirdly, as pointed out by Campbell-Evans, value conflicts in school 
organisation seem to be a fundamental issue. The ambiguity or looseness in 
school organisation is based at least partly on the professional values and interests 
of teachers. Therefore, we can hardly expect that headteachers and their 
management teams succeed without difficulty in making and implementing 
explicit strategies. 
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Now, we may draw an analogy between the modalities of pedagogy and those 
of school organisation and management. The contrast between tight and loose 
coupling or linkage, or that between less and more ambiguity, apparently seems to 
correspond to that between visible and invisible pedagogies in a sense that both 
contrasts seem to be based on the degree of explicitness in social relations. While 
Bernstein's theory of visible/invisible pedagogy is concerned primarily with 
'pedagogic relations' between teachers and pupils, the theories of ambiguity, 
coupling and linkage are concerned with 'organisational relations' between the 
management team and teachers. Here we can remember the comment by William 
Tyler (1988, p.154) that 'the theory of codes suggests that at the deepest level of 
social organisation the relations between the organisation of the curriculum, the 
methods of teaching and the patterns of governance and supervision are tightly 
related'. However, we should further examine the above-mentioned analogy 
between the modalities of pedagogy and those of school organisation and 
management in order to extend the theory of visibility/invisibility or 
explicitness/implicitness to organisational relations between the school 
management team and teachers. 
Invisible pedagogies different from loose coupling and ambiguity models 
The invisible pedagogy is not chaos merely with ambiguity and looseness but a 
generic modality of pedagogy which requires a set of professional values. The 
values are often regarded as progressive. Bernstein seems to see a tighter 
ideological linkage or coupling in 'integrated codes', that is, invisible pedagogies, 
than in 'collection codes', that is, visible pedagogies. He says, 'It may be that 
integrated codes will only work when there is a high level of ideological 
consensus among the staff (Bernstein, 1977, p.107). 'Collection codes have 
explicit and strong boundary maintaining features and they rest upon a tacit 
ideological basis. Integrated codes have implicit and weak boundary maintaining 
features and they rest upon an explicit and closed ideological basis' (ibid, p.1 09). 
In other words, Bernstein believes that values in a school with invisible pedagogy 
are more tightly coupled or less ambiguous than those in a school with visible 
pedagogy. 
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Organisational structure and culture 
John O'Neill (1994) provides us with a relevant perspective from which we are 
able to examine the above-mentioned difference between visible/invisible 
pedagogy and tight/loose coupling (or less/more ambiguity). He presents two 
complementary concepts of' structure' and 'culture'. 'Analysis of organizational 
structures focuses on visible and tangible features of educational organizations. 
Cultural analysis examines those seemingly intangible and invisible 
characteristics of organizations' (ibid, p.lOl). 
He argues that the 'radical' organisational structures with the shared values and 
beliefs are more appropriate than the 'traditional' organisational structures with 
hierarchical lines of authority and established procedural norms in order to 
survive in the changing environments of a market. 'In a radical organizational 
structure, new activities trigger a flexible organizational response according to the 
demands of the task itself. Thus structures become ad-hoc rather than permanent. 
In such an environment hierarchical lines of authority and established procedural 
norms are inappropriate responses when "adaptive, short-run decisions are made 
at the front-line"' (ibid, p.ll5). 'The, comparatively recent, increased focus on 
organizational culture ... has, in part, directly paralleled the move, discussed 
above, in educational organizations away from rigid, hierarchical management 
structures' (ibid, p.ll5). 
His concept of the 'radical' organisational structure has two important 
characteristics, that is, the importance of devolved management and that of culture. 
'Normative models of task-driven organizational management have been 
characterised by a call for more distributed forms of leadership ... with 
managerial authority devolved to autonomous teams . . . . These trends have been 
accompanied by attempts to identify appropriate values, norms and organizational 
behaviours which enable members of the organization to work in a flexible, 
creative way' (ibid, p.116). 
He confirms the trend towards devolved management, saying, 'in both the 
secondary and further education sectors there is a growing body of evidence 
which indicates a perceptible trend towards less bureaucratic, hierarchical 
structures' (ibid, p.l13). He refers to empirical studies of secondary schools, 
saying, 'In these studies effective management is characterised by clearly defined 
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areas of authority and autonomy at subject department or faculty level' (ibid, 
p.113). 
O'Neill states that 'tight administrative control is replaced by tight cultural 
control' (ibid, p.117). According to Bernstein (1977, p.l09), while visible 
pedagogy has explicit boundary maintaining features and a tacit ideological basis, 
invisible pedagogy has implicit boundary maintaining features and an explicit 
ideological basis. Then, does it mean that visible pedagogy is being replaced by 
invisible pedagogy? No, I do not think so. As discussed earlier, it is assumed that 
the quasi-market system encourages schools to adopt strategies oriented towards 
visible pedagogies. It seems that the confusion arises from O'Neill's concept of 
the 'radical' organisational structure which includes devolved management and 
culture. Devolved management and culture should be treated separately. 
Regarding cultural control, there is much evidence of value conflicts in schools 
under the quasi-market system. It seems that devolved management has been 
accompanied by formal structural control rather than informal cultural control. 
Explicit structural control in management can be regarded as equivalent to explicit 
regulative and prescriptive rules in visible pedagogies. 
What is important here is that O'Neill provides us with the complementary 
concepts of organisational structure and culture. Here we should remember that 
Bernstein (1977, p.107) says, 'It may be that integrated codes will only work 
when there is a high level of ideological consensus among the staff. This means 
that invisible pedagogy can exist as a generic modality of pedagogy because of its 
explicit cultural control in organisational relations between staff members. Then, 
we may assume that visible pedagogy can exist without explicit cultural control 
because of its explicit structural control in organisational relations between the 
school management team and teachers. However, this does not mean that cultural 
control cannot be explicit in the case of visible pedagogy. 
Now I extend the theory of visibility/invisibility or explicitness/implicitness to 
organisational relations between the school management team and teachers, and 
propose two modalities of management that correspond to two modalities of 
pedagogy. Invisible management is oriented towards implicit control (loose 
coupling or ambiguity) of structural aspects and explicit control (tight coupling or 
lack of ambiguity) of cultural aspects while visible management is oriented 
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towards explicit structural control and explicit or implicit cultural control. Table 
4.2 shows these definitions of the visible management and the invisible 
management in a diagram. 
Table 4.2 Visible Management and Invisible Management 
Structural Control Cultural Control 
Visible Management Explicit Explicit or Implicit 
Invisible Implicit Explicit 
Management 
The above extension ofBernstein's theory ofvisibility/invisibility to 
organisational relations is in accordance with the comment by William Tyler 
(1988, p.154) that 'the theory of codes suggests that at the deepest level of social 
organisation the relations between the organisation of the curriculum, the methods 
of teaching and the patterns of governance and supervision are tightly related'. 
As Bernstein (1990) says, visible pedagogy is a conservative modality of 
pedagogy, and invisible pedagogy is a progressive modality of pedagogy. 
Correspondingly, visible management is a managerial modality of management, 
and invisible management is a collegial modality of management. 
Devolved management and performance monitoring 
As we can see below, it seems that devolved management in the quasi-market 
system tends to be accompanied by formal structural control rather than informal 
cultural control. The structural control in devolved management seems to be 
realised through senior management's monitoring of staff's and sub-units' 
performances measured by explicit indicators. 
The combined use of devolved management and performance monitoring is an 
essential characteristic of the market-oriented reforms of public services. 
Performance indicators have been developed as tools for organisational control in 
the public services. In the case of education, performance indicators including 
examination results and truancy rates have been built into the quasi-market system. 
According to Common, Flynn and Mellon ( 1992), 'Whatever the motivation for 
decentralization, senior management cannot afford to allow people lower down 
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the organization to have so much autonomy that they fail to follow the strategy of 
the organization or meet agreed performance targets. Decentralization requires an 
adequate system to measure the performance of units and their contribution to the 
performance of the organization as a whole' (ibid, p.52). In their analysis of the 
UK's reformed public service systems with competition and decentralisation, the 
authors point out the prior movement towards decentralisation in the private 
sector. 'Decentralization in the public sector has reflected a trend in the private 
sector over the past two decades. Many companies have tried to reduce the size of 
their head offices and make plant and branch managers more autonomous' (ibid, 
p.50). 
Levacic (1995) also focuses on the combination of decentralised or devolved 
management and performance monitoring in both private and public sectors. She 
says, 'There appears to be an apparent paradox ... that increased central control 
of the curriculum has been accompanied by decreased control of resource 
management. However, the equivalent organizational change in the private 
sector-that of the multidivisional or M-form firm replacing a centrally controlled, 
functionally specialized corporate structure (U-form firm)-has been explained as 
a means of enhancing top management control and hence efficiency' (ibid, p.173). 
She explains the supposed merits of theM-form firm as follows. 'In contrast, a 
multi-divisional or M-form organization is structured into operational divisions, 
based on products, which are given a high degree of autonomy to manage 
themselves. They are controlled by the headquarters management by being set 
targets, monitored against these targets, and allocated resources in line with their 
success in contributing to overall company goals. The greater efficiency claimed 
for theM-form firm ... stems from the ability oftop management to engage in 
strategic management rather than being immersed in detailed operational issues, 
as in the U-form structure' (ibid, p.174). 'Appropriate incentives are given to 
divisional managers through setting personal and divisional performance targets 
which promote company-wide objectives. Thus the self-interest of managers and 
divisions is harnessed for the benefit of the organization as a whole. The 
information required by top management is therefore restricted to that needed for 
monitoring the overall performance of managers and their divisions and for 
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making strategic decisions about the development and direction of the business' 
(ibid, p.175). 
She examines the analogy between theM-form firm and the reformed education 
service. She tries to regard schools as operational divisions of an M-form 
organisation and the LEA or the central government as the headquarters 
management. 'The 1988 Education Reform Act specified key elements of theM-
form model, in particular establishing schools as operational divisions managed as 
independent cost centres, and creating in the national curriculum and its national 
testing a means for assessing the performance of schools and holding them 
accountable' (ibid, p.175). However, she admits imperfections in the analogy, 
saying, 'While the constituent features of theM-form model correspond well to 
equivalent features of the restructured education service, the model as developed 
in the English school system at the time of writing lacks the clear lines of 
accountability between top management and the divisions which characterize the 
generic M-form model' (ibid, 175). 
I would say that schools in the quasi-market system are more analogous to 
companies in a market than to operational divisions of a company. As she herself 
points out, school governing bodies 'are no longer part of the line of hierarchical 
control between school and LEA' (ibid, pp.176-7). The drastically strengthened 
powers of governing bodies are accompanied by the drastically weakened powers 
of LEAs. The strengthened powers of the central government are to establish and 
regulate the market framework, within which schools compete for parental choice, 
rather than to function as the headquarters management. It is difficult to regard 
the whole education service as one organisation. However, the subsequent 
Labour government's policies on education may have changed this situation. 
Schools may be a little more similar to operational divisions of a company than 
they were before the implementation of the Labour's policies. 
Although Levacic's analogy between theM-form organisation and the 
reformed education service may have the above-mentioned imperfections, it 
provides us with a significant insight into the combination of devolved 
management and performance monitoring as an important means of control in the 
reformed education service. She regards LMS as 'an organizational form for 
securing greater efficiency and stronger organizational control' (ibid, p.186). 
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The word 'control' in this context has a rather broad sense. She says, "'Control 
mechanisms" in the sense used here cover a range of distinctly different devices, 
most of which do not imply coercion except as a last resort' (ibid, p.l69). She 
presents four distinct control devices-'market relationship', 'hierarchical 
control', 'political control' and 'ethical codes of accepted behaviour'-, and 
these devices can also be regarded as 'modes of accountability' (ibid, pp.l69-
170). Based on the classification of the modes of accountability by Kogan ( 1986), 
Levacic argues that 'consumerist accountability' corresponds to 'market 
relationship', 'public accountability' to the mixture of 'hierarchical control' and 
'political control', and 'professional accountability' to 'ethical codes of accepted 
behaviour' (ibid, p.l70). 
The education reform has replaced 'LEAs' hierarchical administrative control 
of schools by a quasi-market in which schools receive payments which are 
contingent on their success in attracting pupils' (ibid, p.l71). Parents are 
expected to regard performance indicators including examination results as 
important when they choose a school for their child. Public examinations and 
national tests are surely essential control devices through performance monitoring 
in the reformed education system. Ofsted's inspection scheme is another one. 
These control devices are structural and visible, while professional ethics or 
ethical codes are cultural and invisible devices of control. These modes of control 
through devolved management, performance monitoring and competition are 
responsive, while the modes of control through bureaucratic administration are 
directive. 
The structural and cultural control devices are relevant to both the system level 
and the institutional level. This research will examine control devices adopted by 
school management teams at their schools. 
Directive visible, responsive visible and invisible modalities of management 
Based on the extension of Bernstein's theory of pedagogy to school 
organisation, I have stated that invisible management is oriented towards the 
implicit control of structural aspects and explicit control of cultural aspects of 
school organisation while visible management is oriented towards explicit 
structural control and explicit or implicit cultural control. Now the theoretical 
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extension can be applied to two modalities of visible management as well as 
invisible management. Like the case of visible pedagogy, visible management 
can be directive or responsive. As the responsive visible pedagogy's equivalent in 
organisational relations, the responsive visible management allows the apparent 
autonomy of school staff in their work through devolved management, but tries to 
establish tight control over the results of the work through performance 
monitoring. The above-mentioned literature of devolved management and 
performance monitoring seems to suggest the relevance of this modality to the 
quasi-market system of education. The directive visible management is a more 
traditional modality of management with hierarchical and direct control of staffs 
work. 
I define the three modalities of management as follows. The directive visible 
management is a modality of organisational relations, between school managers 
and teaching staff, which has explicit regulative rules and explicit prescriptive 
rules. The responsive visible management is a modality which has implicit 
regulative rules and explicit prescriptive rules. Invisible management is a 
modality which has implicit regulative rules and implicit prescriptive rules. Table 
4.3 shows these definitions of the modalities of management in a diagram. 
Table 4.3 Definitions ofthe modalities of management 
Regulative Rules Prescriptive Rules 
Directive Visible Management Explicit Explicit 
Responsive Visible Management Implicit Explicit 
(Oppressive Visible Management?) (Explicit) (Implicit) 
Invisible Management Implicit Implicit 
Structural control is divided into control in regulative rules and that in 
prescriptive rules. Both the regulative and prescriptive rules here are in 
organisational relations between school managers and teachers. The regulative 
rules have to do with how explicit the hierarchical power relations are between the 
managers and teachers. The prescriptive rules are concerned with how explicitly 
the teachers' tasks, methods of performing tasks, and performance measurement 
criteria are prescribed. In other words, the prescriptive rules are the rules that tell 
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teachers what to do, how to do, and what is to be evaluated. In contrast, the 
regulative rules are the rules that tell teachers to obey the managers' instructions 
about what to do and how to do. 
I do not include the aspect of cultural control in the above definition, but only 
the aspect of structural control consisting of regulative and instructional rules. 
Although Bernstein's theory implies that invisible pedagogy is oriented towards 
more explicit cultural control and more implicit structural control than visible 
pedagogy, I think that the difference between visible and invisible pedagogies 
does not depend on the explicitness of cultural control, but on the explicitness of 
structural control, that is, regulative and/or instructional rules. 
As implied by Bernstein, in order to function properly as a modality of 
pedagogic and organisational relations, invisible pedagogy may possibly need 
more explicit cultural control than visible pedagogy. Otherwise there is a danger 
of invisible pedagogy becoming chaotic. Without explicit cultural control, visible 
pedagogy can more easily avoid a chaotic situation than invisible pedagogy 
because the former has more explicit structural control than the latter. However, 
it does not mean that visible pedagogy cannot have explicit cultural control. 
Furthermore, whether or not invisible pedagogy manages to avoid a chaotic 
situation is a matter of empirical research rather than that of a theoretical 
definition. 
Finally, I should mention the oppressive visible management in Table 4.3, 
which corresponds to the oppressive visible pedagogy of Table 4.1 in this chapter. 
I have inserted a question mark in brackets next to this modality of management 
in the same way as I have done for the corresponding modality of pedagogy. 
There is no reason to believe that the modality of management will have more 
relevance to my research than the modality of pedagogy. It is not only oppressive 
but also unnatural to sustain a management regime in which school managers 
expose teachers to explicit power relations, but do not explicitly show them what 
tasks they should perform. Therefore, I provisionally exclude this modality of 
management, as well as the corresponding modality of pedagogy, from the set of 
the concepts as tools for my research. 
Modalities of management corresponding to those of pedagogy 
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Now it seems possible to integrate the whole theoretical framework of pedagogy 
and management based on Bernstein's theory of pedagogy and the organisational 
theories discussed above. I shall summarise the above-mentioned discussion as 
follows. 
Bernstein's theory of pedagogies and the organisational theory of ambiguity or 
coupling have a common feature. This feature is the contrast in the degree of 
explicitness of the rules in social relations. While the theory of pedagogies are 
concerned primarily with pedagogic relations between pupils and teachers, the 
ambiguity or coupling theory is concerned primarily with organisational relations 
between staff members. The tight/loose-coupled organisation has more/less 
explicit rules in organisational relations. Visible/invisible pedagogy has more/less 
explicit rules in pedagogic relations. 
However, invisible pedagogy is not mere chaos with ambiguity and looseness, 
but a generic modality of pedagogy with a set of professional values regarded as 
progressive. Bernstein implies that there is a tighter ideological linkage or 
coupling in invisible pedagogies than in visible pedagogies. Using the theory of 
organisational structure and culture, I have stated that invisible management is 
oriented towards explicit cultural control and implicit structural control while 
visible management is oriented towards explicit structural control and explicit or 
implicit cultural control. Thus Bernstein's theory of pedagogy has been extended 
over the border of pedagogic relations between pupils and teachers and brought 
into organisational relations between staff members as well. 
Then, the theory of devolved management and performance monitoring enables 
us to extend the concepts of the directive and responsive visible modalities to 
organisational relations. While the directive visible management is oriented 
towards the explicit control of both regulative and prescriptive aspects in 
organisational relations, the responsive visible management is oriented towards 
the implicit control of regulative aspects through devolved management and the 
explicit control of prescriptive aspects through performance monitoring. Here in 
the context of organisational relations between school managers and teachers, the 
regulative rules have to do with how explicit the hierarchical power relations are 
between the managers and teachers. The prescriptive rules are concerned with 
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how explicitly teachers' tasks, methods of performing tasks, and performance 
measurement criteria are prescribed. 
Thus, extending Bernstein's theory of pedagogic relations between pupils and 
teachers to organisational relations between school managers and teaching staff, I 
define directive visible, responsive visible and invisible management as three 
modalities of organisational relations between school managers and teaching staff 
in school as follows. The directive visible management is a modality of 
organisational relations, between school managers and teaching staff, which has 
explicit regulative rules and explicit prescriptive rules. The responsive visible 
management is a modality which has implicit regulative rules and explicit 
prescriptive rules. Invisible management is a modality which has implicit 
regulative rules and implicit prescriptive rules. 
In the above-mentioned definitions, which correspond to the definitions of the 
three modalities of pedagogy, there is a presumption that pedagogic relations and 
organisational relations may have the same or similar orientation in terms of 
regulative and prescriptive rules. As Bernstein ( 1990) said, visible/invisible 
pedagogy is conservative/progressive modality of pedagogic relations between 
teachers and pupils. In parallel with the dichotomy of pedagogy, visible/invisible 
management is managerial/collegial modality of organisational relations between 
school managers and teachers. The above-mentioned presumption is based on the 
perception that the combination of conservative education and managerial 
organisation is as natural as that of progressive education and collegial 
organisation. The latter combination is generally regarded as based on the 
professional values of the so-called liberal educational establishment. 
The above presumption seems meaningful, and is in tune with Tyler's comment 
that 'the theory of codes suggests that at the deepest level of social organisation 
the relations between the organisation of the curriculum, the methods of teaching 
and the patterns of governance and supervision are tightly related'( Tyler, 1988, 
p.l54). The presumption is useful for formulating the above three modalities of 
management as corresponding to the modalities of pedagogy. The importance of 
Bernstein's theory lies in each modality's definition in the use of the explicitness 
of regulative and instructional or prescriptive rules. 
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The control in the responsive visible pedagogy and management is not 
necessarily looser than that in the directive visible pedagogy and management. 
Explicit prescriptive rules can realise tight control in organisational relations as 
well as in pedagogic relations. Levacic (1995) says, 'TheM-form organization 
thus depicted as tight mission accompanied by loose means. Top management 
operates tight control through strategic management and performance monitoring, 
while leaving how the objectives are attained to middle managers and their 
divisions'. Performance measurements based on prescribed norms of instructional 
discourse and quantitative indicators including examination and test results seem 
to penetrate the three levels of relations- pedagogic relations between pupils and 
teachers, organisational relations between teaching staff and school managers, and 
market relations between schools and parents. At institutional level, classroom 
teachers can be held accountable to their head of department and/or the 
headteacher and senior management team, and the heads of department can be 
held accountable for their performances to the headteacher and senior 
management team. At system level, schools can be held accountable for their 
performances to parents, local and central government, and other stakeholders. 
Performance indicators and measurements, which make prescriptive rules more 
explicit, seem to be effective means of control in organisational relations as well 
as in pedagogic relations. There may be some linkage between a modality of 
pedagogy and that of management, and explicit prescriptive rules may have an 
increasing importance for both pedagogy and management in the education quasi-
market. These issues will be examined later in the analysis of the empirical data. 
Visible, invisible and neutral strategies 
Now, with the above-mentioned theoretical framework of visible/invisible 
pedagogy/management based on Bernstein's theory of pedagogy and the 
organisational theories, let us return to the focal issue of school strategies. Here I 
will repeat the definition of school strategies to ensure that the theoretical 
framework of school strategies is well integrated with that of visible/invisible 
pedagogy/management. In Chapter 3, I have defined strategies of a school as 
plans that the school management team headed by the headteacher adopts and 
implements in the quasi-market education system. The management team usually 
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includes the deputies and other senior teachers. School strategies are institutional 
strategies at management level, as opposed to pedagogic practices at classroom 
level, but include strategies in pedagogic fields such as teaching, assessment, 
reporting and discipline as well as those in managerial fields such as organisation, 
staffing and marketing. These strategies are not necessarily written down or 
publicised as such. Therefore, this research aims to identify school strategies in 
the internal structures of managerial discourse. 
In Chapter 3, I have presented a basic assumption that the quasi-market system 
encourages schools to adopt and implement strategies oriented towards the 
traditional academic model. Now, with the theoretical framework of 
visible/invisible pedagogy/management, this assumption can be rephrased. The 
rephrased assumption is that schools in the quasi-market tend to introduce 
strategies oriented towards visible pedagogy and management. I call these 
strategies visible strategies. Conversely, invisible strategies are those strategies 
that are oriented towards invisible pedagogy and management. In other words, 
visible strategies are basically strategies oriented towards more conservative 
pedagogy and more managerial management. Invisible strategies are those 
oriented towards more progressive pedagogy and more collegial management. 
I will give more operational definitions to the above-mentioned modalities of 
school strategy as follows. A visible strategy is a school strategy that enhances 
the explicitness of regulative and/or prescriptive rules in pedagogic relations 
between pupils and teachers or in organisational relations between teachers and 
school managers. An invisible strategy is a school strategy that enhances the 
implicitness of those rules. If a school strategy enhances neither explicitness nor 
implicitness of the rules, the strategy is a neutral strategy. 
The modalities of visible and invisible strategies are subdivided as follows. A 
regulative visible strategy is a school strategy that enhances the explicitness of 
regulative rules in pedagogic relations between pupils and teachers or in 
organisational relations between teachers and school managers. A prescriptive 
visible strategy is a school strategy that enhances the explicitness of prescriptive 
rules in pedagogic relations or in organisational relations. A regulative invisible 
strategy and a prescriptive invisible strategy are defined in the same way. 
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There is another dimension of the subdivision ofthe modalities. School 
strategies can be placed in either of the two broad areas of pedagogy and 
management, which correspond to the above-mentioned theoretical framework of 
pedagogy and management. Strategies in pedagogic fields, such as teaching, 
assessment, reporting, extracurricular activities, pastoral care and discipline, are 
concerned with pedagogic relations between pupils and teachers. Strategies in 
managerial fields, such as organisation, staffing and marketing, have to do with 
organisational relations between teachers and school managers. Therefore, I will 
indicate the place of each strategy as follows: Regulative visible strategy in 
pedagogy, prescriptive invisible strategy in pedagogy, regulative invisible 
strategy in management, prescriptive visible strategy in management, etc. 
Tables 4.4 and 4.5 summarise the above-mentioned subdivisions of the 
modalities of visible and invisible strategies respectively. 
Table 4.4 Subdivisions ofVisible Strategy 
To Enhance the To Enhance the 
Explicitness Explicitness 
of Regulative Rules of Prescriptive Rules 
In Pedagogy Regulative Visible Prescriptive Visible 
Strategy in Pedagogy Strategy in Pedagogy 
In Management Regulative Visible Prescriptive Visible 
Strategy in Management Strategy in Management 
Table 4.5 Subdivisions oflnvisible Strategy 
To Enhance the To Enhance the 
Implicitness Implicitness 
of Regulative Rules of Prescriptive Rules 
In Pedagogy Regulative Invisible Prescriptive Invisible 
Strategy in Pedagogy Strategy in Pedagogy 
In Management Regulative Invisible Prescriptive Invisible 
Strategy in Management Strategy in Management 
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Visible strategies predominant in the education quasi-market: Hypothesis 
Let us return to the above-mentioned assumption that schools in the quasi-market 
tend to introduce strategies oriented towards visible pedagogy and management. 
Now, with the theoretical framework of visible and invisible strategies in 
pedagogy and management, this assumption can be developed into the basic 
hypothesis of this research. The hypothesis is that school managers in the quasi-
market tend to introduce more visible strategies than invisible strategies in 
pedagogy and management. This research is intended to examine the hypothesis. 
The above-mentioned hypothesis implies that more and more schools become 
oriented towards visible pedagogy and management in the quasi-market system of 
education. However, I must make it clear that the empirical study in this research 
does not deal with the whole picture of pedagogy and management of any school. 
Nor does the study describe all the strategies that were being used in the school at 
the time. The empirical data focus on 'new strategies', which the school 
managers introduced or changed since the quasi-market reform by the Education 
Reform Act 1988. Those strategies were 'new' at the time of the data 
collection. The empirical study in this research aims at investigating new 
strategies or strategic changes pursued by the school managers after the quasi-
market reform in order to examine the basic hypothesis that school managers in 
the quasi-market tend to introduce more visible strategies than invisible strategies 
in pedagogy and management. 
In other words, the empirical study is not concerned with the predominance of 
any modality of pedagogy and management, but is concerned with the directions 
of the strategic changes pursued by the school managers. The hypothesis-the 
introduction of more visible strategies than invisible strategies-implies a general 
direction of movement towards visible pedagogy and management. The 
hypothesis is based on an assumption that the quasi-market system tends to 
encourage school managers to try to move their school in the direction of visible 
pedagogy and management. 
Whether the general direction is towards the directive or responsive modality of 
visible pedagogy and management is another question. Furthermore, there is no 
guarantee that the direction for pedagogy is the same as that for management. I 
can only expect clues to these additional questions from the empirical study. 
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These issues will be discussed on the basis of the empirical findings. However, 
the subdivisions of visible and invisible modalities of pedagogy and management 
are essential for the whole theoretical framework of my research, which gives 
meaning to the hypothesis and the additional questions. 
The place of Bernstein's theory in this research 
Based on the above theory development, let us now clarify the place of 
Bernstein's theory in this thesis as follows. 
The dichotomy ofvisible and invisible modalities can be extended from 
pedagogy to management, and school strategies in both pedagogy and 
management can be interpreted in historical and systemic contexts. Bernstein's 
theory of visible and invisible modalities enables us to relate strategic changes at 
the micro-level of school to quasi-market mechanisms and other forces at the 
macro-level ofthe education system. The integration or linkage of macro and 
micro levels is a major theme in Bernstein's sociological theory. Bernstein's 
theory also makes it clear that education is not a value-free field, and the choice 
between visible and invisible modalities, that is, academic and progressive 
education, has been a major disputed issue within the battleground of educational 
discourse in Britain and elsewhere. At least some advocates of the academic 
schooling model, that is, visible modality, constituted a part of the coalition that 
promoted the then Conservative government's policy of introducing the quasi-
market into education. The macro/micro linkage and the ideological context of 
education are interrelated as Brian Davies ( 1994, p.16) says, 'The different 
modalities were viewed as representation of different ideological positions within 
the state regulation of education and representations of different ideologies of 
control sponsored by different class fractions. The development of the concept of 
code allowed movement from macro structures to micro contexts, pointed to 
ideological arenas of appropriation, sponsorship and creation and showed the 
social basis of different acquisition'. 
In short, Bernstein's theory provides a solid and fertile basis for formulating the 
theoretical framework to analyse school strategies at micro-level in relation to 
historical and systemic contexts at macro-level, at both levels of which conflicting 
values and ideals are of enormous significance due to the social functions of 
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education including socialisation and selection. Such value conflicts can be 
understood in a simple but fundamental question of what kind of education is 
desirable for individuals and for society. Concerning pedagogy, the question will 
be regarding the role that should be played by academic (visible) or progressive 
(invisible) education. Regarding management, the question will be whether 
managerial or collegial operation of school is desirable. 
Having presented the above-mentioned importance of Bernstein' theory to 
this thesis, I would like to re-emphasise that the purpose of this research is not to 
work on or test his theory. The key focus of this thesis is not his theory of 
pedagogy for its own sake but school strategies introduced or changed in the 
quasi-market system of education although the theory provides a valuable 
inspiration for formulating the conceptual framework to investigate those changes. 
Therefore, while this part of Bernstein's theory is used as a tool for this thesis, I 
never claim that the thesis discusses his theory in its integrity. Nor is the thesis 
constrained by the scope of his theory. The dichotomy of visible and invisible 
modalities is explicitly extended from pedagogy to management by the author of 
this thesis. Such an extension is seen only in germ in Bernstein's own writings. 
The theoretical framework to analyse school strategies in the use of the dichotomy 
is originated by the author, and school strategies in the analysis include not only 
strategies in pedagogy but also those in management. 
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Part IV School Strategies in Headteachers' Discourses: 
Multiple-Case Study 
Chapter 5 Methodological Description of the Empirical Study 
Case study as the research strategy 
The first question for designing the empirical study is what methodological 
strategy should be adopted. According to Robson (1993, p.40), a widely used 
approach classifies research strategies into three main categories of 'experiment', 
'survey' and 'case study'. Case study is adopted as the strategy for the empirical 
element of this research. It is almost meaningless to consider a possibility of 
choosing experiment as the research strategy because the research interest here is 
in the real world of the education quasi-market which is too complex to control 
and manipulate variables and conditions for undertaking any experiment. Then, 
why is case study chosen instead of survey? 
The methodological strategy should fit the purpose of the empirical study. The 
purpose of the empirical study in this research is to investigate new strategies or 
strategic changes pursued by school managers after the quasi-market reform. The 
study must be designed to examine the basic hypothesis that school managers in 
the quasi-market tend to introduce more visible strategies than invisible strategies 
in pedagogy and management. It is very difficult to receive more than superficial 
responses to a standardised set of questions in a survey concerning such a 
complex issue as school strategies in the quasi-market. First, respondents may 
simply not understand what is really sought when they are asked about 'strategies' 
in the questionnaire. Even if they understand it, it is unlikely that they will spend 
much time to give thoughtful answers to such a complex issue when busy 
respondents do not feel obliged to do so. Furthermore, the issue may be too 
sensitive for them to give direct answers with regard to strategies in the real world 
of competition. The most serious problem is that it is very difficult to get enough 
information in the questionnaire to judge whether each strategy is visible or 
invisible. The judgement will be possible only if strategies are described in detail 
and analysed within its context. 
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All the above-mentioned difficulties and problems indicate the relevance of the 
'case study' strategy that enables intensive and in-depth analysis of the detailed 
descriptions of each strategy and its context. The methodology of 'case study' 
may open the doors to more than superficial accounts, thoughtful answers with the 
understanding of the issue, subtle responses, rather than no response, to sensitive 
questions with some rapport and appropriate techniques, and detailed descriptions 
of each strategy and its context. 
Multiple-case study: Targeting six secondary schools in a London borough 
If 'case study' is chosen as the methodological strategy, the next important 
question is regarding the 'case' for this research. The subject of the research is 
new strategies or strategic changes in schools pursued by school managers after 
the quasi-market reform, and therefore a school or a certain number of schools 
may be the case(s). According to Yin (1989, p.46), 'A primary distinction in 
designing case studies is between single- and multiple-case designs'. Considering 
that the purpose of this research is to examine the basic hypothesis that school 
managers in the quasi-market tend to introduce more visible strategies than 
invisible strategies for their schools, there seems to be no rationale for a single-
case design. The examination of such a tendency probably needs more than one 
case. Such rationales for a single-case as 'critical case', 'extreme or unique case' 
and 'revelatory case' (ibid, pp.46--49) seem to be irrelevant to the purpose of this 
research. 'The evidence from multiple cases is often considered more compelling, 
and the overall study is therefore regarded as being more robust' (ibid, p.52). 
However, the same author cautions us, 'the conduct of a multiple-case study 
can require extensive resources and time beyond the means of a single student or 
independent research investigator' (ibid, p.53). On the grounds of limited time, 
manpower and resources available for this research, the number of cases cannot 
be large. 
It is necessary to decide whether the case schools should be primary or 
secondary. The decision was to target secondary schools on the assumption that 
they were under more market pressure than primary schools, with which 
proximity was more important for parental choice, and on which performance 
tables were not yet published at the time of the empirical study. 
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It is also necessary to decide where the cases should be chosen from. As a 
matter of practicability, the cases cannot be too far from the researcher's residence. 
It is also appropriate to choose a geographical cluster of schools, which may 
compete with each other. This does not mean that these schools are to be in a 
single local quasi-market. It is not easy to judge which schools are in the local 
market and which are not, until a detailed analysis is completed. We should note 
that the purpose of this study is not to describe a local quasi-market but to analyse 
strategies of schools. Not the local market but the schools are the cases for this 
study. Although some schools may compete with other schools that are not in 
close proximity, there is a higher possibility of competition between schools if 
they are near one another. Any findings of competition between the schools may 
be useful as background information for analysing strategies in the contexts. 
Whether or not all the schools studied are in the single local market, it is easier to 
analyse their strategies in some local contexts if they are in a limited geographical 
area. 
Because the purpose of this research is to examine a hypothesised tendency of 
the strategic movement of schools in the quasi-market, 'extreme' cases should be 
avoided in the use of a similar logic to Patton's 'typical case sampling' (Patton, 
1990, pp.l73-174). For example, analysing the strategies of schools in very 
affluent areas with extraordinarily choosy parents may not make the findings 
particularly persuasive. On the other hand, there is no point in studying schools in 
areas where transportation or any other factor almost prohibits school choice. 
Politically famous LEAs such as the then Conservative government's flagships or 
their targets of political attack would not be very relevant either. 
With reference to the logic of Patton's 'maximum variation sampling' (ibid, 
p.172), if the cases include various types of school, such as co-educational/single-
sex, LEA-maintained/grant-maintained, secular/denominational, and academically 
high/low performing schools, it may result in 'important shared patterns that cut 
across cases and derive their significance from having emerged out of 
heterogeneity' (ibid, p.172). 
The above-mentioned factors taken into consideration, a non-affluent London 
borough without any extremeness has been chosen. The population in the 
borough has diverse socio-economic and ethnic backgrounds. Roughly speaking, 
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it becomes relatively more affluent as you move away from the inner-city areas 
and more deprived as you go towards the inner-city areas. The borough as a 
whole is less affluent than the national average. The 1994 performance tables or 
the so-called league tables published by the then DFE show that the average for 
schools in the borough (excluding independent schools) of the GCSE exam results 
in terms of '5 or more Grades A-C' is more than 10% lower than the England 
average (including all the schools) (43.3%). 
Before the case schools were chosen, an interview with the Assistant 
Education Officer of the borough in charge of admissions was conducted to bring 
about preliminary information on the secondary schools in the borough. The 
information taken into account, from the borough's secondary schools, six schools 
in relatively close proximity to one another were chosen as the cases. The case 
schools were chosen to include a variety of types of school, that is, co-
educational/single-sex, LEA-maintained/grant-maintained, 
secular/denominational, and academically high/low performing schools. 
The empirical study has been conducted on condition that the borough, the 
schools and the people concerned will remain anonymous. I give the borough a 
pseudonym of Roundham and the six case schools the pseudonyms of Easthill 
Girls' School, Roundham Catholic College, George Square School, Fertile Land 
School, Seymour Field School and Riverside Street School. 
The basic features of the six case schools are as follows. All the schools are 
comprehensive. 
Easthill Girls' School 
Type: County; girls; comprehensive; 11-16 
Standard number: Not much below 200 
GCSE results (1994; 5 or more A-Cs): Almost the same as the England average 
Roundham Catholic College 
Type: Voluntary-aided; co-educational; comprehensive; 11-18 (with sixth form) 
Standard number: Not much below 200 
GCSE results: Just above the borough average 
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George Square School 
Type: County; co-educational; comprehensive; 11-16 
Standard number: Not much above 100 
GCSE results: Below the borough average 
Fertile Land School 
Type: County; co-educational; comprehensive; 11-16 
Standard number: Not much above 100 
GCSE results: Below the borough average 
Seymour Field School 
Type: Grant-maintained; co-educational; comprehensive; 11-18 (with sixth form) 
Standard number: Not much above 200 
GCSE results: More than 10% higher than the England average 
Riverside Street School 
Type: Grant-maintained; co-educational; comprehensive; 11-16 
Standard number: Not much below 200 
GCSE results: Higher than the borough average but lower than the England 
average 
Semi-structured interviews to be adopted 
The 'semi-structured interview' has been chosen as the main method of data 
collection for this research. Documents have been collected from schools as 
supplementary data. 
Because of the nature of the research objects, 'school strategies', it is highly 
unlikely to be able to get relevant data mainly from the written information. We 
can easily imagine that such sensitive and complicated objects as the strategies to 
compete with other schools are rarely explicitly stated in written information and 
need to be asked about. School development plans and school policies may 
provide valuable information, but it will be still necessary to ask specific 
questions in order to find what strategy has actually been adopted in specific 
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contexts, why it has been done with specific meanings, and what its implications 
are for the school's competition with other schools for parental choices. 
Therefore, interviews are essential for this research. Documents including 
prospectuses, development plans, policies, and Ofsted inspection reports (if the 
inspection has been done) have been collected as supplementary data sources to 
assist the transcription and interpretation of interview records. 
The semi-structured interview method has been chosen from different interview 
methods because of the following reasons. The purpose of this empirical study is 
to examine the basic hypothesis of school strategies, and therefore it is necessary 
for the interviewer to have great control over what topics should be covered, and 
the topics should be listed in advance and referred to by the interviewer during the 
interview. Without such structure and control, the interviewee's talk might end up 
with, for example, just criticisms against government policies, complaints about 
his/her workload or details about his/her subject. On the other hand, however, the 
interviewer needs a great deal of flexibility in asking to expand on some important 
comments, pursuing new topics emerging during the interview, changing the order 
of topics according to the flow of the interview, and so on. Moreover, the nature 
of the research interest in the competition between schools, which is rather 
sensitive and complex, requires much more tact than allowed by the fully 
structured interview method. 
The self-completion questionnaire method has the problems of the high non-
response rate and the very little possibility of checking the respondent's 
seriousness and understanding in addition to the same disadvantages as the fully 
structured interview method. Although observation methods might have been of 
some use to this research, it is unrealistic to replace the interviews in the research 
by observations because asking questions is much more efficient in getting 
information on school strategies than observing. Observations could have been 
used as a supplementary method, for example, in such occasions as staff meetings 
and parents evenings. However, eventually I have avoided including the method 
because of the lack of time for it and its sensitivity, which might have discouraged 
the schools to accept even interviews. 
Headteachers to be interviewed 
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The obvious next question was who should be interviewed. The purpose of the 
empirical study in this research was to investigate new strategies or strategic 
changes pursued by 'school managers' after the quasi-market reform in order to 
examine the basic hypothesis that 'school managers' in the quasi-market tend to 
introduce more visible strategies than invisible ones in pedagogy and management. 
While intensive and detailed analysis of interview data was necessary, time, 
manpower and resources available for the study were limited. Remembering 
Yin's caution (Yin, 1989, p.53), it was rational to concentrate on the most 
important ones among 'school managers'. Therefore, it was decided that the 
headteachers should be interviewed. 
The research interest is primarily in strategies or strategic changes planned and 
implemented by the management team which the headteacher leads. While 
deputies and other managers may also have important roles in planning and 
implementing strategies, there is no reason to believe that they are more 
responsible for and knowledgeable of all the strategic changes in their school than 
the headteacher is. Then, how about school governors? It is unlikely that 
governors are more knowledgeable of all the school strategies than the 
headteacher is. The governors' role is usually not to plan and implement concrete 
strategies but to supervise the planning and implementation and give broad policy 
directions. In short, 'managers' rather than 'governors' are the main priority for 
this research. Therefore, interviews with headteachers are essential. 
The research is focused on managerial strategies, and pedagogic practices are 
not directly investigated. It would be interesting if the research could also pursue 
relations between the strategies and the practices. However, it would require 
another piece of research. The implications of the findings of this thesis for such 
research will be discussed towards the end of the thesis. 
Conducting the interviews and the transcripts as empirical data 
After considering the questions to be asked in each interview and the 
practicability in terms of getting the appointment, it was decided to ask the 
head teachers to spare one and half hours for the interview at their school. 
Because of the importance of each case from a not-large number of target schools, 
it was essential to avoid them declining the appointment. It was thought that one 
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and half hour interviews would provide substantial amount of information to make 
a significant analysis. The judgement was that to ask for two hours or more might 
make the possibility of declining high as headteachers were believed to be very 
busy, and that it was more convenient for them to spare time for the interview at 
their school without having to move. A letter to request an appointment was sent 
to each of the six case schools, and all of them accepted it. From November 1994 
to Aprill995, the six headteachers (including one acting headteacher) were 
interviewed. The actual dates of all the interviews are stated in Appendix I. 
As stated above, the interviews were carried out as 'semi-structured interviews'. 
The interviewer made sure that the interviewee understood that the interviewer 
was searching for new strategies or strategic changes since the quasi-market-
reform in any aspects of the school both in pedagogy and management. For that 
purpose, the interviewer mentioned exemplifying categories such as teaching, 
discipline, assessment and reporting, marketing, admission, and management as 
potential areas where any strategies might still be left out. Nonetheless, especially 
during the early stage of the interview, the interviewee was encouraged to discuss 
what he/she thought to be important as new strategies. In the course of the 
interview, when the interviewer felt that something potentially important was 
mentioned but not fully explicated by the interviewee, the interviewer asked the 
interviewee to expand on it. Although one and half hours were not plenty of time, 
towards the end of each interview, the interviewer managed to check with the 
interviewee to see if everything to be discussed was covered. 
All the interviews were tape-recorded with the interviewee's permission and 
fully transcribed later. The transcripts are original data from which school 
strategies have been sought out. The transcripts were thoroughly and repeatedly 
read to prevent any new strategy or strategic change from being missed in a large 
amount of transcribed interview data. These new strategies, which were 
specifically said to be introduced or changed after the quasi-market reform, have 
been identified in the data and analysed in detail. The new strategies have been 
classified as visible, invisible, or neutral unless it has been impossible because of 
the lack of information (in that case, classified as unknown). The strategies have 
also been classified into two categories of pedagogy and management. 
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Classification of strategies into visible and invisible modalities 
First it should be reemphasised that the strategies to be identified in this empirical 
study are 'new' strategies, which were introduced or changed since the quasi-
market reform by the Education Reform Act 1988. These strategies were new at 
the time of the data collection. The empirical study aims at investigating the new 
strategies or strategic changes pursued by the school managers after the reform in 
order to explore the basic hypothesis of this thesis that school managers in the 
quasi-market tend to introduce more visible strategies than invisible ones in 
pedagogy and management. 
The new strategies are identified within the transcribed interviews with the six 
school headteachers and classified as regulative and/or prescriptive visible or 
invisible strategy in pedagogy and/or management. The judgement for each 
strategy is based on qualitative analysis, and the following examples show how it 
is done. All the identified strategies are fully described and classified in 
Appendix II. 
The first example is one of the Easthill Girls' School's strategies in pedagogy, 
which is judged as a prescriptive visible strategy, as follows. 
(Easthill Girls' School's Strategy) To introduce setting earlier in mathematics, 
science and languages: Prescriptive visible strategy in pedagogy 
At the time of the interview, the school was introducing setting earlier in the 
subjects of mathematics, science and modem languages: 
I would say where it's changed, for example, in maths, we now try to set 
in Year 8 rather than leave it to Year 9 or 10. So the setting has come 
down earlier. 
In languages, French, Spanish, are also trying to set earlier, and science 
again we're setting earlier. 
The headteacher explains that the earlier setting is a strategy targeting more able 
pupils: 
Right, we now try to do that because we feel that the more able girls have 
a better chance of getting the very top results if they're set earlier. 
Obviously you have to balance with the average girls and the less-than-
average girls, because we don't want to label children, but we definitely 
feel that in most subjects, the higher ability girls have a chance of getting, 
say, the starred A grade or the A grade if they are set earlier and targeted 
more, the work is targeted more. 
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This strategy stratifies the pupils on the basis of their performances, and therefore 
makes prescriptive rules, criteria rules in this case, more explicit in pedagogic 
relations. It is a prescriptive visible strategy in pedagogy. 
The second one, Roundham Catholic College's strategy in pedagogy, is an 
example of the strategy judged as invisible as follows. 
(Roundham Catholic College's Strategy) SMILE scheme of mathematics: 
Regulative and prescriptive invisible strategy in pedagogy 
The school introduced a mathematics scheme called 'SMILE' five years before 
the interview. Under this scheme, pupils work at their own level through sheets 
and cards without textbooks, and a teacher's role is that of a facilitator moving 
around and encouraging pupils. The headteacher describes the scheme as being 
very child-centred: 
But, er, I would say that, er, when the school was set up, er, again, it's, it's 
something that, that happened in the past, I think there was, there was a, a 
very great stress laid on a child-centred education, and on the idea of 
children taking responsibility for their own learning. And for example, 
one of the, the other things that we have done here is a mathematics 
scheme, which is called 'SMILE', which is, er, very child-based. The 
children, er, sort of, control their own sort of learning to some extent and 
they can all work at their own level. 
... the idea is that it's, er, the children work, er, they, they work to their 
own ability. And a teacher is more a person who comes around and, and 
so then encourages them and shows them, and . . . . But they take, they 
take a lot of responsibility for their own learning. The, there are no 
textbooks, the, er, the scheme is, is taught through work sheets and cards, 
and there is a, a very complex system of progression and assessment. And, 
er, actually, to be honest, the logistics of introducing the scheme is very 
difficult, you know. 
The SMILE scheme was controversial. There were quite a few parents, according 
to the headteacher, who were quite negative about the scheme at the beginning. 
He perceived that very many parents liked a very traditional approach: 
That has been very controversial. And ironically, although it was 
introduced, er, I suppose to, er, to encourage, er, parents to see a more 
positive aspect of the school and so on, er, quite a few parents, I think, 
probably at the beginning, were, were quite negative about it. 
Parents were, parents were not, not supportive of our, er, I think parents, 
parents at that time were, would have preferred a more traditional 
approach. And, er, it was, we've had a difficult, er, time introducing this, 
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this new scheme, because it is very new and it is very innovative. . .. But 
I think, again, parents in Catholic schools, I have to say, and in county 
schools presumably as well, er, curriculum innovation is not always, er, 
applauded by parents. Parents, very many parents like a very traditional 
approach. In some ways, Catholic schools always had a, a reputation as 
being very traditional, and that was one of the, the, things that, er, the 
parents found attractive about them, er, especially in the areas of discipline 
and behaviour and those sorts of area. 
Some mathematics teachers also had difficulty in adapting themselves to the 
scheme, and in-service training was provided for the transition to the scheme: 
And again we had here, er, people who were trained in a very traditional 
teaching style. So it, it took a while for them to adopt, er, to the new 
system and for it to be effective. 
But, but let me say it was very, very difficult for logistics of moving from 
traditional mathematics to a new system, which involves cards and filing 
cabinets and children moving about the classroom and things like that. 
And the training and, er, in-service training for staff, that was involved. 
The introduction of the SMILE scheme implies a strategic change from visible to 
invisible pedagogy to improve the school's performance in mathematics as 
follows. The reasons for the introduction of the SMILE scheme was that the 
senior management including the headteacher identified a clear problem in terms 
of performance in mathematics and that it was suggested that a child-centred and 
dynamic scheme might be more suitable for the pupils in the school than the 
traditional type of mathematics teaching: 
Er, but the headteacher and senior management, I mean, obviously, er, 
right from the start, we were looking at performance, and we were looking 
at performance indicators. And we could recognise very early on that 
mathematics was the area which needed very significant improvement. 
Well, first of all we identified that there was clearly a problem and, er, it 
had to be resolved, something had to be done. And, er, it was suggested 
that, er, perhaps one of the reasons why children were failing was because 
that they were not suited to, er, to the traditional types of courses that had 
been taught, and that, er, mathematics as a subject within the school had 
been taught in a very, er, uninteresting, stiff, boring sort of way, and that 
perhaps, er, if we encouraged children to take some responsibility for their 
own learning and if we introduced the very dynamic new scheme, er, 
which was child-centred, that perhaps we could tum things around. And 
that has proved to some extent to have been the case. 
According to the above description by the headteacher, the introduction of the 
SMILE scheme loosened the mathematics teachers' directive control over the 
pupils and the prescription of what and when the pupils should learn, and 
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therefore made regulative and prescriptive rules more implicit in pedagogic 
relations. It is a regulative and prescriptive invisible strategy in pedagogy. It is 
interesting to note that a form of invisible pedagogy can be adopted to improve 
examination results despite the conception that visible pedagogy is more exam-
oriented than invisible pedagogy. 
The third example, from Riverside Street School, is a strategy in management, 
which is judged as visible as follows. 
(Riverside Street School's Strategy) Departmental review: Regulative and 
prescriptive visible in management 
The headteacher has introduced a departmental review, a review of performance 
of each curriculum area. Once a year, in October, every head of department has to 
report to and discuss with the headteacher and the deputy head in charge of 
curriculum. It is focused on examination results. After examination results come 
out in August, each head of department writes a report in September. According 
to the headteacher, he and the deputy ask the heads of department very difficult 
questions in the review meetings: 
Every year, once a year, we have what's called a departmental review. 
Every head of department has to come in this room with the deputy head, 
curriculum. They have to write a report on their examination results, who 
took the exam classes, and we ask some very, very hard questions about 
the quality of teaching. 'Are your teachers setting homework regularly? 
Are they marking it regularly? Who are the best teachers teaching 
examination groups? Why did your results go down last year? How have 
you spent your money and resources?' 
With regard to the introduction of the departmental review, the headteacher's 
intention is to make his teaching staff accountable to him and the deputy in terms 
of examination results and make their control over the staff's performance more 
explicit and tighter: 
We set them targets. We set, we make them accountable to us. It's not 
good enough to teach all year and say, 'Our exam results weren't very 
good last year'. 
Er, we now insist on proper departmental reviews. Teachers are made 
accountable. If you went to a maths teacher now and said, er, 'What 
happens if you don't get good examination results?', their answer would 
be, 'Well, I have to explain to somebody what I have been doing'. We 
make the teachers accountable, put some pressure on the teachers. 
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Review meetings are recorded and minuted, and the headteacher reports on the 
reviews to the governing body. The procedures seem quite formal. The 
consequences of the reviews can be very serious. In the interview, the 
headteacher mentioned a particular teacher whose performance did not satisfy him 
and the head of department, and he said that, unless the teacher improve, he would 
not let the teacher teach any exam classes in the following year. He regards the 
threat to the job as a necessary part of the quality control, which the management 
imposes on the teaching staff: 
Now, I think that comes a time when it's up to the headteacher and the 
deputies to impose on teachers a form of quality control. If you thought 
you were going to loose your job because you were doing it, you're not 
doing it properly, that, that is a motivator. In this country, there isn't 
enough of that in my opinion. 
The departmental review can be regarded as a formal kind of monitoring scheme 
to tighten not only prescriptive but also directive control by the school 
management over the staff based on examination results as a particularly 
important criterion. Therefore, it is a regulative and prescriptive visible strategy 
in management, which enhances the explicitness of regulative (hierarchical) and 
prescriptive (criteria) rules in organisational relations. 
Qualitative data analysis to interpret each strategy in a particular context 
The above examples of interpreting each strategy show how this method of 
qualitative analysis works. Ultimately it relies on the persuasiveness of the 
logical analysis of a strategy in its particular context. While handling qualitative 
data 'in a rigorous and disciplined way' (Robson, 1993, p. 373) is not an easy task, 
the analysis of qualitative data in this research is such an endeavour. Moreover, 
there does not seem to be other better strategy for the analysis of the data 
collected in this multiple-case study. The following chapters are expected to 
demonstrate the success of these procedures. 
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Chapter 6 Strategic Changes Described by the Headteachers 
Now this chapter presents the six schools' 'new' strategies that were introduced or 
changed since the quasi-market reform according to their headteacher. In order 
not to lose sight of the research theme, only some examples of the strategies are 
presented here, and each school's strategies are summarised and discussed in a 
compact manner and purposefully in the context of the hypothesis. The full 
description of all the new strategies mentioned by the six school headteachers are 
presented in Appendix II, and you can see that the summarised discussion is still 
relevant after you read the appendix. 
Easthill Girls' School: County; girls; 11-16 
Standard number: Not much below 200 
GCSE results (1994; 5 or more A-Cs): Almost the same as the England average 
Date of interviewing the headteacher: 1 December 1994 
To introduce setting earlier in mathematics, science and languages: Prescriptive 
visible strategy in pedagogy 
This school, as stated above, introduced setting earlier in mathematics, science 
and languages, which is a prescriptive visible strategy in pedagogy. The strategy 
aimed at enabling academically able pupils to get very good grades in GCSE 
examinations. It is evident in the headteacher's account quoted in the previous 
chapter. 
Examinations Officer: Prescriptive visible strategy in pedagogy and management 
The school also initiated the post of Examination Officer as one of the three senior 
teachers to raise examination results through comparing and analysing 
performances of pupils and those of the curriculum areas. It is a prescriptive 
visible strategy in both pedagogy and management to make criteria (prescriptive) 
rules more explicit in pedagogic and organisational relations. 
About four years before the interview, the headteacher appointed the first 
Examination Officer, who helped the headteacher to monitor each curriculum 
area's performance in terms of examination results: 
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Right, I have an Examination Officer, and one of his main roles is to 
monitor with the heads of the curriculum areas on their students' 
achievements, and he will prepare the analysis for me that I would then 
look at, and I meet regularly with the head of each curriculum area. We 
would look at their results in detail at the meeting, trying to identify where 
praises due and where there are areas for improvement. 
For this headteacher, examinations work was a priority to put money from the 
limited budget into: 
But that post is quite an expensive salary. So it means you have to make a 
decision to put money into a person doing that work. So it's a question of 
priorities. 
Absence policy being planned: Regulative visible strategy in pedagogy 
In addition to examination results, truancy or unauthorised absence was another 
sort of published information for parents as consumers. The headteacher was 
working on absence policy at the time of the interview, and was very conscious of 
the published figures of unauthorised absence: 
... I'm working on improving the figures for the school and form 
groups. . .. I wrote to all the parents in my news sheet last week, saying, 
'It's quite good but it isn't good enough, and there are too many occasions 
of girls having a day off and parents not writing a note, and therefore it's 
seen as a unauthorised absence .... ' ... as you know, the, the absence 
figures are published now as well. 
Not as important as exam results, but it's still important. ... it's making 
the schools like myself look at it to tighten up. It's the publication that is 
draw my attention to it to see how it can improve. 
The headteacher' s initiative aimed at tightening the control of absence to improve 
the published figures, and therefore is a regulative visible strategy in pedagogy to 
make regulative or hierarchical rules more explicit in pedagogic relations. 
Monitoring of teaching performances: Regulative visible strategy in management 
Coming back to the focus on examinations, we can see that visible strategies were 
adopted not only in pedagogy but also in management. The headteacher of 
Easthill Girls' School had introduced a monitoring scheme two years before the 
interview. The teacher's performance related to the children's performance was 
monitored at the two levels of headteacher and heads of faculty: 
... it's over the last two years that I've introduced the monitoring policy. 
Before then, there was just ad-hoc monitoring by me, walking around the 
school, popping into classrooms through four to five minutes, totally 
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unsystematic .... and by myself, whereby, er, teachers' classes are visited 
without prior notice. And I will go at the beginning of the lesson, and I 
will monitor the whole lesson, the teacher's performance to children's 
performance, to resources, the methods of curriculum delivery. All those 
aspects, the behaviour, all those aspects are, will be monitored. And the 
teacher will then come to me for feedback and a discussion and can bring 
items to my attention. And I see every member of staff throughout the 
year, without prior notice. . .. And also the head of their subject has the 
responsibility to go to each of their teachers, monitor, monitor the books, 
monitor the marking, .... 
The relationship between the monitoring process and the appraisal process, in 
which threatening elements are avoided, seems to be confusing: 
... the teacher's performance related to the children's performance comes 
under monitoring, not appraisal .... And it's the monitoring they would 
pick up any underperformance by the teacher ... It could come upon 
appraisals as well, but we are trying to make appraisal non-threatening. 
The headteacher stated that the staff's objections to the monitoring scheme were 
overcome as follows: 
Originally there were objections and this was discussed in the union 
meetings. And I spoke at several staff meetings, trying to explain the 
reason for it, that it was to aim to improvement, you know, make sure 
we're looking at .... It's like quality checks, and it's not just looking at 
the teacher. It's looking at the students' attitude, 'Are they carrying up the 
students' responsibility?' It's looking at the resources, 'Has this teacher 
been given sufficient resources to teach this topic?' It's in order for me to 
find out more about the National Curriculum, more about the modes of 
delivery. And although people were suspicious at first, I supposed it's got 
to happen, so it's started to happen. But because the feedback interviews 
are made optional, not compulsory, but almost every member of the staff 
has come, and they have then gone back and they've found it useful and 
important. They had my entire attention. I could give helpful points to 
them, and they had an opportunity of bringing to my attention, any issue 
they wish, such as they felt they're given insufficient resources, they felt 
their line manager wasn't treating them appropriately. So now this is 
accepted by the school and actually eveli enjoyed. People are now 
speaking in favour of how helpful they have found this at the union 
meetings. So by the dialogue and the presentation of the policy and 
reasoning, er, people have accepted this and seen it as part of the normal 
life of the school to, to, you know, help us to achieve this quality 
education. So I haven't now had any resistance. 
The above statement shows that the headteacher emphasised to the teachers the 
benefits, such as attention to pupils' behaviour and resources and the optional 
feedback with helpful advice. She also minimised the threatening nature of 
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monitoring teachers' performances. The headteacher endeavoured to make the 
essentially hierarchical or regulative nature of the monitoring scheme less explicit. 
The scheme is a means of making the school management's hierarchical control 
over the teachers' performances more explicit. Therefore, it is a regulative visible 
strategy in management to make regulative rules more explicit in organisational 
relations between the teachers and school management. 
Supplementary and summary comments 
Easthill Girls' School was a very popular school for girls in 'Roundham' (the 
pseudonym of the London borough). Its exam results were very good, much 
better than the average for all the 'Roundham' state schools, although they were 
almost the same as the England average. Even in this less affluent inner-city area, 
the importance of the GCSE examination results was obvious for the headteacher 
of this advantageously positioned school. She named Seymour Field School, a 
GM school with the best examination results in the borough, and the other girls' 
school in the borough, as the main rivals of her school, primarily based on the 
examination results. Against this background of the school's perceived position 
in the local market, many of her strategies aimed at improving the examination 
results, and tended to be visible strategies to make pedagogic and managerial rules 
and control more explicit and tighter. 
Table 6.1 Easthill Girls' School's strategies in pedagogy and management 
classified in terms of visibility 
Visible Invisible Neutral Total 
Pedagogy 8 1 3 12 
Management 4 0 2 6 
Total 10 (I) 1 5 16 (I) 
Note: (1) Two of them are in both pedagogy and management. 
In short, the above discourses of the headteacher seem to lend support to the 
basic hypothesis that school managers were adopting more visible strategies than 
invisible ones in response to the perceived market pressures for improving the 
examination results among others. Table 6.1 shows that the primitive quantitative 
116 
analysis of the Easthill Girls' School's strategies does not seem to contradict this 
comment. The full list of the school's strategies and the thorough description of 
each strategy are presented in Appendix II. 
Roundham Catholic College: Voluntary-aided; co-educational; 11-18 
Standard number: Not much below 200 
GCSE results: Just above the borough average 
Date of interviewing the headteacher: 7 December 1994 
SMILE scheme of mathematics: Regulative and prescriptive invisible strategy in 
pedagogy 
As stated already, Roundham Catholic College introduced, five years before the 
interview, a child-centred scheme of mathematics teaching called 'SMILE', which 
is an invisible strategy in pedagogy. The SMILE scheme was controversial 
because many parents liked a very traditional approach. Some mathematics 
teachers were also familiar with a traditional teaching style and had difficulty in 
adapting themselves to the scheme. 
The driving force for the introduction of the SMILE scheme was the senior 
management team's judgement that the school's mathematics needed very 
significant improvement in terms of examination results and that a child-centred 
and dynamic scheme might be suitable for the pupils in the school, and might 
improve the examination results. According to the headteacher, the expected 
results were acquired, persuading the previously sceptical parents. The 
headteacher stated that parents and governors were beginning to be convinced that 
the SMILE scheme was good because the GCSE results had shown a significant 
improvement: 
And it's only this year when we can see a very significant change in our 
mathematics results and performance at the GCSE level that, I think, 
parents are, have become, er, beginning to be convinced that, er, you know, 
this, this scheme is, is a good idea and has worked. Er, for example, last 
year we had got about nineteen percent of the children who passed 
mathematics at the A to C level, and this year that one got to thirty-four 
percent. And this year was the first year who had come through the new 
SMILE system. 
But, er, I think we have managed to convince both governors and parents 
that, you know, there, there has been some progress. And certainly did the 
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results themselves at performance indicators, you know, scream out that, 
you know, for the, we can, we can clearly show that, that the children 
who've come through this SMILE system have performed much better, er, 
than those who have not. 
This is an interesting example of the adoption of an invisible strategy for the 
purpose of improving the examination results, which is usually the reason for 
introducing a visible strategy. 
The school also introduced visible strategies to improve the results as follows. 
The introduction of a fast-track group in science: Prescriptive visible strategy in 
pedagogy 
The school had had a fast-track group in science for two years by the time of the 
interview. This initiative was taken by the science department: 
Sciences recently approved to, er, to have one group which is, er, a kind of 
fast-track group, and mixed ability elsewhere. 
And that has come from the science department itself. 
And science [department] thought that, er, that in particular they would 
like to focus one group out of three, which would be, er, the more able 
students. And the other two groups would be sort of mixed. Now as I said, 
too early, er, for us to see if there is any significant, er, change. But, er, 
it's an area that obviously we're looking at with great interest. 
The headteacher described the school as a whole and himself as being very 
committed to mixed-ability teaching. However, he stated that he was pragmatic 
and prepared to accommodate this type of new developments by the departments 
in certain autonomy: 
I mean, we, we have allied most of our departments in certain autonomy, 
er, with an reason. I mean, the school itself is very much committed to 
mixed ability. But at the same time, we are happy to, er, accommodate 
opportunities for, you know, for departments to try, er, a new sort of 
developments. 
And, er, I, I have to say personally I'm very committed to mixed ability, 
and, er, I will take some convincing about, er, about introducing, er, you 
know, er, a very structured level of setting throughout the school. But at 
the same time, I haven't got a closed mind on it, and I don't think staff 
generally have. I think we're quite pragmatic and we would, er, we would 
look at things and, er, make decisions, er, based on information. 
The introduction of a fast-track group in science stratifies pupils on the basis of 
their performances, and therefore is a prescriptive visible strategy in pedagogy to 
enhance the explicitness of criteria (prescriptive) rules in pedagogic relations. 
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The initiative for the introduction was taken by the departmental management 
rather than the top management, which accepted that it became a school strategy. 
Beginning setting in Year 8 in modem languages: Prescriptive visible strategy in 
pedagogy 
The school was beginning to have setting in Year 8 in modem languages at the 
time of the interview: 
... we begin to, er, to set students, er, in Year 8. If we cannot, it varies. 
Er, generally speaking, they will be mixed ability in Year 7, in the first 
year, but after that we will try and, and put them into sets. 
The headteacher's attitude to the organisation of teaching, expressed in the above-
mentioned topic about science, is evident here about languages as well: 
Whether those sets are, I mean, I don't think we're into rigid setting. I 
think they're, in languages in particular, they're quite flexible. But at the 
same time, er, they would argue that languages in particular is the subject 
area where one has to, er, has to have some sort of setting. And I can, I 
can live with that. 
Beginning setting in Year 8 in modem languages means more stratification of 
pupils on the basis of their performances, and therefore is a prescriptive visible 
strategy in pedagogy, which makes criteria (prescriptive) rules more explicit in 
pedagogic relations. 
Study clubs organised by the SEN coordinator: Prescriptive invisible strategy in 
pedagogy 
Here is again an invisible strategy. Four or five years before the interview, the 
special educational needs coordinator started organising study clubs on two 
evenings in every week, where pupils could study any subjects and staff 
voluntarily help them. The headteacher stated that the students in the clubs were 
very often less able: 
Er, he has organised, he has two homework clubs after school, er, for 
students. And very, very often they are, er, students who, er, who are less 
able . 
. . . Mr Smith [the pseudonym of the SEN coordinator] might say, 'Oh, 
I've got, er, such and such a person who is coming to me on, er, 
Wednesday afternoons', and, you know, they're, they're working 
humanities really very far behind, and one of the humanity teachers, he 
would speak to them, and maybe they'll be coming along and give some 
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extra help to, to that child. It's very informal, but I have to say it works 
very effectively, and quite well attended by various students . 
. . . they're in both study clubs in the library areas and you would have 
staff working there themselves and, you know, obviously, you know, if, if 
they see children, er, who need support or help, they would come and help 
them .... it's a good, good situation, and it's very informal. 
This scheme was expected to provide the less able pupils with remedial assistance 
and therefore decrease the stratifying differences between the pupils' 
performances. It is a prescriptive invisible strategy in pedagogy, which makes 
criteria (prescriptive) rules more implicit in pedagogic relations. 
Supplementary and summary comments 
The headteacher of Roundham Catholic College very often mentioned his 
school's peculiarity as a Catholic school. According to his description, because of 
this peculiarity, his school was less influenced by market pressures than the 
neighbouring schools. The headteacher indicated that his school's competition 
was more with other Catholic schools than with the neighbouring schools. 
Nevertheless, he was aware of the increasing pressures from some of 
neighbouring schools, especially girls' schools . 
. . . . . . there are some Catholic parents who in particular with daughters, 
with girls, who would look to single-sex schools, because single-sex 
schools can provide, er, very good results for girls ....... We would also 
lose a few pupils to Easthill Girls' School and to [the name of the other 
girls' school in the borough]. But not a tremendous number. ..... .I don't 
think it is at the moment, but it is, it is nearly that that could be significant, 
er, over the next few years. 
The headteacher emphasised the necessity for avoiding complacency in 
competition. The importance of school performance tables or league tables was 
obvious for him although he was personally not enthusiastic about them . 
. . . . . . no school can be complacent about the performance indicators that 
kind. And I mean, it would be very foolish for anybody in education not 
to recognise that parents in particular rightly or wrongly or for whatever 
reason are interested in, er, in the performance league tables. . .... .I'm not 
against them particularly, er, although I'm against sort of crude data being 
used ....... But, er, we take the performance tables very seriously, and I 
don't care, I mean, lots of, lots of schools will, will say that they are not 
interested in them in the manner displayed and so on, but at the end of the 
day people are interested, and unfortunately that's the reality. 
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However, it does not necessarily mean that he was compelled to adopt visible 
strategies against his educational ideals, which are clearly expressed in his view of 
his school, 'there was a, a very great stress laid on a child-centred education'. A 
good example of this argument is the introduction of the SMILE scheme for the 
purpose of improving the examination results. The improved performance in 
terms of examination results persuaded the parents that the new scheme had 
worked. This case indicates that invisible strategies can survive the market 
pressure if they manage to be seen as producing better results. 
Nevertheless, visible strategies are also adopted as the school's strategies 
although the initiative was not necessarily taken by the headteacher. Table 6.2 
shows some balance between visible and invisible strategies although too much 
emphasis should not be put on this primitive quantitative analysis. The full list of 
Roundham Catholic College's strategies and the thorough description of each of 
the strategies are presented in Appendix II. 
Table 6.2 Roundham Catholic College's strategies in pedagogy and management 
classified in terms of visibility 
Visible Invisible Neutral 
Pedagogy 4 4 1 
Management 0 0 3 
Total 4 4 4 
George Square School: County; co-educational; 11-16 
Standard number: Not much above 100 
GCSE results: Below the borough average 
Date of interviewing the headteacher: 7 December 1994 
Total 
9 
3 
12 
Introducing setting in science: Prescriptive visible strategy in pedagogy 
At the time of the interview, the school was introducing setting in science for the 
first time. In that academic year, Year 10 pupils were grouped into sets including 
top sets, and pupils from Year 11 above were still in mixed-ability groups: 
Er, maths still sets, French sets, science is now setting for the first time in 
Year 10. 
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... we are implementing at the moment. So Year 10 has got accelerated, 
got top sets. They are setted [sic] to, you know, we are looking in fact to 
see, you know, how that actually works. Year II above are still in mixed-
ability groups. And so, yeah, we are actually changing from that sort of 
point of view, I suppose really. 
When asked about the reason for the change, the headteacher described it as an 
innovative trial to improve science teaching, and mentioned the competitive 
pressure from league tables: 
One, that was trials as the innovation to seek for the improvement and 
what we are actually offering. And it becomes the reason really. And the 
science [department] had been talking about it sometime, 'Should they 
keep mixed-ability groups through the five years?' And this was the 
school decision that for this year we in Year I 0 start the two-year course 
that we will actually try a setting and to see what effects it'll have 
really. . .. Is that a response to league tables? Possibly so. Possibly so 
actually. 
The headteacher expected top sets to stretch more able pupils: 
... through creating a sort of top sets, I mean, therefore, the more able 
children can work at a, hopefully, at a faster pace. 
The introduction of setting means stratifying pupils on the basis of their 
performances, and therefore is a prescriptive visible strategy in pedagogy, which 
enhances the explicitness of criteria (prescriptive) rules in pedagogic relations. 
The profile of a pupil to the parents: Prescriptive invisible strategy in pedagogy 
According to the headteacher, the school's reporting to the parents had been 
changed from simple reports to detailed profiles: 
Well, I think we've actually developed actual profiling side. I mean, 
we've worked on that side quite a bit. 
I mean, the old reports were basically put down 50% and then the teachers 
wrote a comment, which basically is the same format, but now there is 
much more structure, I think, in what is actually put in. 
When asked how structured it was, the headteacher answered as follows: 
Well, I mean, it depends how the department has actually the details the 
department put in there. And the science [department] may put in, for 
instance, percentages of different sorts of units, units they ;ve actually 
tested, and they need to take an average from that, you know, they've 
come from the final result, something like that. ... But obviously the 
parents who used to more traditional, er, '50 over 100', 'satisfactory 
effort', I mean, that's quite different, because obviously for many years 
that's basically what it was. We've come a long way from that. 
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Although the new profiling scheme seems to have certain criteria, because of the 
technical complexity of the structure, it should be regarded as having less 
explicitness of criteria (prescriptive) rules in pedagogic relations than the previous 
reporting with simpler and more clear-cut information. Therefore, the change 
should be identified as a prescriptive invisible strategy in pedagogy. 
The hierarchical merit system of awarding gold, silver and bronze certificates: 
Prescriptive visible strategy in pedagogy 
Two years before the interview, the school introduced a merit system to award 
gold, silver and bronze certificates for achievements in all aspects of the school 
life: 
And so we have a merit system. Gold, gold certificates, er, silver and 
bronze. So they get so many commendations in a journal, it goes the head 
of year, the head of year presents the, no, the form tutor presents the 
bronze, the head of year sends or presents the silver and, lucky enough to 
get gold, the headteacher will present the gold. 
When asked what kind of activities are rewarded, the headteacher answered as 
follows: 
That is down, that is down to the individual teachers' judgement. So if a 
child brings in what they've considered a very good piece of work, they 
may well get a merit for that and that will be recorded as such. If a child 
suddenly, say, their behaviour hasn't been too good, their behaviour in fact 
suddenly gets a lot better, that is then recorded, you know, the child gets a 
sort of, you know, benefit right as well. It seems to work with children. 
The above-mentioned hierarchical merit system highlights the stratifying 
differences between pupils with gold, silver and bronze certificates and pupils 
with nothing, and therefore is a prescriptive visible strategy in pedagogy, which 
enhances the explicitness of criteria (prescriptive) rules in pedagogic relations. 
Monitoring each pupil's performance: Prescriptive visible strategy in pedagogy 
When asked what strategies the school had in order to improve the examination 
results, the headteacher mentioned that the school had recently started the close 
monitoring of each pupil's performance in terms of examinations: 
Er, hard work really. Er, hard work identifying those areas that need 
improvement, and monitoring those subject areas to during their final year, 
II, that's the final year, to actually see really how the children are actually 
performing. I mean, you know, we've done something on that recently. 
Because tomorrow on a study leave, there are mock GCSE, just before the 
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holidays. So we'lllook at the mock GCSE results obviously after the 
holidays, in January, follow that the parents evening, and so on, you know, 
then we have a, hopefully we have a very clear picture of level of 
performance, you know. 
The above-mentioned monitoring of examination performances, enabling the 
comparison between pupils and between subjects, enhances the explicitness of 
criteria (prescriptive) rules in pedagogic relations. Therefore, it is a prescriptive 
visible strategy in pedagogy. 
Supplementary and summary comments 
Although the head teacher of George Square School expressed his disbelief in 
league tables, he acknowledged that they were influential. 
I haven't met any head certainly who are basically in favour of any league 
tables. Er, having said that, it's human nature you do not want your school 
to be at the bottom of the league table. I think league tables are 
unfortunate, because some other things have gone to actually make sure 
you get the good percentage, I don't necessarily agree with ....... We all 
look to see what percentage everybody else has actually got. 
Table 6.3 George Square School's strategies in pedagogy and management 
classified in terms of visibility 
Visible Invisible Neutral Total 
Pedagogy 5 1 0 6 
Management 0 0 0 0 
Total 5 1 0 6 
He only mentioned a small number of strategies, but nonetheless the analysis of 
the strategies in Table 6.3 implies a tendency towards more visibility. The full list 
of the school's strategies and the thorough description of each of the strategies are 
presented in Appendix II. 
Fertile Land School: County; co-educational; 11-16 
Standard number: Not much above 100 
GCSE results: Below the borough average 
Date of interviewing the head teacher: 22 November 1994 
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Fertile Land School shows that significant invisible elements can coexist with the 
visible ones in the same school. However, even in the case of this school, 
visibility is still dominant in the school's strategies. First, invisible strategies are 
introduced as follows. 
Open and honest sex education programme: Regulative invisible strategy in 
pedagogy 
The headteacher mentioned an open and honest sex education programme as a 
part of the school's personal and social education programme, which had been 
developed two years before the interview and then implemented, as a strategy in 
curriculum: 
Well, we've done, we won an award this week, we went to collect last 
Saturday for our sex education programme, and that was regarded as 
something that was quite courageous because there is, there is a difficult 
climate nationally at the moment for open and honest sex education 
programmes to take place .... Er, we were on a TV last week .... 
Well, we spent all of last year developing the sex education programme, er, 
within a broader personal and social education programme. So we did 
quite a lot of training slots throughout the whole year, er, and that was two 
years ago, and the actual programme has been running for a year now, we 
are on second year of it now. 
The sex education programme has adopted discussion and open-ended 
questioning techniques as its major methods: 
So the whole thing about, you know, questioning techniques and open-
ended tasks and that sort of things has had a lot of promotion in the last 
couple of years. Er, and also that goes hand in hand with our sex 
education programme, because a lot of that is discussion-based. 
A positive initiative on sex education, generally regarded as progressive, implies 
respecting and encouraging independent thinking and behaviour by pupils, and 
this programme of sex education is particularly so with its emphasis on discussion 
and open-ended questioning techniques. Therefore, it is a regulative invisible 
strategy in pedagogy, which enhances the implicitness of hierarchical (regulative) 
rules in pedagogic relations. 
The techniques will be explained in the following paragraphs. 
Discussion and open-ended questioning techniques: Regulative invisible strategy 
in pedagogy 
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According to the headteacher, two years before the interview, the techniques of 
discussion and open-ended questioning had been developed in the personal and 
social education (PSE) programme including the sex education programme: 
Well, the whole PSE programme, the personal and social education 
programme. And that's where we put a lot of emphasis two years ago in 
our planning, preparation and training. So it's, you know, it's actually 
been functioning properly for a year and a term. But we did a year's 
planning. 
The headteacher argues that the use of the techniques is not limited within the 
PSE programme but is spread over other curriculum areas: 
No. it isn't only that, but that's where we focused at that time, because this 
was, the PSE programme was a new development for the school. ... So it 
was focused particularly on the PSE programme, but it has knock-on 
effects on the rest of the curriculum, too. 
The techniques target more able pupils: 
We've done a fair bit of work on teaching and learning styles and 
techniques and methodologies, er, because we want to make sure that 
we're pitching our material at a range oflevels because we've got a lot of 
different ability levels here. So stretching the more able is very important. 
So the whole thing about, you know, questioning techniques and open-
ended tasks and that sort of things has had a lot of promotion in the last 
couple ofyears. 
Well, it's to do with this business about differentiation and having 
appropriate materials, appropriate delivery, and that's where the open-
ended questioning and the open-ended tasks are so important. Er, so, 
that's been developed for everybody, but particularly targeted on the more 
able. 
Some teachers, especially those teaching heavily content-led subjects, were not 
very comfortable with the techniques when they were introduced: 
And a lot of them, no, not a lot, some teachers weren't feeling very 
comfortable with that. So we did some training associated with that as 
well. 
That is, basically it's discussion. And if you are a teacher of a heavily 
content-led subject like science or history or something, then you may not 
be so accustomed to teaching in a discussion or sort of way like that. 
The promotion of the techniques seems to have a complex effect on prescriptive 
rules in pedagogic relations. It may enhance the explicitness of criteria rules by 
focusing on the stratifying differences between pupils' performances on one hand, 
but may make selection and sequencing rules more implicit on the other hand. It 
enhances the implicitness of regulative (hierarchical) rules because it respects and 
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encourages independent thinking and behaviour by pupils. Therefore, it is a 
regulative invisible strategy in pedagogy, which makes regulative rules more 
implicit in pedagogic relations. 
The headteacher states that the school has had a mixture of various teaching 
methods including individual, group and didactic work and that the new method 
of questioning and discussion will not undermine other methods but enrich the 
mixture: 
Well, it's all of these things have to be part of a package. Er, there isn't 
one teaching style that happens in Fertile Land School. There's a whole 
range of ones. But we identify that the whole area of questioning and 
answering was the one that needed more development in Fertile Land 
School. So that's why we concentrated on that. But it's not at the expense 
of the others. There are still a lot of group work , a lot of pair work, a lot 
of individual work, and there're still a lot of didactic work as well. So it's 
just a part ofbigger .... 
While invisible strategies are adopted in teaching styles and methods as 
mentioned above, visible strategies are predominant in assessment and reporting 
as follows. 
Assessment and reporting towards clearer description of achievements: 
Prescriptive visible strategy in pedagogy 
According to the headteacher, at the time ofthe interview, the school was 
developing a hard-edged way of assessment and reporting with clearer 
descriptions of achievements. The existent way of assessment and reporting was 
an encouraging one with much identification of efforts and less clear descriptions 
of achievements: 
Assessment is one of our key points of focus this year. And what we are 
doing is changing our reports to parents so that we are reporting 
achievements in a much more hard-edged way than we have done before. 
In the past, we've, we've done a lot of, er, we've, we've had very 
encouraging reports, and we've identified all the efforts that they put in, 
but the achievement hasn't been there so clearly. So this year we've 
started doing that, putting in the achievement, estimated grades and so on. 
Well, the staff at the moment are developing, er, a grading system that we 
can use both in our marking and for reporting to parents. And at the 
moment we are just, er, trying to work out how, exactly how it will, er, 
link with the National Curriculum levels. 
The headteacher pointed out three reasons for the school changing the assessment 
and reporting. These are the necessity for the staff to know ofthe pupils' 
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achievements, some parents' concern, and the inspectors' comment in the Ofsted 
inspection of the school: 
Well, because, er, for a number of different reasons. We often felt that we 
didn't know what the child is achieving. Because, unless we taught them 
ourselves, reading the reports, we couldn't determine what they'd actually 
achieved. And then some parents were concerned that they didn't know 
what their child achieved as well. Er, and the combination of those two 
made us realise that, you know, that we'd got to focus on it. We had the 
inspection in September, and the inspectors said the same sort of thing. 
We just hadn't been clear enough about the attainment part of it. 
The change is based on the view that assessment and reporting should provide 
clearer information on comparative performances, and therefore is a prescriptive 
visible strategy in pedagogy to make criteria (prescriptive) rules more explicit in 
pedagogic relations. 
Prize-giving for high achievers only: Prescriptive visible strategy in pedagogy 
At the time of the interview, the school was changing their award system from the 
celebration of everyone's achievements to the prize-giving just for high achievers 
in subjects: 
... this term, we have a prize-giving, for the first time, which is targeted 
just to the high achievers, nothing else. In the past we celebrated the 
achievement of everybody regarding, you know, for their effort, 
attendance, something else. This year we don't .... 
The head teacher regards the change as one of those strategies which target the 
more able children: 
... it's just part of our wider focus, at the moment, which is on promoting 
the more able and promoting the school as the place where high-ability 
children are going to be taught well. That's a current sort of strategy. 
The award system highlights the stratifying differences between pupils, and 
therefore is a prescriptive visible strategy in pedagogy, which enhances the 
explicitness of criteria (prescriptive) rules in pedagogic relations. 
Visible strategies are not just for pedagogy but also for management as follows. 
Like in the case of Easthill Girls' School, 'monitoring' is the key word. 
Monitoring of the curriculum and the staff performance through written reports 
from curriculum areas: Prescriptive visible strategy in management 
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At the time of the interview, the school's management had just completed the 
planning of a new monitoring scheme, which was to be implemented from the 
following year. Under the new scheme, all curriculum areas are required to 
submit a written annual report with certain evidence to the headteacher, and the 
school management monitors the curriculum and the staff performance. The 
headteacher emphasises the importance of the monitoring scheme in terms of clear 
accountability: 
Er, in terms of accountability, we've set up very clear lines now, with a bit 
confusion for a while, but we've got very clear lines of accountability now. 
And all curriculum areas have to, starting for next year, we've just done all 
the draft work for it, starting from next year, they will have to report to me 
in a written form on annual basis, er, and it will, the report has to cover 
certain evidence. So the evidence will be collected from now. That's, 
that's where we've developed it now. So the evidence collection will be 
very much to do with monitoring the curriculum and the staff performance. 
The monitoring is intended to formalise the assessment of staff performance, and 
therefore enhance the explicitness of criteria (prescriptive) rules in organisational 
relations. It is a prescriptive visible strategy in management. 
Supplementary and summary comments 
Although the headteacher was proud of her school's reputation as a caring school, 
she was anxious to attract more able children, especially girls, to her school to 
balance its intake. 
I think parents regard us as a school with a very caring ethos that has a lot 
of concerns for children's welfare, child-centred school with good 
relations between staff and students ...... .last year was a crunch point 
because that's when we had eleven children with the statement of special 
needs coming into the school, and that was of our thirty-four in the whole 
school, the whole borough population of that year group. So we had a 
third of them just in our school. Er, and coupled with the high gender 
imbalance, so many boys, it meant we had a real problem about adjusting 
the needs of those children. So this year we've concentrated on trying to 
target the more able. So I won't know until this time next year whether 
it's paid off. 
When asked why she needed to attract able pupils as well, she answered as 
follows: 
Well, because if we don't, we will lose our position in the league table 
that's published every year, and that will mean it's more and more difficult 
to attract children of quality. And if more schools become grant-
maintained and if Riverside Street School gets to enlarge its, its space and 
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so on, it will mean that there may come a time when we can't attract the 
numbers. And then we will be in a, you know, downward spiral then . 
. . . . . . But that's not the whole story. The other story is the professional 
pride. And the staff know they can do well with special needs children. 
They want to prove to themselves that they can do well with very able 
children as well, and everything that goes in between. 
Her answers vividly show the complexity of the education quasi-market, where 
not only numbers but also quality of pupils matter for both the economic survival 
and social prestige of a school. 
Fertile Land School seems to have been oriented towards more visibility in its 
strategies, while a few invisible strategies in the field of teaching exemplify the 
room for manoeuvre by school managers in line with its reputation as a 'child-
centred' school with a caring ethos as long as the strategies do not prevent the 
school management from endeavouring to improve its market position as clearly 
perceived by the headteacher. 
Table 6.4 Fertile Land School's strategies in pedagogy and management 
classified in terms of visibility 
Visible Invisible Neutral Total 
Pedagogy 4 2 2 8 
Management 2 0 1 3 
Total 6 2 3 11 
Table 6.4 shows that the primitive quantitative analysis of the school's 
strategies is compatible with the above comment. The full list of the school's 
strategies and the thorough description of each of the strategies are presented in 
Appendix II. 
Seymour Field School: Grant-maintained; co-educational; 11-18 
Standard number: Not much above 200 
GCSE results: More than 10% higher than the England average 
Date of interviewing the acting head teacher: 28 April 1995 
Seymour Field School also shows a combination of dominant visible strategies 
and significant invisible ones. Again teaching is the field for invisible strategies. 
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From a teacher-led style to a variety ofteaching styles with the emphasis on 
independent learning: Regulative invisible strategy in pedagogy 
The acting headteacher states that the school has done a lot of analysis work on 
teaching styles, with help from the Technical Vocational Education Initiative 
(TVEI) and that, as a result, the school now has more variety of teaching styles 
with the emphasis on independent learning than previously when there used to be 
one teaching style of chalk and talk: 
Er, I, I would put that down to, er, the staff really, and the way that they've 
been prepared to take on continuity, er, the way they've prepared to, to 
take on, er, issues of learning styles and motivation of children, er, 
carefully analysing how children learn in relation to how they teach. And 
we've done quite a lot of work on, on that side. We've had a TVEI 
programme when, er, .... 
So you had this, er, about 360,000 over five years. That's enabled us to 
put money into, er, you know, the vocational side of education and also to 
look at, er, helping staff develop more flexible teaching styles and more 
variety of teaching styles. And so I think that there has been a lot of 
adaptation in terms of the way the classrooms are managed .... 
Well, there used to be one teaching style, he stands in front of the 
classroom with a piece of chalk, and you tell the children to do this. And 
now that's just one, one of many styles that you'll see enacted. Children 
take a far more active role in what they are doing. In most areas of the 
school, er, they take much more responsibility. Er, this kind of 
independence is something that TVEI, I think, has featured and promoted. 
According to the acting headteacher, the teachers are encouraged to make their 
classrooms interesting in order to keep the pupils' motivation high and encourage 
them to become independent learners. The change has been gradual, however, 
because the staff includes a high proportion of experienced teachers who are 
accustomed to traditional styles with strict discipline and have difficulty in 
adapting themselves to a more open and maybe more noisy classroom 
environment: 
... the teachers are encouraged to vary things, make things as interesting 
as possible for the children to keep their motivation high, encouraging 
them to become independent learners. Er, but it's been hard going, 
because, er, our staff profile indicates quite a high proportion of people in 
their 40s. The staff have been here some time. And, er, moving people 
who are very experienced and very good at, say, disciplining children, er, 
moving attitudes toward more open, maybe more noisy kind of classroom 
environment, because it's better for their learning activities, er, is qu-, has 
been quite difficult one to confront. Er, but, you know, over a period of 
131 
years, er, those things are, er, I think the way to move things in schools 
slowly, inchmeal, then things do gather pace, you know. 
The above description of the change implies that the change is a regulative 
invisible strategy in pedagogy, which reduces the explicitness of hierarchical 
(regulative) rules in pedagogic relations. 
Seymour Field School also adopts an exam-oriented visible strategy as 
follows. 
Using external services to analyse examinations: Prescriptive visible strategy in 
pedagogy and management 
The school is using more and more external services to conduct detailed analyses 
of examination results and value-added measuring: 
... we, er, monitor the GCSE results by, er, we, we usually do graphs 
subject by subject. Er, in such a way, if you average the child's GCSE 
results, then, er, then compare that individually. If you do that subject by 
subject, then you can see, er, you know, if they're underneath the line for 
themselves there, then they're underperforming in that subject or doing 
better in that subject. That gives quite good information, and you can do 
gender breakdown as well. Because quite good information for 
departments, you know, break that down teacher by teacher. 
We've got an exam officer and, er, she usually does the, the main exams. 
But we also use the service, which has a computer system, which produces 
these graphs, which we find very helpful. ... When we get them in Year 7, 
we're going to give them NFER non-verbal reasoning tests, so that we can 
do value-added measuring in time. 
Other local authorities, er, do administer those tests. . .. the neighbouring 
borough, that we've got good relations with, we've got good relations with 
every local authority except Roundham, er, has, has a year-on-year value-
added data. So we could actually tap into that to, to give some kind of, er, 
information in that aspect. We also subscribe to 'ALICE', the A level 
information system, which, which matches correlation, GCSE results to A 
level results. 
The above-mentioned detailed analyses assisted by the external services enhance 
the relative evaluation of pupils' and teachers' performances, and therefore should 
be regarded as a prescriptive visible strategy in both pedagogy and management, 
which makes criteria (prescriptive) rules more explicit in both pedagogic and 
organisational relations. 
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As in the cases ofEasthill Girls' School and Fertile Land School, Seymour 
Field School also adopts a 'monitoring' scheme as a visible strategy in 
management as follows. 
Quality assurance initiative to monitor teaching in classroom: Prescriptive visible 
strategy in management 
According to the headteacher, at the time of the interview, the school was in a 
process of developing a quality assurance initiative to monitor the effectiveness of 
the curriculum and the quality ofleaming in the classroom: 
Well, that [monitoring] , that wasn't happening, but it is happening more. 
Er, we've got a quality assurance initiative going, er, to set up systems of 
monitoring the curriculum. It's always basically what you're doing. It's 
monitoring effectiveness of the curriculum and quality ofleaming in a 
classroom. 
We've got a, we've got an evaluation phase coming up at the end of the 
summer term and out of that will come, you know, the next developments 
towards it. 
An informal collegial approach to monitoring did not work very well, and then a 
relatively formal approach has been tried: 
So, you've got an initiative, which would again, we try and start off in a, 
in a non-threatening friendly way. Teachers find it very threatening to 
have something walking into their classroom. That doesn't always happen 
here. . .. So by building it up, er, in such a way that, er, it becomes a 
common place for staff to walk in and out of other people's classrooms 
and to have common feedback. I think that was a good idea that though 
didn't work very well. What about trying this kind of idea, er, but also 
putting it on a, a, a relatively formal basis? Then, er, that's one way. We 
are trying to prove, er, the quality of what goes on and the monitoring of 
what goes on. 
The approach needs certain criteria but the criteria will be qualitative rather than 
quantitative: 
A problem with monitoring, anything, I think, is that you've got to have 
yardsticks to monitoring. You see, you know, you can walk into anywhere 
and you get perceptions of what places, what's going on, er, but how you 
can make any other judgement on a purely subjective, like-or-dislike 
judgement, without having clear understanding of what criteria are 
important for what level is, er, I don't know. So, so, it's setting up, er, 
really, er, quality characteristics and monitoring. The main thing we 
sought was to think about what quality characteristics and some measures 
we could be working towards. By building the means to a planning of 
activities in the classrooms and, you know, sharing what these things are, 
that we are trying to achieve this today or that today, then, er, we feel that 
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is a more effective way of monitoring than sending somebody in with a 
tick sheet and keep a check on how many children are paying attention or 
how many good at their sheet. 
The above-mentioned initiative of quality assurance or monitoring is intended to 
assess teaching in classroom with more explicit criteria, and therefore enhance the 
explicitness of criteria (prescriptive) rules in organisational relations. It is a 
prescriptive visible strategy in management. 
Supplementary and summary comments 
The acting headteacher, who was subsequently appointed as headteacher, of 
Seymour Field School made it clear that his school had a better reputation than the 
neighbouring state schools, and mentioned its competition with grammar schools 
and independent schools. When asked which schools he regarded as rivals of his 
school, he answered as follows: 
..... .in terms of rivals, where you're talking about local schools, we don't 
look at them, we don't look upon them as rivals ....... we do get a lot of 
people applying to this school, er, who might have less distance to travel 
to one of the other schools like [the name of a county school] or Fertile 
Land School or Riverside Street School, because they perceive this school 
to be a better school. That is the kind of message you get from parents. In 
some ways our rival schools are not Roundham's schools, but we're, we're 
tending to merge with the, er, markets in [the name of a neighbouring 
borough] where they run 11-18 schools, grammar schools and there are a 
couple of popular, er, public schools, which also offer scholarships. 
When the school became GM, it was already very popular, and GM status seemed 
to have further increased the popularity. 
Er, the school's popu-, the, er, popularity of the school was already high . 
. . . . . . And, since becoming grant-maintained, er, it's becoming more 
popular. 
The basic strategy of the school was to maintain the popularity and reputation . 
.. .. .. we've reached a kind of, er, reputation. So what we're going to do is 
to maintain that reputation. The way to maintain your reputation is by, er, 
what we do. 
The school had been keeping a traditional policy of strict discipline as follows: 
So, we run the school where the pupils are all strictly in uniform. Er, we 
don't let them out at lunchtime. So, that improves things in the 
neighbourhood. Er, we don't put up with any nonsense ....... And you'll 
find that the children enact the aims and values of the school, which are 
clear and easy to understand. They know the boundary line beyond which 
they can't go, I mean, they know the consequences, they don't beyond 
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them ....... You, you've got to be quite strict about it. You've got to be 
quite disciplined about it. I think you, you'll find it ifyou, if you have a 
disciplined professional approach, it doesn't appear to be a, er, highly, er, 
er, militaristic kind of feeling. . ..... Er, but it's a strict regime, and I think, 
I think you've got to do that. 
When asked if classroom teaching was becoming increasingly exam-oriented, the 
acting headteacher non-apologetically answered: 
So, you're talking really about coaching for exams, which, yes, we do, 
absolutely have to, that's why. Er, but there are, there is a variety of ways 
of successful coaching and we employ a number of, of them, you know, 
different ways, it's not just in the classroom, extracurricular classes or in, 
er, small groups as well as in class activities. And we take exams very 
seriously because they are a fact of life. Whether you think they are a 
good form of assessment or not is irrelevant. You have to do one of the 
exams, you know, period. 
The strict discipline and exam-oriented teaching as mentioned above were not 
new strategies for the school but part of its traditional basis, and imply the 
directive modality ofvisible pedagogy. 
························· I 
As Table 6.5 shows, the school's seven new strategies, ofwhich four are visible 
and two are invisible, combined with the above-mentioned basis, seem to be 
consistent with the hypothesised movement towards more visibility in school 
strategies. At the same time, however, we should note that invisible strategies 
could be favoured again in the field ofteaching. The full list ofthe school's 
strategies and the thorough description of each of the strategies are presented in 
Appendix II. 
Table 6.5 Seymour Field School's strategies in pedagogy and management 
classified in terms of visibility 
Visible Invisible Neutral Total 
Pedagogy 2 2 1 
Management 3 0 0 
Total 4 (I) 2 1 
Note: (1) One of them is in both pedagogy and management. 
Riverside Street School: Grant-maintained; co-educational; 11-16 
Standard number: Not much below 200 
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5 
3 
7 (I) 
GCSE results: Higher than the borough average but lower than the England 
average 
Date of interviewing the headteacher: 13 March 199 5 
The headteacher of Riverside Street School described his school's strategies far 
more in accordance with the hypothesised movement towards more visibility in 
pedagogy and management than the other five schools in this research. Let us 
start with the strategies in pedagogy. 
To employ staff with the teacher-led teaching style: Regulative and prescriptive 
visible strategy in pedagogy 
The headteacher makes it clear that he has a policy to employ staff with the 
traditional teacher-led teaching style, which he believes to be the best: 
I like to employ teachers who have a more traditional approach to work. I 
want to see all the children in rows facing the teacher with the blackboard 
behind them. I want to see teachers directing the learning. I don't have 
much faith in people who say to me children learn from each other. Yes, 
children learn bad things from each other as well. Children should be 
learning most of what they learn from teachers who are skilled at what 
they are doing, who know and understand their subject. 
If, if teachers come into my school for interview and they don't agree with 
this, there is no point in appointing, I won't appoint them. So, I explain all 
this that goes out in information. 
What I insist on is I ask, I ask in all interviews, 'What is your classroom 
management style like? What, what is it that you want to teach and pass 
on to children, and how do you do it?' And teachers tum round to me and 
say, 'Well, we, we get together in groups and give them a theme and they, 
they .... ' I'm not interested. 
A good example is the appointment of the head of English whose approach is very 
much in tune with the headteacher' s belief: 
I have employed an En-, a head of English who is far more in tune with 
what I believe in which teaching should be. I don't want children in 
English forever writing poetry. Yes, that's important, creative work is 
important. I want children using proper English grammar, full stops, 
capital letter sentences, and I want children reading a lot of English 
literature. Er, and, so, when I employed my new head of English, I was 
very keen to employ somebody who agreed with this. 
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Although he admits that there are people who do not agree with his belief, he 
argues that he as the headteacher of the school can make the decision based on his 
belief: 
I think teachers direct, the best, the most effective way is for teachers to 
direct learning. I think a lot of time can be wasted otherwise. Not 
everybody agrees with me. I, I perfectly accept that. But then again, 
everybody's head of this school, therefore its' up to me to, to determine 
what I want. 
He acknowledges that the teaching methods in the school did not radically change 
since he became headteacher or the school became grant-maintained. What he 
and his management team do for existing teachers is to focus their attention on the 
quality of pupils' work. 
I, er, it will be wrong for me to suggest that since I became head or, or 
we've got a new senior management team or since we became grant-
maintained, then we radically altered the methods of teaching. I think 
what we've done is to focus attention on the quality of the children's work. 
I don't want teachers accepting poor quality work from the children. 
The headteacher also emphasises the importance of discipline in classroom 
management regarding employing new teachers: 
Er, but every time I have an opportunity to appoint new teachers, I make 
sure that they, they understand and accept this system and are willing to 
work in that system and have a view of classroom management where 
there is discipline in control. If there is not discipline in the classroom, 
there is not much that's to go on. 
This strategy is a regulative and prescriptive visible strategy in pedagogy, which 
is intended to enhance the explicitness of both regulative (hierarchical) and 
prescriptive rules in pedagogic relations. 
Banding system introduced: Prescriptive visible strategy in pedagogy 
The headteacher has been introducing a banding system since September 1994. 
Previously pupils were taught in mixed-ability tutor groups all subjects except 
mathematics, which had setting for Year 7 and above, and French, which had 
setting for Year 8 and above. Under the present system with banding, the pupils 
are put into three broad bands of ability. The top band children form three classes, 
the middle band three, and the bottom band two. 
These children are very able, they work very fast. ... These groups, the 
middle band, a few less children, and they work perhaps a little slower. 
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And these children are children who've got special needs, these children 
who've got reading difficulties, language difficulties and so on. 
English, Science, history, geography, and religious education are taught in these 
band groups. Mathematics is taught in set groups within each band for Year 7 and 
above, and French also for Year 8 and above. Physical education, music, art, and 
technology are taught in mixed-ability tutor groups. Therefore, the pupils belong 
to three or four different classes, depending on the subjects-mixed-ability tutor 
group, banded group, mathematics set group, and for Year 8 and above the French 
set group as well. 
So, let's say a child, if a child comes in, called 'John', John comes in, and 
he goes into Tutor Group C and he register, you know, they take his name, 
and John is in a class 7C for music, for art, PE, design, but he is in also 
Band E, and so he goes into E 1 for English, but he could also be a very 
good mathematician and so he is in Set 1 for maths. So, John could be in 1, 
2, 3 different classes, depending on the subject. 
The new system is replacing the old system year by year: 
So, I've only had this in place since September 1994 in Year 7 and 8. 
September 1995, in a few months time, it will be in 7, 8 and 9. And over 
the next few years, it will be in 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11. 
The children coming to the school, who are offered a place in the school, sit 
NFER mathematics and English tests sometime in June, and they are put into 
bands based on the results of the tests. 
The headteacher regards the introduction of the banding system as one of the 
most important strategies which he has initiated. He states that the strategy was 
the second thing he did; the first thing was raising the status of teaching and 
learning. This strategy is based on his firm belief in the necessity of 
differentiation: 
One of the most important strategies that I've put in place in this school 
for the parents of this area is to not completely sweep away mixed-ability 
teaching but to reassure them that their children will be working with 
children who are ofthe same ability in those classes in those subjects. 
Now, I think, this is a way of differentiating, er, the curriculum to suit 
levels of ability. I ask you a question. Do children all learn maths at the 
same pace? No. Do they, are they all of the same ability in English? No. 
Well, why put them in the same class? ... Now, that is a strategic plan 
that I put in place, a strategic procedure I put in place to, er, improve the 
quality of teaching and learning that goes on in the school. So, that's, that 
was the second thing that I did. 
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The headteacher seems to think that parents tend to prefer differentiated-ability 
groups to mixed-ability groups: 
... I say to parents we will give them a test, and the parents, well, they are 
quite happy. They know that their children are not now going to be in a 
mixed ability situation. 
He mentions that the teachers were not necessarily in favour of the banding 
system when it was going to be introduced, and that there are still some teachers 
who do not like it because they regard it as elitist: 
The first year [from September 1993], I had to plan it all, talk to my staff, 
er, not everybody was keen on it. There are even now people who, not 
particularly, don't like it, because they think it's, it's a bit elitist .... You 
must have heard of it in England a lot of people are concerned about equal 
opportunities. Well, equal opportunities to me means treating children 
according to their differences. 
When asked what percentage of teachers agree with the banding system, the 
headteacher answered that it was 50% when he suggested the system but now 
90% of the teachers like the system although some of them might have 
reservations about the philosophy: 
When I first put it, I would say 50%, but I made sure that my heads, my 
deputy headteachers, senior teachers, and heads of faculty understood the 
system. Now it's, now it's operating, I would say 90%, easily 90% of the 
teachers like this system. They might have reservation about the 
philosophy, but this is the practicality of this, are [sic] much easier to teach. 
You can set work more easily. 
He states that the practicality has persuaded some teachers into accepting the 
banding system, and implies that the examination results have also contributed to 
the persuasion: 
... some ofthem are very, very keen on this, some of them have accepted 
this as being a more realistic, practical way of teaching children, and all of 
them were very concerned that in 1993 the examination results in the 
school were the worst in this borough. Er, they are not now. 
He even emphasises the merit of the banding system for the less able children. In 
the system, the class size of the bottom band classes is smaller than that of the 
middle band classes, which is smaller than that of the top band classes: 
This is not to say that these children will be getting a poorer quality 
education. Far from it, I think, these children will be getting a better 
education because they're in smaller classes. In these classes, specialist 
teachers of English and maths teach them. 
139 
The introduction of the banding system stratifies pupils on the basis of their 
performances, and therefore is a prescriptive visible strategy, which enhances the 
explicitness of criteria (prescriptive) rules in pedagogic relations. 
Simplified reports to parents: Prescriptive visible strategy in pedagogy 
According to the headteacher, the forms for reporting on examinations to parents 
have been simplified: 
... we have simplified our procedure, and they are all like this. School 
badge, name of the subject, name ofthe pupil, tutor group, punctuality: 
good, number of attendances and its lesson, attainment: excellent, good, 
average, below average, and in between them, so, this child is, his 
attainment is average to good, effort: average, then there is a course 
description telling the parents what they are learning, and then it's my 
comment. And all the reports are exactly like that, maths, English, science, 
history, geography, Year 7, Year 8, Year 9, Year 10. Year 11 is slightly 
different. 
He states that the simple reports are in accordance with what parents want to see: 
But all the reports, I think, if you are a parent, you want to know very 
quickly, 'Is your child attending?', and what level, and what effort they are 
putting in, what is the course they are doing, and then you want to see 
what the teacher says. That is very simple. Attendance, effort, 
achievement, course description, teacher comment. 
The reporting form for reviews is even simpler: 
Er, the review is name of pupil, and it has a list of all subjects that they are 
taking, and it has a space for the teacher to comment. And the teacher 
simply in English has to say 'good', 'not so good', English, maths, history, 
geography, er, and one sheet you get a quick review of all subjects. 
After the examination, one sheet for a subject. For the review, all subjects 
on one sheet. 
The simplification of the reporting forms is based on the view that reporting 
should provide clearer information on comparative performances, and therefore a 
prescriptive visible strategy in pedagogy, which is to enhance the explicitness of 
prescriptive (criteria) rules in pedagogic relations. 
System to award pupils prizes for their attainment and effort: Prescriptive visible 
strategy in pedagogy 
The headteacher introduced an awards system in 1994. Under the new system, he 
awards a trophy to pupils who have shown the best academic achievement. The 
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first prize was awarded to two pupils who had achieved the best results in their 
GCSE. 
Well, I just, that's my prize for the most outstanding achievement. They 
got nine grade As each. So I shared the prize between them. 
As a part of the system, he has also introduced a lower school presentation 
evening when books are awarded to pupils who have shown very good attainment 
or effort in each subject: 
And the maximum number of prizes that a child can receive is two, and 
last July we gave prizes to around about eighty children and, er, I gave 
them book prizes to the value of eight pounds each. 
So, we had Year 7 history prize, boy and girl, Year 8 history prize, boy 
and girl, Year 9 history prize, boy and girl, and that's the same for all 
subjects, and then we get, er, effort prizes in history, maths, science, er, so, 
we, what we do is to reward attainment and effort. 
The awards system highlights stratifying differences between pupils, and therefore 
is a prescriptive visible strategy in pedagogy, which enhances the explicitness of 
prescriptive (criteria) rules in pedagogic relations. 
Clearer and stricter policy of permanent exclusions: Regulative visible strategy in 
pedagogy 
The headteacher has made it clear that consistently misbehaving pupils will be 
permanently excluded although the official procedures have not been changed. 
He had permanently excluded four pupils, and was going to exclude another pupil 
at the time of the interview: 
The procedures are the same, but the children now know that if they 
misbehave consistently in this school, I will remove them from the school. 
But where children consistently, persistently misbehave, I think, it's my 
responsibility to say, 'Unless you behave properly, you will not jeopardise 
the chances of the other children in your class'. 
He argues that his policy of exclusions is supported by parents and governors who 
regard it as a deterrent: 
Now, because a lot of my governors and parents, they want to see 
discipline as a deterrent, in other words, if I stand in front of all my Year 
10 children for example and say, 'You will behave properly or I will put 
you out of this school', that frightens them. And if they know that the 
threat is real, then, generally speaking, they behave better. 
He mentions, as a merit of GM status, that the LEA cannot make the school admit 
disruptive children who have been excluded from other schools: 
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And what has changed on the GM is that the LEA cannot send other 
children from other schools who are disruptive to this school. They cannot 
do that. Er, I won't take into this school children who've been disruptive 
in other schools unless they have a particular special need. 
The clearer and stricter policy of permanent exclusions is a regulative visible 
strategy in pedagogy, which increases the explicitness of regulative (hierarchical) 
rules in pedagogic relations. 
Now let us tum to the strategies in management. 
Departmental review: Regulative and prescriptive visible strategy in management 
As the headteacher's discourse quoted in the previous chapter shows, a review of 
the performance of each curriculum area is focused on examination results and is 
intended to make his teaching staff accountable to him and his deputy. It makes 
their control over the staffs performance more explicit and tighter. The 
departmental review is a regulative and prescriptive visible strategy in 
management. 
Larger management team with clear role of each member: Regulative and 
prescriptive visible strategy in management 
Before the school became grant-maintained, the senior management team 
consisted of headteacher and two deputies. Now the team includes four senior 
teachers and a senior administrative officer as well. Therefore, the number of 
team members has been increased from three to eight. This has been coinciding 
with the increase in the school size: 
... it's not a massive school, it's big, and it's getting bigger. And the 
management structure in the school was, before grant-maintained status, 
head, two deputies, that's it. Now head, two deputies, four senior teachers, 
senior administrative officer who doesn't teach, she is an administrator. 
Now my senior management team is eight. 
Each member of the team has a clear role and, according to the headteacher, the 
management structure is much stronger than it was previously. He intends to 
make the management businesslike in a sense: 
One of them is head ofupper school, Year 10 and 11. One of them is head 
of lower school, Year 7, 8 and 9. One of them does all the day-to-day 
administration, ifteachers are absent, cover, diary and timetable. One of 
them is the head of careers and, er, that's basically all he does. I have to 
say he might be leaving soon and, if he leaves, I won't replace him on the 
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senior management team. He is a senior member of staff historically, he is 
a senior member of staff. So, head of upper school, head of lower school, 
head of administration, careers teacher. My two deputies, one is in charge 
of staffing, staff appraisal, INSET and duties, and one is in charge of 
finance and curriculum. My responsibilities are governors, outside liaison 
with agencies, all issues to do with staffing and policy-making. I make all 
the policies. My senior administrative officer does all day-to-day finance. 
Er, she used to be the school secretary, but now she is much more than that. 
She is also clerk to the governing body. So, I have a management 
structure of eight, and it's a lot stronger than it was. 
Er, I'm very keen that people have a clear view of their own role. Mr 
Ohmori, you see, I, I, I would say to you that this school is like a 
business .... our job is to provide a quality service. If we don't provide 
the service, parents will choose to go to other schools. 
Larger management team itself does not have particular implications in terms of 
visibility, but the above-mentioned expansion of the management team is intended 
to provide the management with more hierarchical structure and clearer 
responsibility. Therefore, the above-mentioned change is a regulative and 
prescriptive visible strategy in management, which increases the explicitness of 
both regulative (hierarchical) and prescriptive rules in organisational relations. 
Clear agenda for a meeting of the management team: Regulative and prescriptive 
visible strategy in management 
The management team holds a meeting for three hours every week, and the 
headteacher provides a clear agenda at every meeting: 
We meet here around this table every Wednesday afternoon at 2.30, 2.30 
to 5.30, three hours. Er, we go through the diary for four weeks. We go 
through all staffing issues .... I produce an agenda for every meeting. 
Last week, diary, four weeks, next two weeks, two weeks, diary request, 
bulletin, caretaking, staffing, in-service training, and then various issues 
that are important to us. That takes place once a week. And there are 
eight people around a table. They've all got various responsibilities. 
According to the headteacher, previously there was no agenda and no real 
structure: 
A regular meeting every week, but no agendas, no real structure. I didn't 
like it. 
His intention is to make the school organisation tighter and more explicit: 
Er, and that happens once a week. So, the organisation and administration 
is hopefully all very tight, very clear. 
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This is a regulative and prescriptive visible strategy in management, which 
increases the explicitness of regulative (hierarchical) and prescriptive 
(sequencing) rules in organisational relations. 
Supplementary and summary comments 
According to the headteacher of Riverside Street School, his school is a 'classic 
case' of improved performance with GM status: 
...... this school is a classic case of a school that was within the LEA 
system and the school was not performing well. . ..... In fact in 1993 it was 
the, it was the lowest school, it was the bottom of the list in terms of 
examination results in this borough. . ..... (Its examination results in 1994 
were) the best that this school has ever got GCSE. 
The results were improved by about 170%. In his perception, GM status was a 
part of the driving force for the strategic changes of his school. 
I think that one of the reasons why we have got considerably better, why 
we are getting very much better is because of grant-maintained status . 
. . . . . . there have been real significant changes in terms of leadership, 
organisation, administration, and strategies since 1993. 
The above descriptions of the strategies by the headteacher in the interview imply 
that the strategies as a whole seem to be oriented towards a 'classic case' of the 
directive visible pedagogy and management. 
Table 6.6 Riverside Street School's strategies in pedagogy and management 
classified in terms of visibility 
Visible Invisible Neutral Total 
Pedagogy 12 0 1 13 
Management 3 0 5 8 
Total 15 0 6 21 
Table 6.6 shows that there are fifteen visible strategies, six neutral strategies, and 
no invisible strategy, which are described by the headteacher. Riverside Street 
School is the only school for which no invisible strategy is identified. Of the 
fifteen visible strategies (the largest number among the six schools), one strategy 
makes only regulative rules more explicit, five strategies make both regulative and 
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instructional rules more explicit, and therefore six strategies make regulative rules 
more explicit. Easthill Girls' School has two strategies that make regulative rules 
more explicit. All the other four schools have either zero or one such strategy. 
This comparison is compatible with the outstandingly directive nature of 
Riverside Street School's strategies expressed in the headteacher's discourse. 
Among the six headteachers interviewed, he is the only one who has expressed 
the preference for traditional teaching style. His directive approach is also applied 
to his staff. The teachers are accountable for the results of their pupils' 
achievements. The directive approach in his management is not just traditional 
but businesslike as well. The headteacher expressed his belief that schools should 
be more like business and industry. 
If you have a job, you should be performing to the best of your ability and 
then it's up to managers to make, just in, in exactly the same way as 
industry and business ....... Now, as far as I'm concerned, being the head 
of a grant-maintained school makes me more accountable to the people 
who are my clients and customers. . ..... I want my school to be run more 
on business lines, I want quality education, quality control, targets set, 
children performing well. 
At the same time, however, teaching itself is the most essential part of his strategy 
for the school. 
There was, what I've done is to shift the focus of attention to the quality of 
the teaching in the classroom. It's important that the teacher prepares their 
lessons, marks the work, returns it quickly, and insists on high standards 
from the children. You might say, 'Sure, all schools must do that'. This 
school wasn't doing it. ...... the most important thing must be the quality 
of the teacher. If the teacher in front of the children is good, has a rapport 
with them, likes their subject, works hard, then the teacher will be, will be, 
er, enthusing the children to learn. My job, it's to make the teacher's job 
easier. I have to put in place with them structures and procedures that 
allow them to do their teaching properly ...... .I think when parents see 
and pupils see and teachers see that the most important thing is the quality 
of what goes on in those our lessons, then the children will work a lot 
better. 
Examination results are the focus of his strategy. 
And we've made a very conscious effort to improve our public image. 
Now the most important performance indicator for parents is the 
examination results. If they think their children are going to come to our 
school that is well disciplined and where children are going to be made to 
work hard and perform well on the open market, they will look to our 
school to send their children ....... Every, everything was put aside and all 
attention was focused on 'Please this year we will work hard on the exam 
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results'. When in the past what had happened was we came in, we taught, 
and we hoped for good exam results. 
The school had been struggling to improve its public image and examination 
results in an area with better-performing schools including Seymour Field School. 
According to the headteacher, as a result of the strategic changes, the public 
image of Riverside Street School was very much improved. 
The image that people had of this school was a school that was not very 
disciplined, that, er, children came here and were happy but didn't achieve 
very much in terms of high academic achievement...... I like to think that 
the perception of the school from the general public and parents is 
considerably better. Examination results are improved. The children look 
better. ...... And ifyou ask, ifyou would go on to the street of[the area 
name], they would tell you now that their perception of Riverside Street 
School is a school that is getting very much better, not perfect yet but 
considerably better than it was ...... .I think I'm right in saying that, er, 
the school's, the respect that people have for this school has significantly 
increased over the last eighteen months. That's true. 
The number of applications showed a rapid increase since the school became GM. 
In 1993, Riverside Street School did not have enough applications to fill its places. 
In 1994, the number of applications was more than one and half times as large as 
the school's standard number. For 1995, the school received an even larger 
number of applications. 
Now the headteacher hoped that his school was competing more with Seymour 
Field School and selective schools than with the LEA schools. 
Before 1993, the main rivals were within 'Roundham', Fertile Land 
School, [another county school], er, Seymour Field School. Since 1993, I 
think really, they are, Fertile Land School and [the above county school] 
are ...... they are less of a rival than we are, than the other schools are now. 
I do get now a number of requests to transfer children from Fertile Land 
School or [the above county school] to here ...... .I think the LEA schools, 
they are still rivals, but more, more importantly now, I think, schools like 
the grammar schools, independent schools and Seymour Field School who 
are like ourselves, have a degree of independence, we have, we have 
moved into that league, if you like, and they are, they now represent more 
in terms of competition than the LEA schools. 
Realistically, however, he described a different picture as follows: 
Good independent schools don't regard us as rivals. They have a very 
strong traditional base. . ..... And there are still lots of, lots of parents in 
this country who, if given the opportunity, would prefer to send their 
children, if they are bright and able, to schools where only bright and able 
children go to. What that causes of course is divisiveness. It's, it, it 
causes a division. No, I don't think they see us a rival. ...... Er, now the 
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small, and there is only one really, very small independent school, that see 
us as a rival. [The above county school], Fertile Land School, they see us 
as a rival. Er, Seymour Field School, to a certain extent, but, but they've, 
they've been a good school for a long time. My job is to make this school 
better, better, better and put it in the same league as Seymour Field School. 
It seems that Riverside Street School was moving towards a stereotype of 
directive visible pedagogy and management as far as the strategies described by 
the headteacher are concerned. 
Here we are at the end ofthe presentation of the six case schools' new 
strategies or strategic changes, since the quasi-market reform, in their 
headteachers' discourses. Now we will see what can be found from the above 
empirical data as a whole. 
Findings: Strategic Changes towards More Visibility 
Now we should sum up all the findings from the above analysis of the six schools' 
strategies described by the headteachers as 'new' strategies that were introduced 
or changed since the quasi-market reform by the Education Reform Act 1988. 
Visible strategies dominant across the case schools 
Among the above six schools, only Roundham Catholic College indicates some 
balance between visible and invisible strategies, and all the other five seem to 
lend support to the basic hypothesis that school managers were adopting more 
visible strategies than invisible ones as 'new' strategies although in different 
degrees. While Fertile Land School and Seymour Field School have substantial 
minority elements of invisibility in their strategies, Easthill Girls' School and 
particularly Riverside Street School show very little or virtually no elements of 
invisibility. The essential point here is that on the whole the new strategies 
expressed by the headteachers seem to be consistent with the hypothesised 
movement towards more visibility in school strategies. 
In the case ofRoundham Catholic College, according to the headteacher's 
discourse, the fact that it is a Catholic school decreases the competitive pressures 
for his school in the local school market. In addition, he seems to be most in 
favour of the so-called child-centred education among the six headteachers as far 
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as their discourses in the interviews are concerned. These factors may have 
affected Roundham Catholic College's strategies. 
More prescriptive visible strategies than regulative ones 
While Riverside Street School has six regulative visible strategies that make 
regulative rules more explicit, and Easthill Girls' School has two, all the other 
four schools have either zero or one such strategy. The vast majority (even for 
Riverside Street School) of the visible strategies expressed by the headteachers 
are prescriptive ones. Among the six headteachers interviewed, the headteacher 
of Riverside Street School is the only one who shows the preference for 
traditional teaching style, and his directive approach is also explicit in the 
organisational relations with his staff as well as in the pedagogic relations with 
pupils. We may cautiously interpret the results as indicating that quasi-market 
pressures are directed more towards academic achievements or, more crudely, 
examination results than towards discipline and moral aspects in schooling. 
Examination results as the agent of change 
In all the six headteachers' discourses, the most prominent topic among others is 
how they take examination results seriously-whether or not they are personally 
in favour of them being used as performance indicators of schools. This seems to 
be the main driving force towards prescriptive visible strategies adopted by the 
schools. It is clear in the headteachers' discourses that they are conscious of 
possible or even probable consequences of the effect of the increasing role of 
examination results for parental choice in the local market. 
The analysis of examination results is a focal point of strategy as the cases of 
Easthill Girls' School, George Square School and Seymour Field School 
exemplify. The monitoring of pupils' academic achievements can be closely 
linked to that of teachers' performances as explicitly indicated in Fertile Land 
School and Riverside Street School. 
Coupling of strategies in pedagogy and management 
Visible strategies in management often seem to be in tune with those in pedagogy. 
In particular, a mechanism for monitoring or reviewing the performances of staff 
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and/or subject departments in relation to pupils' performances, introduced as a 
new strategy in Easthill Girls' School, Fertile Land School, Seymour Field School 
and Riverside Street School, is a typical case of the strong linkage between 
pedagogic and managerial domains. 
The combined use of devolved management and performance monitoring is an 
essential characteristic of the market-oriented reforms of public services. 
Performance indicators have been developed as tools for explicit organisational 
control in the public services. In the case of education, performance indicators 
including examination results have been built into the quasi-market system. The 
accountability line between the state and schools and that within each school are 
linked with each other, and both are based on pupils' academic achievements. 
Room for manoeuvre for invisible strategies 
While on the whole the emphasis on examination results tends to promote visible 
strategies, it does not necessarily prevent the adoption of an invisible pedagogy 
that 'works'. Roundham Catholic College introduced a child-centred scheme of 
mathematics, SMILE, in order to improve examination results and, according to 
the headteacher, it has 'worked'. Interestingly, the improved results persuaded 
the sceptical parents who liked traditional teaching approaches. On the one hand, 
this case exemplifies the perceived parents' favour in traditional teaching or 
visible pedagogy. On the other hand, it indicates that invisible strategies can 
overcome the parents' attitude if they 'work' towards improving the results. 
In the cases ofRoundham Catholic College, Fertile Land School and Seymour 
Field School, the adoption of invisible strategies in teaching styles and methods is 
prominent. It may tell us that the market pressure in terms of parental preference 
is more about 'results' than about 'processes'. While sacrificing the examination 
'results' for whatever reason may not be a very realistic choice for schools, 
prejudice held by parents rightly or wrongly against particular teaching 
approaches or 'processes' is not necessarily unchangeable. Therefore, there 
seems to be room for manoeuvre by school managers who introduce invisible 
strategies in processes as long as the strategies improve the results or, at least, do 
not endanger them. 
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As the findings of the empirical study have been analysed as above, the next 
task in the following Part is to discuss the implications of the findings for broader 
contexts including research on education quasi-markets, Labour's policies, and 
the theoretical framework. These implications will demonstrate the significance, 
relevance and originality of the findings and their theoretical basis. 
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Part V Implications, Summary and Conclusions 
Chapter 7 Implications of the Findings for Research on Quasi-
Markets 
The controversy continues as empirical studies accumulate 
The empirical work for this thesis was carried out from 1994 to 1995. Since then, 
there have been more empirical studies on the effects of education quasi-markets. 
Lauder et al. (1999, p.1-2) classified the processes ofthe debate on education 
markets in Britain, New Zealand and other countries into three phases. In the first 
phase, the advocates and critics of education markets exchanged abstract 
arguments based on principles and inferences. The second phase included 
research on the aspects of policies to introduce market mechanisms. They 
declared that their book initiated the third phase, in which the effects of education 
markets were reported and claims of the advocates and critics of markets were to 
be tested. Based on their empirical study ofNew Zealand's education markets, 
their conclusion was largely in favour of the claims of the critics, saying, 'In 
general terms our studies have found that the trends predicted by critics of 
marketization are confirmed' (ibid, p.l31) and 'our findings suggest that neither 
efficiency or equity is well served by education markets' (ibid, p.l34). 
Nonetheless, the debate is still going on. 
When the empirical work of this research was conducted, the debate was in the 
second phase. Now the debate is in the third phase as termed by Lauder et al. 
(1999, p.1-2). However, the basic features ofthe debate have been astonishingly 
stable and virtually unchanged. According to Lauder et al. (ibid, p.131 ), 'Three 
major issues lay at the heart of the debate: choice, polarization and school 
effectiveness'. In the terminology ofthis thesis (see Chapter 3), the focal points 
of the controversy are still the interrelated issues of 'choice and diversity versus 
inequality and hierarchy' 19 and 'educational standards and efficiency', on both of 
19 There seems to be a prevailing view that quasi-market reforms make schooling less equal and more 
hierarchical. Stephen Gorard and John Fitz (2000) challenged the view. According to them, 'the notion of 
markets having a significant stratifying effect on school intakes is now so commonly held that it will take 
substantial evidence to shake it' (Gorard & Fitz, 2000, p.ll6). They analysed data from all secondary 
schools in England and Wales relating to poverty and special educational needs, and concluded that overall 
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which empirical research has been accumulating but has not yet reached decisive 
conclusions. Therefore, as shown as follows, the empirical findings and their 
theoretical basis in this thesis have important implications for the research and 
debate, at this current stage, on education quasi-markets. 
In contrast with recent research on school strategies in the quasi-market 
Regarding school strategies in, or school responses to, quasi-markets, the research 
has been accumulating. This section reviews other research works in contrast 
with the findings and implications of this research. As the review demonstrates 
below, the thesis's findings in the context of its theoretical framework have 
relevant implications for the current quasi-market system, and the originality and 
uniqueness of the findings and theoretical framework are not diminished by other 
recent research. 
Nick Foskett (2003, pp.l31-4), after discussing 'strategic management' 
comprising three components of' strategic analysis', 'strategic choice', and 
'strategic implementation', says, 'Few detailed research-based case studies exist 
either in the school sector or in FE'. Then, he introduces four such research 
works in addition to one of his own. Although Foskett himself works on school 
management and marketing, three of the four named works are not within the 
management literature tradition but in the policy sociology tradition that deals 
with the consequences of the education quasi-market. These three works contain 
empirical work on school responses to, or strategies in, the education quasi-
market. Therefore, here these works will be reviewed in the context of the theme 
of this thesis. 
segregation between schools had been declining from 1989 to 1998. They suggested that the 
desegregation was not primarily due to market forces, but more likely due to other social and demographic 
changes including the reorganisation of schools. Their argument attracted much criticism from other 
researchers including Alex Gibson and Sheena Asthana (2000) and Philip Noden (2000). Gibson and 
Asthana (2000) not only criticised the methodology adopted by Gorard and Fitz, but also referred to 'the 
wealth of evidence cataloguing the detrimental consequences of the marketization of education' (Gibson 
and Asthana, 2000, p.l50) produced by largely qualitative studies. Noden (2000) analysed the data for all 
English secondary schools from 1994 to 1999, and concluded that there was a net increase in segregation 
during the period although he cautiously mentioned a possibility that this increase was from a lower 
baseline than the level of segregation prior to the quasi-market reform. Nonetheless, Gorard (2000) 
insisted not only that schools were becoming more socially mixed in the 1990s, but also that achievement 
gaps between different groups of students in terms of class, ethnicity and gender were all decreasing over 
time. 
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Philip A. Woods, Carl Bagley and Ron Glatter's (1998) work is valuable as one 
of the limited number of empirical studies on school responses, that is, strategic 
changes in response, to the quasi-market system of education in Britain. 
Moreover, a particular strength of this research work lies in the combination of 
quantitative surveys on parental choice and qualitative interviews with school 
staff about school responses to choice and competition. Their work is based on a 
multiple case study of parental choice and school responses to choice and 
competition, in the use of both qualitative and quantitative methods20 , for which 
data collection was carried out between 1993 and 1996. The case study, known as 
the Parental and School Choice Interaction (PASCI) study, covered three areas of 
a town, a deprived urban area and a semi-rural area, each ofwhich included three 
to six state secondary schools, to the total of eleven. 'The main objectives of the 
interviews' were to find 'the ways in which secondary schools perceive the issue 
of parental choice and competition', 'the extent to which secondary schools can 
and do respond to parental choice and competition, and the factors that influence 
those responses', and 'what, if any, changes the research schools were making 
were intended to encourage parents to choose their particular school' (pp.6-10). 
Although Woods, Bagley and Glatter's (1998) work may have enormously 
contributed to the detailed description of the quasi-market, 'public-market' in 
their terminology, their approach is different from the one adopted in this thesis, 
resulting in different values. While their work provides descriptive accounts of 
'school responses', this thesis analyses school strategies with a highly 
conceptualised framework for judging the directions of those strategies, providing 
an explicitly defined trend in the schools' strategic changes. While their work 
explicates the dominance of the academic aspect against the personal and social 
aspect in school responses to choice and competition, this thesis clarifies the 
directions of change in the academic aspect and the personal and social aspect 
with a refined conceptual or theoretical framework. Furthermore, the thesis pays 
20 The data collection on parental choice consisted of annual surveys in the use of postal questionnaires, 
which resulted in a total of nearly 6,000 (2000 per year) completed questionnaires, and supplementary 
personal interviews with samples of parents (124 interviews in total). In the questionnaire survey, parents 
were asked about sources of information and factors influencing choice of school. On the other hand, the 
principal method of the data collection on schools was personal interviews with headteachers, deputy 
heads and other teachers as well as a small number of bursars/business managers and governors. Each 
interview lasted around 45 minutes to an hour, and the total number of interviews was 109, including 
'repeat interviews with key individuals'. 
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particular attention to a possible linkage between responses (strategies) in 
pedagogy and those in management. The thesis has presented and examined the 
hypothesised trend in school strategies towards more visible modalities of 
pedagogy and management and their interconnection. 
In contrast to the complexity of parental choice and the importance of the 
intrinsic-personal/social, with regard to the school responses to choice and 
competition, the authors argue that they have found an increasing focus on the 
'academic', which they define as 'educational progress which is primarily 
oriented towards success in examinations' (p.162). They insist on the dominance 
of the academic aspect against the personal and social aspect in school responses 
to choice and competition. This is in line with this thesis's earlier discussion on 
an interesting inconsistency between the findings of the researches on parental 
choice and the critical arguments about the quasi-market. While it is often said 
that parental choice is complex and that a humanistic perspective seems more 
predominant than academic performance or at least the latter is far from a single 
dominant factor, most of the critics of the quasi-market argue that the competition 
between schools for parental choice will be significantly driven by the academic 
performance as measured by examination and test results. 
Foskett (2003, p.134) also names the book edited by Glatter, Woods and 
Bagley (1997), which contains fourteen chapters written by different authors. As 
one of those chapters, the work by David Halpin, Sally Power and John Fitz 
(1997), based on their empirical studies21 carried out between 1992 and 1994, 
presents a picture of the institutional changes in a sample of GM schools in 
comparison with the neighbouring LEA-maintained schools. While the changes 
found for the GM schools in their work are similar to the strategic changes 
towards more visible modalities of pedagogy and management found in this thesis, 
their work is not about the overall trend in the strategic changes of schools 
including both the LEA-maintained and the GM schools. Furthermore, their work 
does not take the approach of constructing a theoretical framework such as the 
21 Their empirical studies consist of semi-structured (audio-recorded) interviews with the head teachers of 
nine GM schools, seven LEA schools, and one private school; a questionnaire survey of the teachers in six 
of the nine GM schools, all the LEA schools and the private school; supplementary interviews with a range 
of governors; a questionnaire survey of Year 7 pupils; and semi-structured (notebook-recorded) interviews 
with Year 9, 10 and II pupils. 
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one in the thesis that enables us to analyse both pedagogy and management in the 
use of an integrated set of concepts, that is, visible and invisible modalities. 
The main conclusion of their research is that the then GM schools in the sample 
were, rather than becoming innovative, moving towards the traditional modes of 
education with the emphasis on academic achievement and rigorous discipline, 
that is, 'opting into the past'. Among their key findings, the combination of the 
'organisational orthodoxies and curriculum and pedagogical conservatisms' (p.66) 
is important in the context of this thesis. With regard to management, the authors 
argue that 'the concentration of power within the hands of the headteacher is more 
pronounced in schools which have opted out' and that 'staff in GM schools are 
less likely to be involved in decision-making' (p.62). Furthermore, the 
organisational structure found in the GM schools 'is more hierarchical and 
traditional than that found in many LEA-maintained schools' (p.63). Concerning 
the curricular change, according to their account, 'Most of the changes mentioned 
by GM headteachers in interview represent either glosses on the National 
Curriculum (notably in technology) or revivals of academic selectivity and 
traditional modes of education generally' (p.64). 
While their findings seem to suggest that GM schools tend to have more visible 
pedagogy and management than LEA-maintained schools, it does not imply a 
general trend towards more visible modalities of school strategies. Furthermore, 
although their research work has shown a significant possibility of linkage 
between school strategies in pedagogy and those in management, the linkage is 
not theoretically explicated. By contrast, this thesis enables us to interpret 
possible linkages in the context of the integrated theoretical framework for 
pedagogy and management in the use of the concepts of visible and invisible 
modalities. 
Another chapter of the same book, written by Jason Hardman and Rosalind 
Levacic ( 1997), provides interesting and important information not directly on 
school strategies but on factors for the 'market success', in terms of recruitment of 
pupils, which has implications for school strategies. Importantly their quantitative 
analysis demonstrates a positive linkage between successful recruitment and the 
GCSE examination performance. Therefore, this finding implies that school 
strategies to raise examination results are really responsive to parental choice 
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while their paper itself does not say anything about school strategies. In this sense, 
their work is complementary to this thesis. 
Their paper is based on the longitudinal quantitative analyses of five LEAs' 
administrative data on some 300 secondary schools, though the number of schools 
available for each particular analysis differs. The first of their research questions 
is whether parental choice causes recruitment changes and hence brings about 
competitive pressures for the sample schools. The authors' answer is 'yes'. They 
say, 'The existence of surplus capacity along with evidence of the annual 
redistribution of the incoming pupil cohort amongst groups of closely located 
schools together indicate that competition between schools as a result of parental 
choice can and does arise' (p.132). They also explore the hypothesised 
association between 'market success' in terms of intakes and 'two key school 
characteristics' (p.119), that is, the GCSE examination results and the socio-
economic status of pupils. Concerning the latter characteristic, because of data 
limitations, they have only reached a tentative finding that 'the most successful 
schools (i.e. 'improving/full') tend to have lower proportions of pupils qualifying 
for free school meals than their competitors' (pp.128-31). With regard to the 
former characteristic, they have found that '"improving/full" schools tend to have 
a higher percentage of their pupils achieving five or more A-C grades in GCSE 
than the "middling" schools' and 'declining/plateau' schools for each academic 
year from 1989-90 through to 1993-4. However, 'There is no significant 
difference in the GCSE results of "middling" and "declining/plateau" schools' 
(p.127). Based on these findings, the authors argue that 'quasi-market success is 
coupled with a relatively high level of GCSE performance', and that 'parental 
choice and the school resourcing mechanism are tending to favour schools in line 
with Government expectation', while 'the lack of a significant difference in the 
mean GCSE performance of "middling" and "declining plateau" schools suggest 
that examination results may not be a key reason for parents avoiding particular 
schools' (p.133). 
While the empirical study in this thesis did not collect data on parental choice, 
its qualitatively analysis of the headteachers' discourses suggests that the school 
managers were adopting more and more visible strategies often to raise 
examination results. 
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This thesis, without collecting data on parental choice, cannot give a direct 
answer to the question of whether these school strategies were really responsive to 
parental choice. Therefore, on one hand, Hardman and Levacic's (1997) work, 
demonstrating a positive association between the successful recruitment and the 
GCSE examination performance, complements the thesis in this regard. On the 
other hand, their work does not tell us anything about what strategies the schools 
are adopting in response to parental choice, and the thesis's value lies in 
researching these strategies. 
However, as their work suggests that complete failure in the quasi-market may 
not simply be decided by examination results, parental choice is complexly 
influenced by a number of factors. This thesis is unique in pointing out a paradox 
that both the advocates and critics of the education quasi-market seem to agree 
with each other that the academic schooling model with focus on examination 
results prevails in the quasi-market even though parental choice is complex and 
diverse. The very nature of the quasi-market with league tables as an essential 
element incorporated encourages schools to attract parents who want to choose a 
better school in terms of examination results. Incentives for school managers' 
strategies in the education quasi-market are both 'economic' in terms of 
enrolment numbers and 'social' in terms of their school's perceived status. Such 
complexity is typically expressed in the following answer by Fertile Land 
School's headteacher to the question why her school needs to attract more able 
pupils: 
Well, because if we don't, we will lose our position in the league table 
that's published every year, and that will mean it's more and more difficult 
to attract children of quality. And if more schools become grant-
maintained and if Riverside Street School gets to enlarge its, its space and 
so on, it will mean that there may come a time when we can't attract the 
numbers. And then we will be in a, you know, downward spiral then . 
. . . . . . But that's not the whole story. The other story is the professional 
pride. And the staffknow they can do well with special needs children. 
They want to prove to themselves that they can do well with very able 
children as well, and everything that goes in between. 
By both the economic and social incentives, school managers are motivated to 
raise their position in league tables and attract academically able children and 
academically oriented parents. Therefore, the managers tend to increase visible 
strategies oriented towards the academic schooling model with focus on 
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examination results. This is the reason why the model seems to prevail in the 
education quasi-market even though parental choice is complex and diverse. 
Importantly 'the positive association between schools' market success and their 
raw GCSE performance', as a key finding by Hardman and Levacic (1997), 
suggests that school strategies are really responding to parental choice. This view 
is in line with the theoretical framework and empirical findings of this thesis. The 
thesis, based on its empirical findings from the qualitative data collected in the 
context of its theoretical framework, argues that the school managers were 
responding to subjectively real pressures. Hardman and Levacic's (1997) findings 
suggest that these market pressures are objectively real as well. Complemented 
by their findings, the thesis can argue that school strategies are responsive to 
market pressures from parental choice. 
The other book named by Foskett (2003, p.134) is Sharon Gewirtz, Stephen J. 
Ball and Richard Bowe's (1995) work. Their work, which was arguably said to 
be the first comprehensive study of market dynamics in British education, seems 
to have enormously contributed to setting the scene of controversy at the first 
stage of empirical research on the education quasi-market. While their extensive 
and detailed descriptions oflocal education markets 22 are valuable in themselves 
at that stage, their grounded approach, contrastive to this thesis's approach with 
an explicit theoretical framework, has produced results of different values. Here 
the review of their work focuses on their analysis of the secondary schools' 
'institutional responses to competition' or 'policies being enacted within schools' 
(p.156) in the context ofthis thesis's interest. 
The authors argue that they have identified five key trends. The first one is the 
'short-termism' or 'quick fix' approach including a strictly enforced dress code, 
telephoning and writing to parents of truants, and permanent exclusions (pp.157-
60). The second one is to 'pass the buck', seen in permanent exclusions and 
formal and informal selection (p.160-6). The third one is 'internal provisional 
differentiation' including reduced provision for children with learning difficulty, 
newly developed provision for able children, and a shift away from mixed-ability 
22 Their research was carried out between 1991 and 1994, and the empirical data was collected from 'three 
competitive "clusters" of schools in three geographically contiguous LEAs in London' (p.l3). The number 
of the secondary schools researched was fourteen. They also interviewed eighteen headteachers of feeder 
primary schools and, moreover, conducted 137 interviews with parents. 
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grouping towards setting. The fourth one is a 'narrowing of scope' of schooling 
with almost exclusive emphasis on academic and instrumental aspects at the 
expense of social and expressive aspects (pp.l74-5). The fifth and the last one is 
'commodification of schooling and the child' (pp.l75-8), which means 'not only 
schools or school services but also children themselves are coming to be viewed 
as commodities, some of whom are more valuable than others'(pp.l75-6). 
We see that individual findings and arguments in their work are informative 
and sometimes relevant to this thesis. For example, the thesis's findings are in 
tune with the authors' argument that 'within our case-study schools, particularly 
undersubscribed ones, it was firmly believed that survival in the marketplace 
makes it necessary not only to fill the school to capacity but also to retain or 
create "balanced" intakes and to raise the raw-score performance potential of 
student bodies' (p.l86). 
Their descriptive analysis of the local education markets had a particular value 
in starting the empirical research on the British education quasi-market. Most of 
the later research on the issue of school responses to, or strategies in, the 
education quasi-market has continued to tend to be descriptive rather than 
theoretically explicative. This thesis is intended to contribute to theoretical 
development well based on empirical findings. The central device in the thesis is 
the theoretical framework in the use of visible/invisible modalities of school 
strategy in pedagogy and management. This device is expected to identify the 
orientations of schools' strategic changes in the quasi-market in a systematic and 
consistent manner and make general trends emerge from those orientations. The 
empirical findings of the case study in this thesis are generally supporting the 
relevance of the theoretical device. 
Continuing relevance, originality and uniqueness of this thesis 
As we have seen in the above literature review, concerning school responses to, or 
strategies in, the education quasi-market, empirical, mainly qualitative, research 
has been accumulating and providing detailed descriptions of 'local markets' with 
some emphasis on complex particularities in local (political, socio-economic, 
cultural, demographic, etc.) environments. Although some generalisations have 
also been tried in such research, the generalisations have tended to be rather ad 
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hoc without a conceptually defined theoretical framework. In the absence of such 
a framework, it is difficult to judge the directions of individual responses or 
strategic changes in a systematic and consistent manner and to make general 
trends emerge from those directions. 
This thesis is relevantly tackling the above-mentioned weakness in the research 
development. Its theoretical framework built in the use of visible/invisible 
modalities of strategy in pedagogy and management is expected to provide the 
judgement criteria for orientations of individual strategies and a device for finding 
general trends within apparently chaotic details and particularities. The empirical 
findings of the thesis, the most important one of which is a general trend towards 
more visibility, seem to support the relevance and effectiveness of this theoretical 
framework. The particular originality and uniqueness of this thesis lie in its 
systematic analysis of school strategies, its integration of modalities of both 
pedagogy and management in a single conceptual framework, and its empirical 
examination of the hypothesised movement towards more visibility both in 
pedagogic relations between teachers and pupils and in organisational relations 
between school management and staff. The above literature review demonstrates 
that the relevance, originality and uniqueness of this thesis have not been 
diminished by other recent research. 
Implications of this research for the debate on the education quasi-market 
Then, as original research work on the directions of school strategies in the 
education quasi-market, this thesis may have some implications for the debate on 
the education quasi-market. The nature of the debate has been rather stable, and 
the controversy is still focused on the interrelated issues of 'choice and diversity 
versus inequality and hierarchy' and 'educational standards and efficiency'. As 
shown as follows, this research has important implications for the debate. 
Implications for the paradox of choice and diversity 
In Chapter 3, it is indicated that there seems to be a paradoxical inconsistency in 
both the arguments by the advocates of the quasi-market and those by the critics 
of it. The former arguments, on the one hand, emphasise the freedom of parental 
choice and the diversity of schools for parents to choose between, but on the other 
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hand, some of them expect that the traditional academic model with rigorous 
teaching and discipline will be predominant. The latter arguments, on the one 
hand, emphasise the complexity of parental choice and deny the dominance of 
academic performance as a factor of choice. However, on the other hand, they 
predict the formation of a hierarchy of schools and the increase in the inequality 
among pupils on the assumption that the competition between schools for parental 
choice will be significantly driven by the academic performance as measured by 
examination and test results. Both the advocates and the critics seem illogical in 
making such inconsistent arguments as above. However, paradoxically enough, 
both sides seem to agree with each other that the academic schooling model with 
focus on examination results prevails in the education quasi-market even though 
parental choice is complex and diverse. 
The predominance ofvisible strategies among 'new' strategies, described by 
the headteachers as being introduced or changed since the quasi-market reform, in 
the above empirical study endorses this paradoxical view agreed between the 
advocates and critics of the quasi-market. When the headteachers explicate 
visible strategies, they often mention that they take examination results seriously. 
The very nature of the quasi-market system with league tables as an essential 
element incorporated in the system encourages schools to attract parents who 
want to choose a better school in terms of examination results. As the interview 
data in this thesis show, the headteachers sometimes argue that their school should 
attract academically able children and that the 'quality' of intake is important. 
This indicates what kind of pupils and parents tend to be targeted in the education 
quasi-market. 
What matters for a school is not just the intake. Performing well in league 
tables is in itself valuable for the school's perceived social status and the pride of 
the headteacher and staff. Performance tables provide a linear scale on which 
schools are positioned, and their position on the scale can be regarded as an 
indicator of their status. The perceived status of the school can be linked to the 
professional pride of the headteacher and other staff. With or without concern 
about the number of its intake, it is understandable for a school to have strategies 
to raise its status indicated in league tables. It is reasonable that such strategies 
are visible ones oriented towards the traditional academic model that is supposed 
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to focus on and be successful in raising examination results. As discussed in the 
first section of this chapter, incentives for school managers in the education quasi-
market are social as well as economic. 
The complex mixture of the economic and social motives of school managers in 
the quasi-market is typically expressed in Fertile Land School headteacher's 
answer, as quoted in Chapter 6, to the question why her school needs to attract 
more able pupils. According to the answer, losing able children will mean losing 
her school's position in the league table, and it may lead to a downward spiral 
where the school cannot attract enough pupil numbers. Her answer also mentions 
the staffs pride. 
School managers are motivated to raise their position in league tables, and 
attract academically able children and academically oriented parents. While these 
two aims are often in a chicken and egg situation, the logical conclusion is that the 
managers tend to increase visible strategies oriented towards the academic 
schooling model with focus on examination results. This is the reason why the 
model is said to prevail in the education quasi-market even though parental choice 
is complex and diverse. 
Quasi-markets in favour of uniformity rather than diversity in pedagogy 
The above discussion suggests that education quasi-markets may promote 
uniformity rather than diversity in pedagogic strategies at the level of school 
management. As already discussed in this thesis, it is apparently paradoxical that 
both the advocates and the critics seem to agree with each other that the academic 
schooling model with focus on examination results prevails in the education 
quasi-market even though parental choice is complex and diverse. However, this 
paradoxical view agreed between both sides should become a solid basis for 
further developments of the debate on the education quasi-market. In the author's 
view, both the advocates and critics of quasi-markets should explicitly agree on 
this bottom line for academically constructive discussions on education quasi-
markets. 
The above argument is compatible with some findings of other research. For 
example, an economic analysis by Adnett and Davies (2000) concludes that 
market-based reforms of state schooling in England seem to have initially 
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increased the curriculum conformity to a traditionalist academic orientation rather 
than curriculum innovation and diversity. Over time, they say, 'curriculum 
innovation is more likely, especially amongst schools losing market share' 
(Adnett and Davies, 2000, p.l64). However, these 'unsuccessful' schools are 
least able to have adequate resources to enable successful innovation. On the 
other hand, 'successful' schools with more resources generally have little 
incentive to undertake the risks of innovation. 
Although there are a number of pieces of research that indicate the same 
direction towards uniformity or conformity, the uniqueness of this research lies in 
its presentation of mechanisms to conformity as school strategies. In the 
education quasi-market, school managers tend to adopt more and more visible 
strategies oriented towards explicit rules in pedagogy and management to raise 
examination results and to attract academically able children and academically 
oriented parents as discussed above. This trend results in a move towards 
conformity to more visible modalities of pedagogy. 
Ron Glatter (2004) points out that 'the reforms initiated by the 1988 Act were 
particularly strong drivers of uniformity and homogenisation' (p.65). As he 
describes, diversity in secondary schooling has been promoted through the 
'specialist schools' scheme, which originated in the then Conservative 
government's experimental policy and was subsequently extended by the Labour 
government to an enormous size. More than half of all the secondary schools in 
England have gained specialist status. The specialisms now include not only 
technology, languages, sport and the arts but also engineering, science, 'business 
and enterprise', 'mathematics and computing', music and humanities. However, 
the substance in specialisation should be questioned when the reality of 
specialisation appears as follows. According to the findings by West et al. (2000) 
as quoted by Glatter (2004, p.65), 'By far the most common reason cited for 
seeking specialist school status (by 51% of the headteachers responding) was the 
additional money it would bring from sponsors and the government. More than 
half the heads (53%) said that the specialism chosen for the bid was not the 
school's strongest teaching area'. Whatever the evaluation of the scheme is, this 
form of diversity is not from market mechanisms but from a government policy. 
In other words, it is still valid to say that education quasi-markets tend to promote 
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uniformity rather than diversity in pedagogic strategies towards more visible 
modalities. 
Efficiency and Educational standards improved by market mechanisms? 
If the quasi-market reform promoted visible strategies that placed the emphasis 
upon academic achievement measured by examinations and tests, a natural 
question is whether or not these strategies were successful in raising academic 
achievements or educational standards. 
Garard and Taylor (2002) analyse the possible impact of market forces on 
educational standards. The authors' conclusion is that although state schools' raw 
scores in GCSE and A-level examinations and their relative position to fee-paying 
schools have been improving since 1988, it is not clear whether these 
improvements mean a rise in educational standards and whether the improvements 
are related to market forces. They point out a fundamental difficulty in measuring 
the changes in standards over time, saying, 'if the test is not norm-referenced how 
can we tell that apparent changes over time are not simply evidence of 
differentially demanding tests?' (Garard and Taylor, 2002, p.15) On the other 
hand, norm-referencing, by definition, does not allow any rise or fall in grades 
over time because grades are allocated proportionately within each annual cohort. 
Even if the improvements are interpreted as a rise in standards, it is not easy to 
judge whether the rising standards are attributable to market forces. The authors 
argue, 'If choice reforms are accompanied by other changes in an educational 
system, it becomes difficult to isolate the actual cause of academic improvement' 
(Garard and Taylor, 2002, p.8), and this is exactly the case for the English 
education system. 
What can this thesis say about the issue of efficiency and standards in terms of 
pupil achievement? It is not about the empirical data on the quasi-market 
reform's impact on pupil achievement but about the implications of the reform for 
strategic changes undertaken by school managers with regard to pupil 
achievement. As the data analysis of the interviews with the six school 
headteachers presented in Chapter 6 indicates, the strategic changes in the quasi-
market seem to be oriented towards visible strategies that are supposed to place 
the emphasis on measurable academic achievements or, more crudely, 
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examination results. Therefore, the results of the empirical study in this research 
suggest that the quasi-market pressures encourage school managers to focus their 
strategies on academic achievement measured as examination results. In other 
words, in the education quasi-market, school strategies tend to aim at raising the 
examination results. Then, the question that remains is not regarding the 
orientation of school strategies but regarding the effectiveness of the strategies. 
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Chapter 8 Implications of the Findings for Labour's Policies 
Back to the future: The quasi-market at the heart of education reform again 
The interviews for the case study of the six secondary schools were carried out 
between 1994 and 1995, and therefore this research is primarily on the quasi-
market system of education introduced by the Conservative government before 
being modified by the Labour government. There have been certain changes as 
well as continuities between the former Conservative government and the current 
Labour government as discussed later in this chapter. However, because Labour's 
policies have basically let the education quasi-market remain largely intact, the 
implications of the above analysis and findings for the current system are still 
significant. There has been virtually no argument that the education quasi-market 
has been replaced by something else under the Labour government, and therefore 
the change of government has not diminished the relevance of this research work 
on the quasi-market. 
Moreover, the relevance was re-enhanced as the quasi-market with parental 
choice and school autonomy was placed back in the position of the main driving 
force for education reform towards the end of Tony Blair's government. In 
October 2005, the Labour government published a White Paper, Higher Standards, 
Better Schools For All: More choice for parents and pupils (DfES, 2005), which 
demonstrated an astonishingly Conservative-like rhetoric and proposals for 
promoting schools' freedom and parents' power in the English education system. 
The proposed policies included the introduction of 'Trust school' status, as self-
governing independent state school, easier entry for independent schools into the 
state sector, easier expansion for popular schools, free transport for children in 
low income families to any of the three nearest secondary schools, choice advisers 
to help the least well-off parents, the change of the role of the local authority from 
provider to commissioner, among others. Although the White Paper cautiously 
avoided the usage of the words 'market' and 'competition', the combined effects 
of the proposed policies could not be anything but a strengthened quasi-market 
system. The then Prime Minister, Tony Blair, himself used the word 'market' in 
his speech on the eve of the publication of the White Paper as follows, 'In both 
the NHS and in education, there will in one sense be a market. The patient and 
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the parent will have much greater choice. But it will only be a market in the sense 
of consumer choice, not a market based on private purchasing power'. 23 This 
description is the exact essence of what the Conservative-originated quasi-market 
is while both the then Prime Minister and the then Secretary of State for 
Education and Skills, Ruth Kelly, were keen to emphasise the differences between 
their policies and the Conservative policies upon the launch of their White Paper. 
Their proposals were welcomed, jeeringly though, by Conservative MPs while 
many Labour MPs and a few Cabinet ministers, including Deputy Prime Minister 
John Prescott, were reported to be unhappy with, or opposed to, the proposals. 
The Conservative Shadow Education Secretary, David Cameron, offered his 
support to his counterpart in the Labour Cabinet, saying, 'Wherever the 
Government promoted rigour, encourages discipline, and gives schools more 
autonomy and parents more choice, we will support them. And as we read that 
the Chancellor is against her, the Deputy Premier's against her, and many Labour 
MPs are against her, she's going to need all the support she can get'. 24 By 
contrast, the White Paper was very controversial among Labour MPs, and a 
particular concern was expressed on the further erosion oflocal authority's power 
over schools, upon possible disadvantaging effects of enhanced parental choice 
and school freedom for poor parents and children, and on the replacement of the 
comprehensive schooling by more diverse schooling with more school types and 
more curriculum specialisms. 
Despite the uneasiness about the proposed policies within the Labour Party, the 
then Prime Minister was determined to implement the policies in his legacy 
territory nearly at the end of his premiership. At the start ofhis speech on the eve 
of the publication of the White Paper, Tony Blair argued, 'Tomorrow's white 
paper on education marks a pivotal moment in the life of this parliament and this 
government'. 25 He expected the proposed policies to create 'a system of 
independent non-fee paying state schools', and in the new system, he predicted, 
23 From 10 Downing Street's website, http://www.number-IO.gov.uk/output/Page8363.asp (Last accessed on 
6 November 2005). 
24 From the Conservative Party's website, 
http://www.conservatives.com/tile.do?def=news.story.page&obj_id= 125871 (Last accessed on 6 
November 2005). 
25 From the Guardian's website, http://education.guardian.co.uk/policy/stroy/O, 15572,1599651 ,OO.html (Last 
accessed "on 6 November 2005). 
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'improvements become self-sustaining within individual schools, with changes 
owned and driven by schools and parents' (DfES, 2005, p.4). Furthermore, he 
also declared that the proposals would 'ensure irreversible change for the better in 
schools' (DfES, 2005, p.4). Therefore, he believed that the strengthened quasi-
market system would be basically sustained in the future. Ruth Kelly also bluntly 
said in a press notice from her Department, 'The underlying principle is simple-
freedom for schools and power for parents equal better standards for all' 26 . 
All the above inevitably gives us the impression of going back to the future 
when market forces, created through a combination of parental choice and school 
autonomy, are at the heart of education reform. Even though the then Prime 
Minister and Education Secretary claimed differences between new 'Trust 
schools' and former GM schools, which had been introduced by the Conservative 
government and then abolished by the Labour government, in terms of fair 
funding and fair admissions, the great deal of similarity between the former 
Conservative reform initiatives and the current Labour reform proposals was 
undeniable with regard to the basic principles of parental choice and school 
autonomy. The Shadow Education Secretary criticised '8 wasted years' after the 
Prime Minister abolished GM schools, which 'had the very freedoms he is now 
talking about' 27 , while the Education Secretary proudly argued, 'Without the 
substantial improvements we have made to the education system, the reforms I am 
announcing today would not be possible'. 28 
Tony Blair and his education secretary were trying to present the reform 
proposals in the White Paper as a natural step forward on the basis of what his 
government had been doing in the area of education since 1997. According to the 
then Prime Minister, 'Since 1997, there have been two stages of reform. In the 
first, we corrected the underinvestment and drove change from the centre. This 
was necessary. . .. In the second stage, essentially begun in 2001, we added 
another dimension. We started to open the system up to new influences and 
26 From DfES's website, http://www.dfes.gov.uklpns/DisplayPN.cgi?pn_id=2005_0124 (Last accessed on 6 
November 2005). 
27 From the Conservative Party's website, 
http://www.conservatives.com/tile.do?def=news.story.page&obj_id= 125848 (Last accessed on 6 
November 2005). 
28 From DfES's website, http://www.dfes.gov.uklpns/DisplayPN.cgi?pn_id=2005_0124 (Last accessed on 6 
November 2005). 
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introduced the beginnings of choice and contestability. . . .In schooling, specialist 
schools all have external sponsors, on a small scale, but nonetheless important in 
focussing the specialism, whether business, science, languages, art or sport. City 
Academies are further along the spectrum, with the external partner fully engaged 
in the formation of the school. ... We are now at the crucial point where the 
reforms can be taken to their final stage. . . .In our schools, as I shall go on to 
describe, the system will finally be opening up to real parent power. All schools 
will be able to have Academy style freedoms'. 29 
The then Prime Minister and Education Secretary's endeavour, however, did 
not seem to be successful in convincing others including many critical or sceptical 
Labour MPs, as well as jeeringly cheering Tory MPs and the media. An article in 
The Guardian read, 'Tony Blair's vision of greater autonomy for schools is a clear 
revisitation of Tory principles' 30 , and another article in the newspaper quoted the 
general secretary of the Association of Teachers and Lecturers as saying, 'Too 
much of the white paper is a return to the failed rhetoric, which was abandoned in 
Labour's first term'. 31 The Times' leading article argued, 'In aiming to return 
schools to a state of autonomy not unlike the grant-maintained status that Labour 
abolished eight years ago, the White Paper does represent a pivotal break with 
Labour's centralising past'. 32 In short, the claimed continuity from Labour's 
previous policies was not accepted, and the apparent similarity to Tory's ones was 
pointed out. Deja vu clearly existed. 
In his speech on the eve of the launch of the White Paper, the Prime Minister 
himself partly appreciated the former Conservative government's reforms, saying, 
'To be fair, there were genuine attempts at reform. But they only ever touched a 
small minority and through the incentives given, often accentuated inequalities in 
provision rather than ameliorated them. . .. GM schools only covered 18 per cent 
of secondary schools and 3 per cent of primary schools and on both funding and 
29 From 10 Downing Street's website, http://www.number-10.gov.uk/output!Page8363.asp (Last accessed on 
6 November 2005). 
3
° From the Guardian's website, 
http://education.guardian.co.uk/schoo1s/commentlstroy/0,9828,1600406,00.htm1 (Last accessed on 6 
November 2005). 
31 From the Guardian's website, http://education.guardian.co.uk/po1icy/stroy/0,15572,1600431 ,OO.html (Last 
accessed on 6 November 2005). 
32 From The Times' website, http://www.timesonline.co.uklprintFriendly/O, 1-41-1841171-41 ,OO.html (Last 
accessed on 6 November 2005). 
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admissions, where special privileges were given, created a real sense of anger 
amongst other less fortunate schools, needlessly creating a two-tier system. So 
whereas there were elements of the reforms-greater powers for the frontline-
that were welcome-they were seriously flawed because they helped the few at 
the expense of the many and developed within a culture of neglect and 
underinvestment where failure for some was seen as inevitable'. The above 
statement sounds as if he would have preferred to provide all, not part of, schools 
with GM status, the abolition of which, in reality, was one of the policies his 
government first implemented. The White Paper also included partial 
appreciation of the Conservatives' reform as demonstrated in the following 
sentence: 'School improvement has been helped not only by the reforms 
introduced since 1997, but also by published data and inspection reports, and the 
ability of many parents to vote with their feet by finding a better state school' 
(DfES, 2005, p.8). 
In short, Mr Blair's government explicitly endorsed the quasi-market elements, 
which were parental choice, school autonomy, and performance tables (now 
renamed as 'achievement and attainment tables') and other information provision 
for choice, and justified the fact that the Labour government had let the education 
quasi-market remain largely intact. To be fair, the difference of the policy 
discourse ofMr Blair's government from that of Mrs Thatcher and Mr Major's 
government was the emphasis placed upon policies for 'the many rather than the 
few' and for 'all' pupils, 'all' parents and 'all' schools. Sharon Gewirtz (2001) 
argued that the education policies of Mr Blair's government had been attempting 
to 're-socialize' working-class parents and make them like ideal-typical middle-
class parents who were active consumers in the education market and closely 
monitored schools, universalising those middle-class parents' attributes. It seems 
that Mr Blair's government might be trying tore-socialize not only parents but 
also schools, making all parents and all schools fit for further universalised quasi-
market of education. 
It is fair to say that school autonomy as well as parental choice came back to 
the heart of governmental initiatives for education reform as the White Paper 
proposed policies for power and choice for all parents and freedom for all schools. 
It implied a strengthened quasi-market system of education. The findings and 
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theoretical basis of this research on the education quasi-market will have 
particular implications for the 'system of independent non-fee paying state 
schools'. Tony Blair's preference for visible pedagogy to the invisible one 
seemed apparent in his speech that argued, 'Local authority efforts to create 
equity often produced deadening uniformity, with child-centred learning and a 
rigid adherence to mixed ability teaching too often failing to raise expectations 
and meet basic standards'. The findings and theoretical framework of this thesis 
suggest that he was probably right in expecting that his reform would encourage 
visible pedagogy and discourage the invisible one. The thesis also suggests that 
school strategies will have a particularly important role in promoting visible, 
rather than invisible, pedagogy in the quasi-market. This suggestion seems 
relevant as the White Paper reads as follows: 'We have pushed higher standards 
from the centre: for those standards to be maintained and built-upon, they must 
now become self-sustaining within schools, driven by teachers and parents' (DfES, 
2005, p.l2). 
However, the above is not the whole story. A rhetoric that the Labour 
government inherited from the Conservative one is 'diversity', as demonstrated in 
its first education White Paper (DfEE, 1997, p. 40) as follows: 'We are deeply 
committed to equal opportunities for all pupils. This does not mean a single 
model of schooling. We want to encourage diversity, with schools developing 
their own distinctive identity and expertise'. Later, another White Paper (DfES, 
2001, p.6) argued that the Labour government aimed at 'Encouraging all schools 
to build a distinct ethos and centre of excellence, whether as a specialist school or 
by some other means'. In this policy direction, the number of, and the categories 
of, 'specialist schools' have been enormously expanded to promote more diversity 
in secondary schooling. The Specialist Schools Programme originated in the 
former Conservative government's modest scheme, which only covered 
technology, languages, sports and arts as eligible areas for specialist status. Now, 
under the Labour government, specialisms also include engineering, science, 
'business and enterprise', 'mathematics and computing', music and humanities, 
and the vast majority, more than 2000, of all secondary schools in England have 
gained specialist status. 
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One of the implications ofthis thesis is that quasi-market forces tend to 
promote uniformity, rather than diversity, towards more visible modalities of 
pedagogy and management through school strategies. Therefore, it implies that 
there is a problem in the logic of 'choice and diversity', which originated from the 
Conservative government's reform and is now to be revitalised under the Labour 
government. The thesis suggests that more parental 'choice' does not result in 
more 'diversity' in schooling. The thesis uniquely points out a paradox that both 
the advocates and critics of the education quasi-market seem to agree with each 
other that the academic schooling model prevails in the quasi-market even though 
parental choice is complex and diverse. The very nature of the quasi-market with 
league tables as an essential element incorporated encourages schools to adopt 
strategies to attract parents who want to choose a better school in terms of 
examination results. 
It seems that Labour government's aim of the Specialist Schools Programme 
and other initiatives lies in pursuing excellence in hierarchical standards rather 
than diversity in different but equal values as demonstrated in the then Prime 
Minister Tony Blair's following view: 'We have seen how specialist schools-
with external sponsors, strong leadership and a clear sense of mission, driven by 
their acquisition and retention of specialist status-have improved faster than 
other comprehensives. We have seen that Academies-still relatively new 
independent state schools-improving this year at more than three times the 
national average in areas of the greatest challenge and disadvantage' (DfES, 2005, 
p.3). This means that both specialist schools and Academies are praised for their 
hierarchically higher achievements in examinations in comparison with other state 
schools rather than their unique values and that being specialist is regarded as a 
measure to motivate these schools to improve their achievements rather than a 
purpose in itself. Then, for the government, it is not a problem that the education 
quasi-market encourages schools to improve their achievements in uniform 
standards rather than to enhance their diverse values, and therefore it is a natural 
choice for the government to strengthen the quasi-market. This is another 
implication of this thesis for the Labour government's policy. 
However, even under the pressure for improvement in hierarchical standards, 
schools may adopt invisible strategies in pedagogy as long as the strategies 
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contribute to improving examination results. As the case ofRoundham Catholic 
College's child-centred scheme of mathematics, SMILE, shows in Chapter 6, 
invisible strategies, which 'work', can be choices for school management that 
aims at raising examination performances. Therefore, the search for improvement 
in hierarchical standards does not necessarily prohibit diversity in approaches to 
such improvement. Nonetheless, the results of the empirical work in this thesis 
generally support a hypothesised trend that competition with an emphasis on 
examination results encourages schools to adopt more visible strategies. It is 
unlikely that the combination of more freedom for schools and more choice for 
parents, that is, a strengthened quasi-market, will encourage diverse innovations 
in curriculum and pedagogy. 
Towards the end of Tony Blair's premiership, the education quasi-market came 
back to the heart of education reform by government while it had continued to 
exist whether or not government emphasised its importance. In the next section, 
we will review policy initiatives taken by the then New Labour since its takeover 
of government in 1997 until the government's interest in the quasi-market reform 
revived in 2005. 
The then New Labour's policies: The quasi-market continued with more 
state interventions added 
Now the policy changes and continuities between the Conservative and Labour 
governments are to be examined in the light of the theoretical framework and 
empirical findings of this research. 
There is a broad consensus that the then New Labour's education policy is a 
mixture of ideologically inconsistent measures. Arguably, most importantly, the 
Labour government has retained the very core of the Conservative's education 
reform, that is, the quasi-market policy package of open enrolment or parental 
choice, LMS or school autonomy, and performance tables of examinations and 
tests based on the National Curriculum. Labour has not only accepted the neo-
liberal regime as a fact oflife but has also extended some of its elements. A 
higher percentage of the local education budget is delegated to schools under 'Fair 
Funding' than under the former LMS. Labour is more daring than the 
Conservatives were in privatising part of services provided by 'failing' LEAs 
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and/or schools. In short, Labour's policies have basically let the education quasi-
market remain largely intact, and therefore the implications of this research for the 
current system are still significant. 
The Labour government has been even more enthusiastic in strengthening the 
neo-conservative policies to centralise the pedagogic aspects of schooling. Prime 
Minister Tony Blair justifies his government's interventionist and centralising 
approach as follows: 'Since 1997, there have been two stages of reform. In the 
first, we corrected the underinvestment and drove change from the centre. This 
was necessary'. 33 The White Paper in 2005 argues, 'We have pushed higher 
standards from the centre' (DfES, 2005, p.l2). Now prescriptive control is put 
not only on the curriculum or what to teach but also on how to teach and how to 
organise classrooms although the requirements are technically not statutory. 
Pupils, particularly in secondary schools, are to be set by ability for such subjects 
as science, maths and languages. The Conservatives' attacks on mixed ability 
grouping have now been converted to the introduction of setting as a formal 
policy of the Labour government. Each school is expected to provide highly 
structured literacy and numeracy hours with emphasis on whole-class teaching 
plus phonics, mental arithmetic and other basics. Although the Conservative 
government did advocate whole-class teaching and other traditional 'back to 
basics' approaches, it kept its fundamental position that market forces rather than 
government interventions should influence pedagogic preferences. Gewirtz (2002, 
p.160) rightly says, 'Whilst ...... Conservative policies of national testing, league 
tables, the regular inspection of schools by Ofsted and the reduction of the 
continuous assessment component of GCSEs combined to encourage conservative 
pedagogies in schools, Conservative governments did not intervene directly to 
shape schools' pedagogical strategies'. The above-mentioned interventionist 
aspect of the Labour policy on pedagogy seems to be oriented towards the 
promotion of visible pedagogy. In the case of the English language curriculum, 
Gemma Moss (2002) argues that the switch from invisible to visible pedagogies 
can be most clearly traced in the Labour government's revisions on the National 
33 From 10 Downing Street's website, http://www.number-IO.gov.uk/output!Page8363.asp (Last accessed on 
6 November 2005). 
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Curriculum and the regulatory document for the initial teacher training 
programmes. 
Sharon Gewirtz (2002, pp.179-80) diagnoses the Labour's traditionalist policy 
on pedagogy as more thorough than that of the Conservatives and unfit for the 
knowledge-based economy, saying, 'Moreover, the forms of cognition fostered by 
the traditional pedagogic practices that are being promoted by New Labour, with 
even more vigour than their Conservative predecessors, do not correspond to the 
cognitive skills now being demanded by the new multinational 'knowledge-based 
industries'. Labour's intervention policies have been oriented towards the 
promotion of visible pedagogy, possibly directive visible pedagogy. 
Power and Whitty (1999, p.537) rightly say, 'Although state regulation was an 
important element of quasi-markets, the New Labour government has, in some 
respects, sought to control education more directly. Unlike the previous 
governments, which were often considered to "steer at a distance", this one has 
intervened directly on a number of fronts'. It is obvious in both their rhetoric and 
initiatives that Labour has been more in favour of state interventions than market 
forces until the launch of the White Paper in 2005. The Labour government 
showed its intention of not waiting for market forces to bring about improvements 
on schooling but directing pedagogic practices to raise education standards when 
the Department for Education and Employment (DfEE, 1997, p.5) said, 'The 
focus will be on standards, not structures'. With blunt target -setting, of pupil 
performance, at national, local and school levels, Ofsted inspects LEAs as well as 
schools, and identifies the 'failing' ones. 
These interventions might contribute to enhancing the explicitness of both 
regulative and instructional rules in pedagogic and possibly organisational 
relations. The target-setting, of pupil performance, at national, local and school 
levels, with the monitoring of performance seems to be intended to make more 
explicit instructional and possibly regulative rules in both pedagogic and 
organisational relations. This is something like a nationalised system of 
performance monitoring comparable to a departmental review, a review of 
performance of each curriculum area, introduced by the headteacher of Riverside 
Street School, as quoted in Chapter 6. 
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LEAs have been given a new role in raising education standards and new 
responsibilities with regard to the national initiatives including Education 
Development Plans with the above target-setting. According to the DfEE (1997, 
p.27), the LEA's role is as follows: 'The LEA's task is to challenge schools to 
raise standards continuously and to apply pressure where they do not. That role is 
not one of control. Those days are gone. An effective LEA will challenge 
schools to improve themselves, being ready to intervene where there are problems, 
but not interfere with those schools that are doing well'. This rehabilitation of the 
LEA's role was a clear departure from the Conservative policy. On the other 
hand, those LEAs reported by Ofsted as unsatisfactory or worse are under 
enormous pressure from the Labour government, which bluntly states, 'In some 
cases, there has been full or partial outsourcing of LEA services or strategic 
management to a private sector provider, or joint venture delivery in an equal 
partnership with the private sector' (DfES, 2001, p.49). Now, with the White 
Paper's proposals waiting for implementation, local authorities' power is likely to 
be undermined further in the near future, but that is another story. 
The above-mentioned interventionist policy instruments adopted by the Labour 
government place emphasis on academic performance primarily measured by tests 
and examinations, and therefore may have promoted visible strategies in schools. 
Now not only quasi-market pressures but also state interventions are the driving 
forces for the promotion of visible strategy in pedagogic practice and in 
performance monitoring. The Labour government has not been hesitant about 
taking direct measures to impose traditional pedagogic practices including whole-
class teaching, setting, phonics, and mental arithmetic, which the Conservatives 
did not impose but promoted through quasi-markets with tests and examinations. 
Rather than waiting for market forces to bring about desirable results, the Labour 
government has supplemented the inherited quasi-market system with the quality 
control system strengthened by the blunt target-setting, of pupil performance, at 
national, local and school levels, monitoring of the performance through Ofsted 
inspections, and LEAs' interventions in 'failing schools'. 
In short, the quasi-market system is still in place, but more central intervention 
has been added to the system. The combination of market forces and state 
interventions is not new. The Conservatives-created system itself was made of 
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such a combination. However, Labour's policies have added new emphasis on the 
significance of state interventions. Not only the quasi-market but also the state 
interventions may have been promoting more visible modalities of pedagogy and 
management. Therefore, it is worth trying to examine whether school managers 
are adopting more and more visible strategies in the current system under the 
Labour government. Furthermore, as we have seen, once the policies proposed in 
the White Paper in 2005 are implemented, the education quasi-market will be 
strengthened, and the importance of school strategies in the market-oriented 
system of education will be further enhanced. 
To be fair, it should be pointed out that part of Labour's rhetoric has surely 
included social democratic ideals, and some policy changes have been 
implemented to demonstrate its commitment to those ideals. However, the 
changes have not been made to discontinue the education quasi-market with 
choice and autonomy or the standard-oriented reform with prescribed curriculum 
and tests and examinations introduced by the Conservative government. Rather, 
the changes have been aimed at disseminating benefits of the standard-oriented 
reform to all pupils as stated in its manifesto in 2001 (Labour Party, 2001, p.18): 
'Excellence for the many, not just the few is our driving passion. Our goal is to 
develop education to harness the individual talents of every pupil'. 
The Labour government's quick actions to abolish the nursery voucher system 
and the assisted places scheme were consistent with the social democratic agenda 
of previous Labour administrations. The change of status from GM to Foundation 
schools was subtler. On one hand, bringing those schools back under the auspices 
of the LEAs could be regarded as a backward movement in terms of autonomous 
management. On the other hand, however, as Power and Whitty (1999) argue, 
greater parity between different types of school in terms of the amount of funding 
and the degree of independence is not inconsistent with a quasi-market approach. 
A significant difference between Labour and the Conservatives lies in the issue 
of selection in schooling. Labour's policy on the differences in ability is not the 
stratification between schools but that within each school. The party's manifesto 
in 1997 (Labour Party, 1997, p.7) stated, 'There should be no return to the 11-plus. 
It divides children into successes and failures at far too early an age. We must· 
modernise comprehensive schools. Children are not all of the same ability, nor do 
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they learn at the same speed. That means "setting" children in classes to 
maximise progress, for the benefit of high-fliers and slow learners alike. The 
focus must be on levelling up, not levelling down'. While letting the local parents 
decide whether the remaining grammar schools should be retained or abolished, 
the Labour government has ruled out any more introduction of partial selection by 
academic ability and empowered the adjudicator to end such selection where it 
already exists. On the other hand, specialisation by aptitude, introduced by the 
,•·. Conservative government, has been endorsed by Labour. The Labour government 
has been endeavouring to expand the establishment of 'specialist schools' as 
discussed already. Docking (2000, 33) describes this change of policy as 'a shift 
from a policy of choice based on school status (grammar and GM schools v. 
comprehensives) to one based more on curricular diversity (specialist v. general 
comprehensives)'. This shift may be more consistent with a quasi-market 
approach if the shift means more equal conditions for competition in quasi-
markets. Labour's modifications of the education system, including greater parity 
between former GM and LEA schools and stopping further introduction of partial 
selection, might have contributed to restoring the 'level playing field' (Power & 
Whitty, 1999, p.539) in quasi-markets. 
Labour distanced themselves from the Conservatives in introducing Education 
Action Zones (EAZs) 34 and the Excellence in Cities (EiC), both of which were 
intended to target additional funding on schools in socially disadvantaged areas 
and encourage partnerships between public, private and voluntary sectors in 
communities. Although these initiatives had a privatising element or commercial 
involvement as well as community involvement, even Hill (1999), a Left critic of 
New Labour policy, regarded these initiatives as social democratic and 
exemplifying the principle of' social inclusion', that is, one of the eight guiding 
principles35 of New Labour in his judgement. According to West and Pennell 
(2000, p.533), who analyse the distribution of funds to LEAs and schools, while 
'A focus on school standards remains, indicating continuity with the previous 
Conservative Government', 'the targeting of resources on disadvantage through 
34 Now there does not exist the EAZs scheme that was absorbed into the EiC scheme. 
35 The other seven are 'standards and control', 'managerialism', 'competitiveness and selection', 
'privatisation', 'traditionalism', 'techno-ideology' and 'low public expenditure', all of which he regards as 
continuation of Conservative government policy. 
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some of the DfEE initiatives is a clear break with the Conservative legacy'. 36 The 
funding initiatives that allocate more money for certain schools on the basis of 
political decisions rather than market forces may have decreased, to a probably 
modest degree, the importance of quasi-market mechanisms in those limited areas. 
This may have some effects on the school strategies in the areas. 
However, it is not appropriate to exaggerate the impacts of the changes on the 
basic framework of the education quasi-market. With the above-mentioned and 
other initiatives, Labour has been advocating 'partnership' instead of 
'competition'. However, as mentioned above, quasi-market mechanisms have 
been retained. As Gewirtz (2002, p.158) points out, 'Crucially-despite the 
rhetorical emphasis on collaboration, partnership and community-market forces 
have been preserved, with resources still distributed to schools primarily on a per 
capita basis'. According to Jackson (2000, p.178), 'Co-operation was sought 
within a system designed for competitiveness'. Quasi-markets are still in place, 
and therefore this research has relevant implications in this regard. 
The relevance and implications of this research for Labour's policies 
Despite all the complexity of the Labour government's policies, the most 
important point is that the policies have basically let the education quasi-market 
remain largely intact. The Labour government has retained the quasi-market 
policy package of open emolment, LMS, and performance tables of examinations 
and tests based on the National Curriculum. Therefore, the relevance of this 
research's findings for the current system has not diminished. The bottom line is 
that both the quasi-markets retained and state interventions strengthened by the 
Labour government can be expected to promote visible pedagogy. Therefore, it is 
worth trying to examine whether school managers are adopting more and more 
visible strategies in the current system under the Labour government. 
Furthermore, not only the former Prime Minister Tony Blair's policies for more 
parental choice and more school freedom proposed in theWhite Paper in 2005 
have been implemented to strengthen the education quasi-market, but also the 
36 However, even these initiatives meet with criticism from Gewirtz (2002, p.l68), who indicates the demerits 
of the bidding system as follows: 'One distinct possibility is that resources will accumulate in those areas 
and institutions with the most skilled bidders'. 'Moreover, significant amounts ofLEA money, which 
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current Prime Minister Gordon Brown has been basically maintaining his 
predecessor's positions on education policy. Therefore, the importance of school 
strategies in pedagogy and management has been kept. In Chapter 6, the 
qualitative analysis of the interviews with the head teachers indicates that the 
quasi-market pressure from parental choice in combination with the published 
examination results was very real in their perception when they undertook 
strategic changes towards more visibility in pedagogy and management. The 
findings and theoretical framework of this thesis imply that the continued quasi-
market system may have been driving school strategies towards more visible 
modalities of pedagogy and management even under the Labour government. The 
thesis has another related implication that such movement towards more visibility 
means more uniformity rather than more diversity in schooling, which is within 
what the Labour government intends to realise despite the rhetoric of diversity. 
The intention seems to be to realise excellent achievements in hierarchical 
standards measured as examination and test results for more schools and more 
pupils rather than to allow diverse schooling models with different but equal 
values. In other words, 'choice' will not promote 'diversity', but it is okay for the 
Labour government. With theses implications of this thesis, future research on 
school strategies in the education quasi-market will be of significant importance. 
could be spent directly on teachers and classroom resources, are being diverted to paying for the 
consultants who are employed to write the numerous bids, not all of which are successful'. 
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Chapter 9 Implications of the Findings for the Theoretical Framework 
Relevance of visible/invisible modalities as school strategies 
The findings of the empirical study in this research seem to have shown a fertile 
possibility of the theoretical framework with visible and invisible modalities in 
analysing school strategies. The hypothesised dominance of visible strategies as 
newly introduced strategies is found in the headteachers' discourses across the 
case schools. In tune with the market pressures linked to examination results as a 
performance indicator, the vast majority of these visible strategies are prescriptive 
visible strategies rather than regulative ones. Some possible interrelation or 
coupling between strategies in pedagogy and those in management is also 
suggested. 
The theoretical framework with visible and invisible modalities in analysing 
school strategies has a particular value because it enables the analysis to be related 
to the continuing controversy on a simple but fundamental question of what kind 
of education is desirable for individuals and for society. The dichotomy of visible 
and invisible modalities is linked to 'the enduring debates around the nature of 
what constitutes an "appropriate" form of education' (Sally Power & Geoff 
Whitty, 2002, p.600). With regard to pedagogy, the question will be whether 
academic (visible) or progressive (invisible) education is desirable. Concerning 
management, the question will be whether managerial or collegial operation of 
school is desirable. Such debates are only meaningfully understood in the context 
of macro (system) and micro (school) level linkage. Therefore, there is a strong 
interrelation between the macro/micro linkage and the ideological context of 
education. As shown in the case study data, the headteachers' discourses often 
seem to be conscious of the system (policy) level context and the ideological 
(political) implications, especially when they connect their strategies with market, 
competition, league tables, etc. The theoretical framework contains such 
ideological context in macro (system) and micro (school) level linkage. 
While Bernstein's theory of pedagogy provides a valuable basis for 
constructing the theoretical framework, this thesis explicitly extends the 
dichotomy of visible and invisible modalities from pedagogy to school 
management, and elaborates these modalities to apply them to the analysis of 
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school strategies. The theoretical originality of the thesis in relation to his theory 
lies here. The case study adds the value of empirical examination. Nonetheless, it 
is hoped that this thesis contributes to the Bernstein-originated theoretical 
developments in a broad sense, including those in the use of part of his theory 
such as this one. 
At the same time, however, it should be restated that the purpose of this 
research is not to work on Bernstein's theory for its own sake but to theoretically 
and empirically analyse school strategies in the education quasi-market. While 
the theoretical framework for the research is constructed in the use of a part of his 
theory, that is, the theory of visible/invisible pedagogy, as an essential basis for 
the framework, it can never be claimed that this thesis discusses his theory in its 
integrity. 
Implications in the light of recent work by and on Bernstein 
Since empirical work was conducted for this thesis, there has been increasing 
literature by Bernstein and on his research. Although sadly he is no longer able to 
produce his own literature, other authors' literature on his theory and research will 
probably accumulate further more. While this thesis is not intended to discuss 
Bernstein's theory in its integrity, it should refer to relevant works that are 
directly or indirectly related to its research topic. Bernstein himself was not 
necessarily happy with other researchers' partial use of his work. 'They are 
regarded as especially deplorable when they break up "the unity of the original 
corpus" for their own academic convenience, treating a part as all that matters' 
(A.D. Edwards, 1995, p.103). However, I agree with Edwards (1995, p.103) in 
saying, 'it seems umeasonable to expect complex theoretical formulations to be 
used only in their entirety and strictly within their terms of reference'. This thesis 
may also be a case of such use for its own academic convenience. While 
Bernstein's work is known by 'his highly abstract descriptive language', 'his 
ideas have nevertheless proved remarkably good to think with about a wide range 
of"practical" topics' (Tony Edwards, 2002, p.527). The thesis is also on such a 
'practical topic'-the orientation of school strategies in the quasi-market system 
in Britain. As explicated above, the theoretical framework of visible/invisible 
modalities, developed on the basis of his theory of visible/invisible pedagogy 
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(Bernstein, 1990), seems to be relevant in analysing those strategies in pedagogy 
and management. However, it is necessary to see whether the framework is still 
relevant in the light of more recent work by and on Bernstein as follows. 
Bernstein ( 1996) mentions that the theory of pedagogic codes is applicable not 
only to families and schools but also to other social relations including industrial 
relations, saying, 'We have discussed the codes of pedagogic practice in terms of 
family and school, but the conceptual language is not limited to these agencies. It 
can be applied to any pedagogic relation, or more generally to any transmission 
relation of control, e.g. between doctor and patient, social worker and client, 
psychiatrist and patient, prison staff and prisoners, and, of course, to industrial 
relations' (pp.l03--4). The above-mentioned extension of theoretical application 
is again only in germ in his own writing. Nonetheless, the extension seems to be 
in line with this thesis's extension of his pedagogic theory to organisational 
relations in school. 
The finding of the dominance of visible strategies is in tune with Bernstein 
(1996) saying, 'The management structure's major focus is upon the school's 
performance, with regard to attracting and retaining students, their conduct and 
their attainments' (p.75). Furthermore, the revised edition (Bernstein, 2000) 
seems to echo what is found in some visible strategies within this research when it 
discusses the 'De-centred Market' (D.C.M.) identity or position as a sort of 
ideological position, saying, 'The management system here is explicitly 
hierarchical, small, non-elected committees, few in number, which will distribute 
resources to local units, according to their efficiency and their procedures of 
accountability. Management ideally reveals itself to distribute rewards and 
punishments. Management monitors the effectiveness of the local units, groups or 
departments in satisfying and creating local markets' (p.69). On the other hand, 
another ideological position, 'De-centred Therapeutic' (D.C.T.) identity or 
position, 'is not a strong player in any arena' (p.70). 'The transmission prefers 
weak boundaries, integration prefers to talk of regions ofknowledge, areas of 
experience. The management style is soft, hierarchies are veiled, power is 
disguised by communication networks and interpersonal relations' (p.70). 
The D.C.M. seems very similar to visible management defined in this thesis 
while the D.C.T. does so to invisible pedagogy and invisible management. 
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However, Bernstein himself does not explicitly explicate the relations between the 
new typology of concepts including the D.C.M./D.C.T. and the previous typology 
of pedagogic code concepts including visible/invisible pedagogy and 
collection/integrated code. Moreover, the D.C.M./D.C.T. is not conceptually 
defined, as the previous code concepts, but is described in a rather ad hoc manner. 
In this regard, the concepts of this thesis are more conceptually tidy and 
operationally defined, and are used for an empirical examination, while the recent 
development of Bernstein's theory is still in tune with the theoretical framework 
and empirical findings of the thesis. The thesis presents and examines the 
hypothesis that under the quasi-market system school managers tended to engage 
in strategic changes towards visible modality of pedagogy and management, and 
the findings support the hypothesis. Thus, the thesis contributes to both the 
theoretical and empirical development of research based on Bernstein's work. 
Here is an aspect of originality of this research in relation to his theory. 
A substantial quantity of empirical research on the basis of, or in the use of, 
Bernstein's theory ofpedagogies or educational codes has been carried out by 
other researchers. While such research naturally often focuses on curricular 
and/or pedagogic aspects at classroom level, there is also research work on policy-
level initiatives. Recent examples of the policy level research include the work by 
Isabel Neves and Ana Morais (2001) on science curriculum reforms in Portugal 
and that by Joseph Solomon and Anna Tsatsaroni (2001) on a Hellenic 
governmental project of school self-evaluation. Neves and Morais (2001, p.223) 
argues, 'We consider that Bernstein's model of pedagogic discourse (Bernstein, 
1990, 1996) permits a comprehensive sociological analysis ofthe processes and 
relationships which characterise curriculum development at the macro and micro 
levels'. Indeed, 'macro-micro' linkage or integration is a major theme in the 
literature by and on Bernstein, and it is evident in such expressions as: 'the 
attempt of the theory to integrate macro/micro levels and disciplines' (Bernstein, 
1996, p.92); 'modelling the macro and micro structuring ofknowledge' (Parlo 
Singh, 2002, p.572); 'Working at both micro and macro levels, Bernstein 
provided a model for the understanding of how social class and power distribution 
become internally shaped means of recognition and cognition' (Mario Diaz, 2001, 
p.84). Therefore, macro (society and/or policy) and micro (classroom) levels are 
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linked up. However, astonishingly and curiously, managerial or organisational 
aspects at school level seem to be almost missing from the literature by and on 
Bernstein. It is hoped that this thesis will contribute to filling this gap. The thesis 
focuses upon school strategies, expressed in headteachers' discourses, in both 
pedagogy and management. 
Issues for furthering theoretical development 
Although Bernstein's recent work is generally compatible with the theoretical 
framework and empirical findings of this thesis, there are issues that can be raised 
through the review of the recent work by Bernstein and that in the use ofhis 
theory. 
Practical skills and knowledge relevant to work and life 
First, we can discuss the issue ofthe 'technologizing of knowledge' (Bernstein, 
1996, p.23). Bernstein (1996) points out a trend in pedagogic discourse towards 
practical skills and knowledge relevant to work and life. In higher education, 
'there are pronounced moves to regionalization' (p.74). 'Regions are the interface 
between disciplines (singulars) and the technologies they make possible. Thus 
engineering, medicine, architecture are regions. Contemporary regions would be 
cognitive science, management, business studies, communications and media. 
Regionalization in higher education has proceeded at a rapid pace in the new 
universities' (pp.65-6). 'Regions' are applied areas of scientific knowledge that 
are supposed to have some practical relevance to human life and society. 
'Singulars' are academic disciplines including physics, chemistry, history, 
economics, etc, and 'are, on the whole, narcissistic, orientated to their own 
development, protected by strong boundaries and hierarchies' (p.65). Bernstein 
(1996) takes note of a tendency towards 'regionalization' in higher education, 
especially in non-elite institutions. 
'In contrast, as a consequence of the National Curriculum (and its many 
revisions), there is a stronger classification, for this curriculum is a collection of 
singulars (subjects)' (pp.74-5). 'State monitoring ofthis curriculum through 
national testing and the structures of public examinations support this collection 
code' (p.75). 'It is a matter of interest that the organization of discourse at the 
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level ofthe school is firmly based in singulars, despite movements to 
regionalization in higher education' (p.66). However, he continues, 'Perhaps the 
equivalent ofregionalization in higher education at the level of the school is the 
move to generic skills' (p.66). 'Generic modes are predominantly, but not 
exclusively, found in Further Education (FE)' (p.67). Nevertheless, generic 
modes seem to have been influencing secondary schools as well. 'Generic modes 
are essentially directed to extra-school experiences: work and "life'". 'Generic 
modes are produced by a functional analysis of what is taken to be the underlying 
features necessary to the performance of a skill, task, practice or even area of 
work. These underlying apparently necessary features are referred to as 
"competences"' (p.67). 
Bernstein (1996) classifies the 'generic mode' as one of the three modes ofthe 
'performance model', which is almost identical to visible pedagogy or collection 
code. However, he acknowledges that the generic mode has similarities to the 
'competence model', which is almost identical to the invisible pedagogy or 
integrated code, as the term 'competences' is used in the discourse of the generic 
mode as suggested above. Generic skills are not confined to academic subjects 
(singulars), and the emphasis is not on compartmentalised knowledge but on 
practical capacity to deal with real world situations. Generic modes 'have their 
deep structure in the concept "trainability"'(p.73), that is, 'the ability to profit 
from continuous pedagogic re-formations and so cope with the new requirements 
of"work" and "life"'(p.72). Generic modes are expected to 'realize a flexible 
transferable potential rather than specific performances' (p.73). The generic mode 
seems to emphasise active and creative learning rather than passive transfer of 
knowledge from teacher. In the generic mode, it may be difficult to find the 
explicitness of selection, sequencing, pacing and criteria of knowledge 
transfer/acquisition and that of hierarchical control as in visible pedagogy. The 
generic mode seems rather similar to invisible pedagogy in this respect. 
Nonetheless, Bernstein (1996) argues that 'generic modes and the performances to 
which they give rise are directly linked to instrumentalities of the market, to the 
construction of what are considered to be flexible performances' (p.69). 
Therefore, he judges the generic mode to be within the 'performance model' 
'despite superficial resemblance to competence modes' (p.69). The question here 
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is whether his judgement is persuasive enough against the resemblance and 
whether the resemblance is merely superficial. 
Johan Muller (2000, p.l 05) restates Bernstein's view in saying, 'Performance 
models are geared to be accountable to something outside the learner. We must 
distinguish between two rather different forms of performance model: the 
autonomous and the market oriented. The former is the traditional (elite) 
secondary and tertiary model-Young's (1999) "curriculum of the past", where 
learners are subjected to the regime of disciplinary subjects; the latter is skilling 
tailored to specific needs, tasks and slots in the increasingly labile occupational 
hierarchy'. Magnus Haavelsrud (2001, p.329) also seems to follow Bernstein's 
line in this respect, saying, 'The shift in official ideologies over the last 30 years 
from an ideology of competence to an ideology of performance can be understood 
as a change in the dominant ideology of the pedagogic device. The previous 
emphasis on the pupil's inner commitments and possibilities (dedications) has 
been replaced by short-term instrumentalities or short-termism, in which the 
formal school is seen as a contributor to modernisation and economic growth. In 
this quest for performance, a greater emphasis is placed on a new identity 
construction in which identities can be achieved through an explicitly 
entrepreneurial/vocational culture of the new rationality of the school'. Here, 
there seems to be no question of tension between vocationalism and visible 
pedagogy while the recent policy direction to promote visible pedagogy instead of 
invisible pedagogy is well summarised. However, Tony Edwards (2002, p.533) 
discusses 'a new form of vocational education' described by Bernstein, and says, 
'It was a version that shared with "old progressivism" its rejection of subjects and 
their "visible" transmission, but not its anti-technology and anti-industrial bias. In 
its emphasis for future managerial professional "leaders on widely applicable 
(generic) skills" and on problem-solving that exploits relevant knowledge without 
regard for conventional academic boundaries, it was not obviously aligned with 
the persistently "academic" character of elite schooling'. Edwards' argument here 
seems to be a balanced description of the nature of the generic mode in relation to 
visible and invisible pedagogies. 
In a book published after his death in memory of himself, Bernstein (2001a) 
raises the question, 'Is a segment of the economy setting up a generalised demand 
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for new knowledge of "creativity", "adaptibility" [sic], on the basis of the 
imagined needs of a particular sector of the economy? Understanding I. T. is quite 
different from being programmed by it as the source of a new intellectual 
potential releasing the acquirer from the restricting boundaries, social and 
intellectual, of the old knowledges' (p.368). Here he critically reviews the 
emergence of discourse for new forms of knowledge and the transmission of them. 
Are they not more similar to invisible pedagogy or integrated code than to visible 
pedagogy or collection code? 
William Tyler (2001), in his analysis of hypertext-based or online learning in 
the use of Bernstein's theory of pedagogic discourse, says, 'In fact, one might 
argue that many instances of post-modern culture, or rather what might be termed 
"post-culture" ... , are infused by a de-institutionalised form of the invisible 
pedagogy, especially in its ludic manifestations such as the "leisure principle", 
"edutainment", and so on' (p.350). 'It is argued that Bernstein's theory of 
pedagogic discourse provides a particularly valuable basis for generating a 
descriptive model not only of the applications ofthe virtualising technologies to 
educational contexts but also, reflexively, of the less explicit pedagogic processes 
of a digitalised culture' (p.340). Tyler's classification of pedagogic discourse in 
online learning as a form of invisible pedagogy seems rather natural. 
A recent trend in pedagogic discourse towards practical skills and knowledge 
relevant to work and life is evident in the regionalization in higher education and 
the generic mode in further education and vocational elements within secondary 
education. The recent development of online learning or e-learning also tends to 
support the emerging discourse in favour of a new form of knowledge and its 
transmission. Although some tensions between vocationalism and the academic 
education model with visible pedagogy are already pointed out early in this thesis, 
the main theme of the thesis is developed on the dichotomy between visible 
pedagogy or academic education and invisible pedagogy or progressive education. 
At present, the generic mode may not be so substantially embedded in school. 
However, how about the future? What will be the relation between the generic 
mode and the dichotomy? This issue may require further theoretical development 
and empirical research. Bernstein (1996, p.75) argues, 'Thus there is a dislocation 
between the culture of the pedagogic discourse and the management culture. The 
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culture of the pedagogic discourse of schools is retrospective, based on a past 
narrative of the dominance and significance of disciplines, whereas the 
management structure is prospective pointing to the new entrepreneurialism and 
its instrumentalities. The State has therefore embedded a retrospective pedagogic 
culture into a prospective management culture'. The question here is whether the 
above dislocation between the culture of the pedagogic discourse and the 
management culture is stable or unstable. The findings of this thesis may suggest 
that it was stable at least at the time of the empirical study, which shows that the 
performance indicators of academic examination results were important as both 
pedagogic evaluation criteria and organisational accountability criteria as far as 
the headteachers' discourses are concerned. The effect of the generic mode on 
such stability may be an issue. 
State and market 
The second issue to be raised here is the role of the 'state' in relation to the 
'market'. As mentioned above, Bernstein (1996, p. 75) says, 'The State has 
therefore embedded a retrospective pedagogic culture into a prospective 
management culture', and continues, 'However, the emphasis on the performance 
of students and the steps taken to increase and maintain performance, for the 
survival of the institution, is likely to facilitate a state-promoted instrumentality'. 
For Bernstein, the state and the market are not an opposing dichotomy. 
Certainly the quasi-market education system in Britain has been introduced by the 
state, that is, the then Conservative government. Furthermore, the publication of 
the state-imposed performance indicators of examination and test results is an 
essential element of the quasi-market. There are also non-market interventionist 
devices including Ofsted inspections. With all these, it still seems productive to 
research on the quasi-market system of education from the market mechanism 
viewpoint. However, increased direct interventions on pedagogic discourse and 
practice under the Labour government has probably strengthened the role of the 
state, and the market mechanisms may have been made more complicated by 
influences of the state interventions. School strategies may now be more directly 
influenced by state interventions. 
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Under such circumstances, is there a necessity to redefine the relation between 
the state and the market in the context of the education system? Bernstein's 
analysis of this issue is shown in his concept of 'Re-centred State', which 'refers 
to new forms of centralised regulation whereby the state de-centralises and 
through (a) central setting of criteria and (b) the central assessment of outputs of 
agencies, financially (and otherwise), rewards success and punishes failures: 
"choice", selection, control and reproduction'(2000, p.78). Nonetheless, John 
Beck (2002, p.623), mentioning Bernstein's discussions of the role of the State, 
argues that 'his analyses are certainly incomplete; they could be criticized for a 
certain "ad hoc" character', and continues, 'Moreover, there is no general theory 
connecting his theorizations of class, pedagogic discourse, and .the key concepts 
of powere and control, to a comprehensive analysis of the State'. In a paper 
published after his death, Bernstein (200 1 b) points out 'the pervasiveness and 
management of symbolic control by the State through central targeting linked to 
·allocation of resources' (p.31 ). Is it the case that both market mechanisms and 
direct interventions constitute an integrated system of such symbolic control? Or 
do market mechanisms and direct interventions problematically coexist in a 
significant tension? What are consequences for school strategies? This issue may 
deserve further theoretical and empirical research. 
World-wide historical trend? 
The third issue is the position of the current British movement towards visible 
pedagogy and management in a world-wide historical context. Patricia M. 
Broadfoot (1996) argues, 'Employing Durkheim's categories of social order, 
Bernstein identifies a tendency in contemporary society for there to be a transition 
from a social and economic order based on overt mechanical solidarity and covert 
organic solidarity to one of overt organic solidarity and covert mechanical 
solidarity. One outward sign of this change in education systems is a trend 
towards invisible pedagogies and integrated codes represented by more student-
centred teaching and cross-curricular approaches. The latter are presented by 
Bernstein as a movement towards weak classification and weak framing, in which 
subject boundaries are broken down and teachers enjoy considerable freedom over 
what and how to teach. The reason for this trend, Bernstein argues, is 
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developments in technology which have given rise to the need for a more flexible, 
inner-directed labour force ... Although there is by no means a consistent 
development in this respect in any society, since any such change comes up 
against a whole range of powerful sources of resistance which are rooted in 
traditionalist ideologies and vested interest (as in the current backlash against 
"progressive" educational ideas in the United States and the United Kingdom), 
international evidence concerning the changing shape of educational 
qualifications and thus courses would nevertheless appear to demonstrate a 
continuing trend' (pp.84-5). 
Is the current situation in the UK a mere backlash? Bernstein himself seems to 
have argued that the current movement from invisible to visible pedagogy is more 
deeply rooted in social, economic and political structuring at least in Britain and 
probably elsewhere. Gemma Moss (2002, p.552), reviewing Bernstein's (1996, 
pp.54-81 ), paper, says, 'Thus the paper re-traces the emergence of invisible 
pedagogies in the 1960s, considers their apparent dominance on the education 
scene during the subsequent decade, and then goes on to review the current trend 
towards their replacement by much more visible forms of pedagogy in many parts 
of the world'. Nevertheless, the universality of such a movement is in question. 
Courtney B. Cazden (1995, p.l59) seems to support Broadfoot's argument in 
saying, 'Prominent educational discourse in the United States argues that changes 
in the economy demand deeper understanding of knowledge, greater flexibility of 
skills, and more interpersonal competencies for all students than even many of the 
elite achieved in the past. When we remember Bernstein's (1975) statement that 
"the weak classification and frames of the invisible pedagogy emphasize the 
importance of ways of knowing, of constructing problems" (p.l34; emphasis in 
the original), it is not surprising that contemporary statements of educational 
reform goals often echo tenets of progressive education of an earlier era'. What 
seems to be certain is that struggles are still going on between visible and 
invisible pedagogic discourses in the UK and other parts of the world. Visible 
and invisible pedagogies are 'manifest in some of the enduring debates around the 
nature of what constitutes an "appropriate" form of education' (Sally Power & 
Geoff Whitty, 2002, p.600). In the meantime, the trend towards visible 
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management seems to be more universal, though modalities of pedagogy and 
management seem to be interrelated as suggested by some findings of this thesis. 
Therefore, continuing development of theoretical frameworks for modalities of 
pedagogy and management is necessary. Bernstein's theory provides a good basis 
for such development. This thesis explicitly extends his dichotomy of visible and 
invisible modalities to cover organisational relations in school as well as 
pedagogic relations in classroom, bridging these two levels of relations, and thus 
is intended to contribute to encouraging further theoretical development and 
empirical research in this direction. 
Managerialism and performativity 
As Stephen Ball (1998) summarises, there are general and common elements in 
contemporary education reforms across national borders. These elements or sets 
of influences, which constitute 'the new orthodoxy' endorsed by the World Bank 
and OECD among others, include neo-liberalism, new institutional economics, 
performativity, public choice theory, and new managerialism. Elsewhere Ball 
(2003) focuses upon three interrelated 'policy technologies' of the market, 
managerialism and performativity, which are the key elements of the education 
reform package. How do the concepts of (new) managerialism and performativity 
relate to this thesis's theoretical framework with visible and invisible modalities 
of pedagogy and management? To answer the question, we need to briefly 
discuss these concepts as follows. 
New managerialism is 'the insertion of the theories and techniques ofbusiness 
management ... into public sector institutions' (Ball, 1998, p.123). As discussed 
by Martin Thrupp and Robert Willmott (2003, pp.22-5), New Public Management 
(NPM) is another term that is almost identical to new managerialism. Typical 
features ofNPM includes 'attention to outputs and performance rather than 
inputs', 'the separation of purchaser and provider', 'using competition to enable 
exit or choice by service users', and 'decentralization of budgetary and personnel 
authority to line managers' (John Clarke, Sharon Gewirtz & Eugene McLaughlin, 
2000, p.6). We can easily find these characteristics in the quasi-market reform of 
the British education system. The education quasi-market is a package of 
competition between schools, with delegated powers of budgetary and personnel 
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control, for parental choice and for better performance indicators including league 
tables. In this system, schools, as service providers, are regarded quasi-
autonomous bodies to be managed separately from local and central government 
(purchaser) that funds education. NPM or new managerialism is more about 
policy trends at system or government level than about strategic changes at 
provider or school level. The conceptual framework of new managerialism 
cannot replace that of visible and invisible modalities. Rather, most 
characteristics of new managerialism in British education are expected to 
encourage schools to strategically change towards more visible modalities of 
pedagogy and management. 
According to Ball (1998, p.l22-3),pe7formativity, named by Lyotard (1984), is 
a mechanism of 'indirect steering or steering at a distance' which replaces 
intervention with 'target setting, accountability and comparison'. It seems that 
performativity is an essential element of new managerialism. Elsewhere he 
defines performativity as 'a technology, a culture and a mode of regulation that 
employs judgements, comparisons and displays as means of incentive, control, 
attrition and change-based on rewards and sanctions (both material and 
symbolic)' (Ball, 2003, p.216). As discussed in Chapter 4, the combination of 
devolved management and performance monitoring is an essential means of 
control in the quasi-market education system, and this combination is applicable 
not only to the system level relationship between government and schools but also 
to institutional level relationship between school management and teaching staff. 
Performativity concerns these relationships at both levels. The combination at the 
institutional level is identical to the responsive visible management with implicit 
regulative rules, which allow apparent autonomy in work through devolution, and 
explicit prescriptive rules, which establish tight control over the results of work 
through performance monitoring. Even at the level of pedagogic relationship 
between teachers and pupils, performativity seems to exist in the form of 
responsive visible pedagogy. The empirical study of this thesis has supported the 
hypothesised trend towards more visible pedagogy and management, especially 
through responsive visible strategies rather than directive visible strategies. 
Ball (2003, p.219) says, 'In Bernsteinian terms, these new invisible pedagogies 
of management, realised through appraisals, performance reviews and forms of 
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performance-related pay, "open up" more of the managed to control. The weaker 
frames of new managerialism enable a greater range of the workers' behaviour 
and emotional life to be made public'. His reference to Bernstein's conceptual 
framework is meaningful and relevant to the theme of this thesis although the 
view of the thesis's author is that the performativity in the education quasi-market 
concerns responsive visible, rather than invisible, modality of management. As 
Ball (2003, p.218) himself points out, 'The ethics of competition and performance 
are very different from the older ethics of professional judgement and co-
operation'. The former is a characteristic of the responsive visible management 
and the latter is that of invisible management. 
However, Ball (2003) rightly indicates some trends towards opacity or 
invisibility, rather than transparency or visibility, in the flood of various indicators 
and evaluations. 'The teacher, researcher, academic are subject to a myriad of 
judgements, measures, comparisons and targets. Information is collected 
continuously, recorded and published-often in the form of League Tables, and 
performance is also monitored eventfully by peer reviews, site visits and 
inspections .... A sense of being constantly judged in different ways, by different 
means, according to different criteria, through different agents and agencies . 
. . . And yet it is not always very clear what is expected of us' (p.220). His 
description is applicable to both school and higher education levels. 
The above reality of performativity is not necessarily identical to the responsive 
visible management. Administrative accountability mechanisms, including school 
inspection among others, should not be confused with the quasi-market 
accountability mechanisms of competition for parental choice partly in the use of 
crude data in examination league tables. The former type of accountability seems 
to sometimes increase complexity, opacity or invisibility while the latter enhances 
visibility. Performativity in the real world includes both types of accountability. 
Part of performativity with complex and opaque requirements may not necessarily 
have been promoting visibility in prescriptive rules. At the same time, the 
situation with increasing direct interventions may have been making regulative 
rules more visible. 
Since its establishment by the 1992 Education (Schools) Act, the inspection 
system for all schools has been regulated and managed by Ofsted, and actual 
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inspections of schools have been conducted by teams of independent inspectors 
contracted by Ofsted. The Ofsted inspection has been one of the major sources of 
external influence on both pedagogic and management aspects in school. This 
non-market type of accountability system should be regarded as an important 
device for performativity. 
The Ofsted inspection is 'both an accountability measure and a spur for 
improvement', as pointed out by Nicola Brimblecombe, Michael Ormston and 
Marian Shaw (1996, p.126). According to the official description ofthe purpose 
of school inspections in the latest framework for school inspections (Ofsted, 2005, 
p.4), 'The inspection team's findings provide a measure of accountability and 
must help the school to manage improvement'. The former Ofsted Handbook 
(Ofsted, 1995, p.8) mentioned the expected impact of an inspection on the 
school's strategy as follows, 'The inspection process, feedback and reports give 
direction to the school's strategy for planning, review and improvement by 
providing rigorous external evaluation and identifying key issues for action'. 
Therefore, the inspection has been intended to directly affect school strategies. 
According to Janet Ouston, Brian Fidler and Peter Earley's (1996) research on 
170 headteachers of secondary schools inspected in 1993, most headteachers were 
positive about the inspection's contribution to their school's development. 
Furthermore, the Ofsted inspection's influence has been not only on school 
management but also on classroom teachers37 . Over one third of the 850 teachers 
in 40 secondary and middle schools, researched by Brimblecombe, Ormston and 
Shaw ( 1996), answered that they intended to change their practice in some way or 
another as a result of inspection. The authors were reasonably cautious not to 
confuse intention to change with actual change, and even if there was actual 
change, they said, 'It is impossible, too, to pinpoint the source of change' (ibid, 
p.131). 
This problem in identifying the cause of change is explicit in the following 
discourse by the headteacher of Fertile Land School in this thesis, pointing out 
three reasons why the school started changing the way of assessment and 
reporting to a more hard-edged one with clearer descriptions of achievements: 
37 Under the latest framework, now the observation of classroom lessons no longer have such great weight as 
under the previous regime. 
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'I 
Well, because, er, for a number of different reasons. We often felt that we 
didn't know what the child is achieving. Because, unless we taught them 
ourselves, reading the reports, we couldn't determine what they'd actually 
achieved. And then some parents were concerned that they didn't know 
what their child achieved as well. Er, and the combination of those two 
made us realise that, you know, that we'd got to focus on it. We had the 
inspection in September, and the inspectors said the same sort of thing. 
We just hadn't been clear enough about the attainment part of it. 
The driving force behind the above-mentioned prescriptive visible strategy could 
be the Ofsted inspection, quasi-market mechanism, professional pride, or all. 
The influence of the Ofsted inspection, as a device for performativity, on 
visibility in pedagogy and management seems to have been complex. In an 
analysis of 400 inspection reports produced in 1993 and 1994, Jean Northam 
(1996) pointed out that the issues raised in the great majority of reports were those 
ofwhole-school planning and staff roles and responsibilities as well as 
inconsistencies in standards. 'A more systematic approach to whole-school 
planning, monitoring and review was required in most schools' (Northam, 1996, 
p.87). 'The issue of staff roles and responsibilities was frequently raised, 
especially where these were undefined or unclear or, as in the case of some 
secondary schools, variable from one department to another' (ibid, p.87). These 
features of the inspection reports might imply a leaning towards more visible 
management. However, elsewhere, the same analysis showed apparently different 
inclinations as well as similar ones. For example, one of the features shared 
among the 'good schools' was 'a management style encouraging staff 
participation in decision-making'. Furthermore, the compiled profile of the 'good 
school' included 'teachers can use a variety of teaching approaches' and 
'encourage active participation in lessons' (ibid, pp.94-5). These features do not 
seem to have recommended more visible modalities of management and pedagogy, 
and may have suggested some invisible modalities. Nevertheless, the research by 
Brimblecombe, Ormston and Shaw (1996, p.l30) found that in preparing lessons 
for the inspection 'a quarter of the teachers planned to deliver a more formal 
lesson than they would have done'. 'Some did this in the belief that the inspector 
would consider more didactic lessons to be the "right" sort-and this was before 
the much publicised DFE/OFSTED drive for more whole-class teaching'. It is 
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probably appropriate for us to accept the above complexity in the Ofsted 
inspection's implications as it is. 
The Education Act 2005 and the latest framework (Ofsted, 2005) for the Ofsted 
inspection under the Act have streamlined school inspections and decreased the 
burden on schools and their staff in terms of time, work and pressure involved in 
preparation for and in the course of on-site inspection. Now schools usually have 
no more than two days' notice, and therefore are unable to spend weeks of 
anxious pre-inspection preparation. An on-site inspection takes only two days 
rather than a whole week. Under the previous regime, a dozen inspectors came to 
a school, and observed a sample of lessons to judge the quality of teaching in the 
school. The new inspection arrangements give much more emphasis to dialogue 
between the inspection team, comprising no more than five inspectors, and the 
school's senior management, and the school's own self-evaluation plays its role as 
the starting point in the dialogue. The observation of lessons is no longer 
conducted in the same way as under the previous regime, and inspectors do not 
always observe complete lessons or sessions. 
The above-mentioned changes may have well responded to a number of 
problems, pointed out by teachers, school managers and educational researchers, 
including the one that was described by Carol T Fitz-Gibbon and Nicola J 
Stephenson-Forster (1999, p.114) as follows: 'The aspect of inspection which is 
the most expensive in inspectors' time, the most costly to schools in staff stress, 
and the least validated, is the practice of having inspectors sit in classrooms using 
classroom observation methods which have not been demonstrated to meet any 
level of quality standards and drawing unchallengeable conclusions which have 
yet to be subjected to proper scrutiny for their reliability, validity or sufficiency 
for the purpose of publicly rating an entire school'. One of the results of their 
survey (Fitz-Gibbon and Stephenson-Forster, 1999, p.107) was that a vast 
majority (72%) of the headteachers would believe the value-added data rather 
than the Ofsted judgement if these two were different from each other. Only a 
tiny minority (8%) answered that they would believe the Ofsted judgement. The 
authors (Fitz-Gibbon and Stephenson-Forster, 1999, p.107) argued that 'the 
inspection system of the future could be vastly reduced in cost, be far more 
economical and have higher perceived validity if value-added indicators replaced 
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the guesses of inspectors'. Furthermore, according to Cedric Cullingford and 
Sandra Daniels (1999), every school year from 1993-94 to 1996-97, the.schools 
inspected in the year had a significantly less proportion of pupils obtaining five or 
more A* to C grades at GCSE than the other schools not inspected. The authors 
(Cullingford and Daniels, 1999, p.66) concluded, 'Ofsted inspections have the 
opposite effect to that intended. Year on year they lower standards'. 
Despite the above-mentioned uneasy relations between the essentially personal 
judgements in inspections and the quantitative performance measurements in the 
form ofleague tables, not only advocates but also critics of the Ofsted inspection 
too often regard it as a market-oriented policy measure in the same direction as 
the publication of examination and test results. For example, this confusion is 
implicit in Cullingford's (1999, p.5) argument as follows, 'The purpose of 
inspection is to be able to measure, against set criteria, the exact levels of 
performance. The more simple the formulae, indeed the more simply quantifiable, 
the better'. It is not so easy to regard 'the bureaucracies of inspection, growing 
even faster than Parkinson's Law' (Cullingford, 1999, p.1) as a policy instrument 
to apply the market principle. Maurice Kogan and Margaret Maden (1999, p.18) 
found that following the Ofsted inspection, 25% of the schools had changed their 
management structure and 58% had changed their teaching styles and curricular 
organisation even though there was little presented in the inspection reports that 
the schools were not aware of and working towards remedying. Therefore, the 
Ofsted inspection has influenced school strategies. The important question is in 
which direction the inspection has changed these strategies. As discussed above, 
the Ofsted inspection's implications for visibility in pedagogy and management 
can be complex. 
Performativity in education includes both the mechanism of the measurement 
of output (examinations and tests) and that of the evaluation of process (Ofsted 
inspections)38 . Both the mechanisms are different from the market itself. 
Nonetheless, the former mechanism is deeply integrated into the quasi-market 
system of education as parental choice is expected to be partly driven by 
38 As pointed out by Gewirtz (200 I, p.368), the government's website, on the theme of choosing a school, 
encourages or advises parents to look at league tables and Ofsted inspection reports, with links to these 
pieces of information. The current address is 
http://www.parentscentre.gov.uk/educationandleaming/choosingaschooll (Last accessed on 7 May 2006). 
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examination and test results, and the latter is also at least related to the system. 
Performativity in the real world of British education is a complex structure, the 
components of which do not necessarily promote the same modalities of pedagogy 
and management. 
This complexity in performativity inevitably means the complexity in new 
managerialism that contains performativity as an essential element. Another 
source of complexity can also be found in the concept of new managerialism. 
'New' managerialism, with discourses of innovation, creativity and empowerment 
and freedom, is contrasted with the traditional public sector management, with 
bureaucratic and inflexible control, which is called Taylorist management (Thrupp 
& Willmott, 2003, p.22). It may sound as if new managerialism is oriented 
towards an invisible modality of management. Nevertheless, 'the new 
managerialism does not dispense with Taylorism' (ibid, p.25), since the system of 
payment by examination results for elementary schools was introduced by the 
revised Code of 1862 as Thrupp and Willmott (ibid, p.25) refers to. Ball (2006, 
p.13) also argues, 'the shift from neo-Taylorist management to new 
managerialism is by no means clear-cut. The use of performance indicators, 
specified contracting between purchasers and providers and the continued 
interventions of the state into organisational practices all tend to encourage the 
retention of organisational characteristics of "machine bureaucracies'". The 
question raised here is how 'new' new managerialism is. At the same time, these 
arguments mean that both Taylorist management and new managerialism have 
visible modalities of control in common. Based on Bernstein's concepts, the 
theoretical framework of this thesis distinguishes the directive visible 
management and the responsive visible management. The former modality of 
visible management may be similar to Taylorist management and the latter to new 
managerialism. Nonetheless, new managerialism, as well as performativity, in the 
real world seems to contain elements of not only the responsive visible 
management but also the directive visible management and even the invisible 
management. 
As discussed above, both managerialism and performativity are descriptive 
concepts of a package of complex policy trends and discourses that are not 
necessarily in harmony with each other. By contrast, visible/invisible pedagogy 
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and management are more purified concepts of analytical nature. While the 
theoretical framework of visible/invisible modalities of pedagogy and 
management has its unique strengths in the analysis ofthe school-level effect of 
the quasi-market, the above brief discussion is not sufficient to explicate the 
relationship between the framework and the concepts of managerialism and 
pe1jormativity. It needs more work, which is beyond the primary purpose of this 
thesis. 
In the meantime, the work ofThrupp and Willmott (2003) provides a thorough 
critique of the education management literature, which indirectly supports this 
thesis's attempt to use a sociological theory of Bernstein, rather than the 
management literature, as its theoretical basis. Their work comprehensively 
reviews education management texts, and enables us to find out examples of 
management discourses that are 'decontextualised and depoliticised' (Angus, 
1994, p.80). In the education management texts reviewed by them, the 
importance of social context is underplayed, and political conflicts are not 
emphasised. 
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Chapter 1 0 Summary and Conclusions 
Summary 
This thesis is intended to make a contribution to research on the quasi-market 
education system, which was introduced by the Education Reform Act 1988 under 
the Conservative government led by Margaret Thatcher, and has survived the 
changes of government and premiership. The essential elements of this system 
are autonomous management of schools, parental choice, examination/test results 
as performance indicators, competition among schools, and funding based on 
students numbers as follows. Schools with self-management responsibility 
compete for choice by parents. Information on exam/test results is available for 
parents. Student numbers as the result of parental choice largely decide the 
allocations of public funding to individual schools. 
As well as the continuation of the quasi-market system, there has also been a 
continuing controversy between the advocates and critics of the quasi-market. 
Despite the great controversy, there seems to be a strange agreement between the 
advocates and critics. Both sides have a paradoxical view that the traditional 
academic model with rigorous teaching prevails in the quasi-market system even 
though parental choice is complex and diverse. To try to explain the paradox, this 
thesis focuses on schools' strategies as schooling model is influenced by parental 
choice only indirectly through the schools' strategies. Based on Basil Bernstein's 
theory, the thesis proposes a hypothesis that school managers in the quasi-market 
tend to introduce more visible strategies oriented towards explicit rules in 
pedagogy and management, or towards conservative pedagogy and managerial 
management, than invisible strategies oriented towards implicit rules, or to 
progressive pedagogy and collegial management. 
The hypothesis has been empirically examined through a multiple-case study 
targeting six secondary schools in a London borough. Semi-structured interviews 
with the headteachers were carried out between 1994 and 1995, when the quasi-
market system was 'purer' than the current one that contains more interventionist 
mechanisms added by the Labour government. 
The results of the empirical study show that in five of the six schools the 
headteachers were adopting more visible strategies than invisible ones, and 
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therefore lend support to the hypothesis of school strategies in the education 
quasi-market and the relevance of the theoretical framework. The supported 
hypothesis may be an endorsement of the paradoxical agreement between the 
advocates and critics of the quasi-market that the academic schooling model 
prevails in the education quasi-market even though parental choice is complex 
and diverse. 
Thus, the hypothesis and theoretical framework can be a solid basis for 
systematic analyses of effects of quasi-market forces for school strategies. In 
discussing the implications ofthe findings for Labour's policies, research on 
quasi-markets, and Bernstein's theory, reviews of recent literature demonstrate the 
sustained relevance and significance of this research to the education system at 
the time of writing the thesis. 
In summarising this thesis, the main findings of this research are 
reemphasised as follows: 
Strategic changes towards more visibility in the quasi-market 
The strategic changes expressed in the headteachers' interviews on the whole 
show the hypothesised movement towards more visibility in school strategies. In 
other words, the results of the empirical study seem to be consistent with the basic 
hypothesis that school managers were adopting more visible strategies than 
invisible ones as new strategies in the quasi-market system. 
Prescriptive, rather than regulative, visible strategies 
The vast majority of visible strategies expressed in the interviews are prescriptive 
ones, and the regulative visible strategies found are not so many. A cautious 
interpretation of the results is that the effects of quasi-market forces are more on 
academic achievements or examination results than on discipline and moral 
aspects in schooling. 
Strategies in pedagogy and management in tune 
The coupling of strategies in pedagogy and management is found in the results of 
the empirical study. Typically a mechanism of monitoring or reviewing the 
performances of the teaching staff and/or subject departments in relation to 
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pupils' academic performances is found as a new strategy for four of the six 
schools in the study. These visible strategies in management are linked to 
performance measurement at pedagogic level. The results suggest that the 
accountability line, based on pupils' academic achievements, between state and 
schools is extended to within each school, between the school management and 
teaching staff. 
League tables as major driving forces for strategic changes 
All the six interviewed headteachers expressed that they took examination results 
seriously whether they were personally for or against them as performance 
indicators of schools. They were conscious of possible or even probable 
consequences of the results for their school's success or failure in the education 
quasi-market. This may explain why prescriptive visible strategies were so often 
adopted as new strategies after the quasi-market reform. 
Some invisible strategies for better examination results? 
The empirical study shows that the perceived importance of examination results 
seems to have promoted visible strategies, especially prescriptive ones. However, 
there is room for manoeuvre for invisible strategies that work for improving the 
results. In one of the six schools, there was such a case where a child-centred 
scheme of mathematics was introduced to improve the results, and the actually 
improved results persuaded the sceptical parents who originally liked the 
traditional teaching approaches. Furthermore, three of the six schools adopted 
invisible strategies in teaching styles and methods. It seems to be the case that the 
effects of quasi -market forces are more about 'results' than about 'processes', and 
that invisible strategies in 'processes' may be acceptable in the quasi-market as 
long as the strategies improve or, at least, do not endanger the 'results'. 
Implications of the findings for the current education system under the Labour 
government 
While Labour's policies have basically let the education quasi-market remain 
largely intact, their policy changes include more direct interventions by 
government in pedagogic practice and in performance monitoring. The findings 
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of this research can contribute to an accumulation of research concerning the 
education quasi-market in two ways. First, the above-mentioned policy 
continuation assures a reasonable degree of relevance of the findings to the 
current system. Secondly, the findings on the recent past system of a purer quasi-
market are informative when the distinction between the effects of quasi-market 
and those of governmental intervention is needed. 
Implications of the suggested strategic changes for the debate on the education 
quasi-market 
The focal points of the controversy over the education quasi-market have been the 
two issues of 'choice and diversity versus inequality and hierarchy' and 
'educational standards and efficiency', on both of which empirical research has 
been accumulating but has not yet reached decisive conclusions. 
It is apparently paradoxical that both the advocates and critics of the quasi-
market reform seem to agree with each other that the academic schooling model 
with focus on examination results prevails in the education quasi-market even 
though parental choice is complex and diverse. This paradox is explained by the 
finding that school managers seem to increase visible strategies oriented towards 
the academic schooling model with focus on examination results to raise their 
school's position in league tables and attract academically able and academically 
oriented parents. This finding suggests that the education quasi-market may 
promote uniformity rather than diversity in pedagogic strategies at the level of 
school management. 
However, whether or not the promoted uniformity leads to inequality and 
hierarchy, or segregation and polarisation, in schooling is a different issue. 
Furthermore, whether or not strategies at management level, distinguished from 
classroom level, positively impact on academic achievements in terms of 
examination results is beyond the purpose of this research, which is not intended 
to work on empirical data concerning academic achievement. What the findings 
of this research suggest is that the quasi-market pressures encourage school 
managers to focus their strategies on academic achievement in terms of 
examination results. 
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Trends in school strategies emerging through systematic analysis in a defined 
theoretical framework 
Research on the education quasi-market has been developing without any doubt. 
As Ron Glatter's (2004) concise summary shows, the development covers a 
number of issues: parental choice, diversity and hierarchy of schools, school 
responses to quasi-markets, quasi-markets' effects on educational outcomes 
including examination results, and socio-economic segregation and polarisation. 
With regard to school responses to, or strategies in, the education quasi-market, 
empirical, mainly qualitative, research has been accumulating, and providing 
detailed descriptions oflocal markets with emphasis on complex particularities. 
Although some generalisations have also been tried in such research, the 
generalisations have tended to be done in a rather ad hoc manner without a 
conceptually defined theoretical framework. In the absence of such a framework, 
it is difficult to judge the directions of individual responses or strategic changes in 
a systematic and consistent manner, and to make general trends emerge from 
those directions. The literature on school responses so far is generally descriptive, 
and has not yet sufficiently developed in terms of theorisation. 
The aim ofthis thesis is to tackle the above-mentioned weakness in the research 
development. Its theoretical framework with visible/invisible modalities in 
pedagogy and management is expected to provide judgement criteria for the 
orientations of individual strategies and a device for finding general trends within 
apparently chaotic particularities. Thus it is hoped that the thesis will contribute 
to theoretical development well based on empirical findings. 
Implications of the research results for theoretical development 
The relevance and effectiveness of this theoretical framework seem to be 
supported by the above-mentioned empirical findings of the thesis. The 
hypothesised trend to more visibility, much more prescriptive visible strategies 
than regulative ones, and a possible interrelation between pedagogy and 
management are among the most important findings. 
The theoretical framework has a particular value because it is related to the 
continuing dispute on a fundamental question of what kind of education is 
desirable. The dispute lies in an ideological context with macro (system) and 
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micro (school) level linkage. The theoretical framework seems to be relevant and 
effective in enabling us to analyse school strategies at micro-level in relation to 
the historical and systemic context at macro-level, at both levels ofwhich 
conflicting values and ideals are of enormous significance due to the social 
functions of education including socialisation and selection. 
The theoretical framework contains such context. While Bernstein's theory 
provides a fertile basis for building the theoretical framework, this thesis 
explicitly extends his dichotomy of visible and invisible modalities from 
pedagogy to school management, and elaborates the modalities to apply them to 
school strategies in pedagogy and management. 
Although there has been increasing literature by Bernstein and on his research, 
the theoretical framework is still relevant to the purpose of this thesis for the 
following reasons. First, while recent work by Bernstein often tackles issues 
related to the quasi-market, his writing is generally in tune with the arguments and 
findings of this thesis. Secondly, although he has developed new concepts, the 
development does not necessarily provide this research with more useful device 
that is conceptually neat and operationally defined for empirical studies. Thirdly, 
while research works in the use of Bernstein's theory by other authors as well as 
those by Bernstein himself focus not only on curricular and/or pedagogic aspects 
at classroom level but also upon policy level initiatives and trends, astonishingly 
and curiously, managerial or organisational aspects at school level seem to be 
almost missing from such literature. It is hoped that this thesis will contribute to 
filling this gap. The thesis focuses on school strategies, expressed in the 
headteachers' discourses, in both pedagogy and management. 
Conclusions 
The above-mentioned findings were with regard to the quasi-market education 
system created by the Conservative government and not yet modified by the 
succeeding Labour government. Nevertheless, as Labour's policies have basically 
let the quasi-market system remain largely intact, the findings have significant 
implications for the current system. Furthermore, as the Labour government has 
introduced a number of new policy instruments to strengthen direct state control, 
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the findings of this research can be of a particular value in providing the analysis 
of the comparatively purer form of quasi-market system in the recent past, which 
was rather rapidly lost after ten- year or so existence. This study now provides a 
baseline for subsequent research, possibly returning to the same schools to 
examine their experiences during the interim time period. Such continuity for 
longitudinal analysis is an obvious possible next step, which this thesis itself 
cannot afford due to time constraint. The author's hope is that this thesis will 
contribute to further theory development and empirical studies on the effects of 
quasi-market forces for school strategies in pedagogy and management. The 
theoretical framework of the visible and invisible modalities of school strategies 
and the above empirical findings can be a solid basis for such development and 
studies. 
Nevertheless, this thesis has its limitations on both the methodological and 
theoretical fronts as follows. Methodologically, the empirical study of this 
research is limited to a relatively small-scale multiple-case study. Moreover, 
while the data from the interviews with the headteachers is relevant to the 
research purpose and is of good quality as shown in the thesis, it would be better 
if the data could be supplemented with that from the interviews with other staff 
and/or governors. Observations could also be a supplementary method though the 
inclusion of this method with some sensitivity might have discouraged the 
headteachers to accept even interviews. On the grounds of limited time, 
manpower and resources available for this research, the number of cases could not 
be large, and the variety of data collection methods had to be restricted. Rather, 
much of the precious research time has been concentrated on conducting an 
elaborated analysis of the quality data in a systematic and consistent manner. In 
other words, depth is chosen at the expense of breadth. Hence the empirical 
findings of this research need a cautious approach to any claim to generalisation. 
Theoretically, although the dichotomy of visible and invisible modalities has 
shown its productivity, relevance and effectiveness in researching on school 
strategies in the education quasi-market, the generic mode in Bernstein's 
terminology, as an emerging trend in pedagogic discourse towards practical forms 
of knowledge and its transmission relevant to work and life, may shake the 
stability of the dichotomy in future. Furthermore, the role of the state in relation 
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to the market may have to be re-examined against the background of increasing 
complexity in the education quasi-market with Labour government's direct 
interventions in addition to built-in elements, introduced by the then Conservative 
government, including examination and test results, as performance indicators, 
based on the nationally prescribed curriculum, and Ofsted inspections. For 
Bernstein, the state and the market are not an opposing dichotomy, and may even 
be regarded as constituting an integrated system as discussed in the last chapter. 
However, it may turn out that market mechanisms and government interventions 
problematically coexist in significant tension. This issue may deserve further 
elaboration. Regrettably, we are no longer able to get comments from Bernstein, 
to whom this thesis owes so much. 
With reference to the above-mentioned values and limitations of this research, 
in concluding the thesis, possible future research developments are suggested as 
follows. These developments need not necessarily be independent ones. Some of 
them can be connected within the same research, depending on the research 
design. 
Larger scale research on the quasi-market for the purpose of generalisation 
Larger scale case studies, collecting data not only from headteachers but also from 
other staff, governors, and possibly pupils and parents, will be a possible option to 
test the theoretical framework and hypothesis of this research. Such studies may 
even include some quantitative method, designed on the basis of this thesis's 
findings. Nonetheless, any new studies must be careful of distinguishing the 
effects of quasi-market forces and those of government interventions, 
strengthened under the Labour government, which links to the following research 
development. 
Longitudinal research on the case schools 
An obvious possibility for follow-up research is a longitudinal study on the case 
schools' subsequent experiences, which is out of consideration in this thesis itself 
because of the limited time available for it. While there can be such longitudinal 
research as an independent piece of research, the longitudinal element can be 
included in the above-mentioned larger scale research. 
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Effects of the mixture of state interventions and market forces on school strategies 
A crucial development may be about the issue of the state and the market in 
relation to Labour's combination of state powers and market forces in their 
education policy. In the current education system under the Labour government, 
there are more governmental interventions to directly influence pedagogic 
practices rather than waiting for quasi-market forces to bring about desirable 
results. When effects of the complex mixture of state interventions and market 
forces need to be distinguished and comprehensively analysed, the findings of this 
research on the recent past with the purer form of quasi-market may contribute to 
such efforts. Such empirical work may need further theoretical elaboration on the 
basis of the theoretical framework of this research. 
Strategies at management level and practices at classroom level 
Another possible development based on the findings of this research may be to 
examine how effective school strategies at management level are in changing the 
pedagogic practices at classroom level, and what factors influence their 
effectiveness. This category of research is of a particular significance for 
complementing the findings of this thesis. A fundamental question here is 
whether or not visible strategies at management level are successful in promoting 
visible pedagogy at classroom level. The data from teachers and pupils is of 
particular importance for such research. 
School strategies and educational outcomes 
In relation to the above-mentioned type of research, relationships between school 
strategies and educational outcomes may also be explored. Educational outcomes 
can be narrowed to examination results or broadened to the inclusion of the 
personal and social aspect of schooling, depending on the research purposes, 
designs and feasibility. Not only the effects of strategies on outcomes but also the 
possible influences of outcomes on strategies may be researched. The modalities 
of strategies are expected to have hypothesised implications in both the directions. 
School strategies and socio-economic segregation 
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Equality in educational opportunities and hierarchy of schools have arguably been 
the central issue in the controversy over the education quasi-market. Future 
research work may examine the interrelations between school strategies and 
socio-economic segregation. Such research may focus on how visible/invisible 
strategies adopted by competing schools affect, and are affected by, socio-
economic segregation, and have implications for the dispute over the existence or 
non-existence of polarising effects of the quasi-market. Complexity will be added 
by the effects of government interventions including specialist schools and other 
diversity policies. 
Integration of the generic mode into the theoretical framework 
Future theoretical development, with some empirical work, may integrate the 
generic mode into the theoretical framework. Although the generic mode does 
not seem to be substantially embedded in secondary schools at present, such 
research work may be an important step forward for the future direction. When 
that sort of research is conducted, particular attention needs to be paid to the 
mode's ambivalent relations with both visible and invisible pedagogies, which 
have been discussed in the last chapter. 
International comparison of trends in modalities of pedagogy and management 
As suggested in the last chapter, the universality of the current British trend 
towards visible pedagogy and management is in question, and then the issue needs 
to be explored ideally in a world-wide historical context or at least in some 
international comparison. Possible interrelations between pedagogy and 
management must be taken into consideration in such research. 
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Appendix 1: Dates of the Interviews with the Headteachers 
of the Case Schools 
Easthill Girls ' School 
Type: county; girls; comprehensive; 11-16 
Standard number: not much below 200 
GCSE results (1994; 5 or more A-Cs): almost the same as the England average. 
Interview with the Headteacher: 1 December 1994 
Roundham Catholic College 
Type: voluntary-aided; co-educational; comprehensive; 11-18 (with sixth form) 
Standard number: not much below 200 
GCSE results: just above the borough average. 
Interview with the Headteacher: 7 December 1994 
George Square School 
Type: county; co-educational; comprehensive; 11-16 
Standard number: not much above 100 
GCSE results: below the borough average. 
Interview with the Headteacher: 7 December 1994 
Fertile Land School 
Type: county; co-educational; comprehensive; 11-16 
Standard number: not much above 100 
GCSE results: below the borough average. 
Interview with the Headteacher: 22 November 1994 
Seymour Field School 
Type: grant-maintained; co-educational; comprehensive; 11-18 (with sixth form) 
Standard number: not much above 200 
GCSE results: more than 1 0% higher than the England average. 
Interview with the Acting Headteacher: 28 April1995 
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Riverside Street School 
Type: grant-maintained; co-educational; comprehensive; 11-16 
Standard number: not much below 200 
GCSE results: higher than the borough average but lower than the England 
average. 
Interview with the Headteacher: 13 March 1995 
223 
Appendix II: Full Description of All the New Strategies Mentioned 
by the Case School Headteachers 
(A) Easthill Girls' School: county; girls; comprehensive; 11-16 
Standard number: not much below 200 
GCSE results (1994; 5 or more A-Cs): almost the same as the England average. 
Date of interviewing the headteacher: 1 December 1994 
(AI) Development of technology facilities: Neutral strategy in pedagogy 
Two years before the interview with the headteacher, the school obtained a 
quarter of million pounds under the government's Technology Schools Initiative 
and spent the money on developing the technology facilities. 
The headteacher is clearly conscious of effects of this strategy on parents: 
So we spent that money on developing our technology facilities, and that, 
er, is focused upon particularly for parents, when they come to visit our 
school, because other schools around here haven't got that, so even 
Seymour Field School, School I [county; girls; comprehensive; 11-16] 
haven't got. 
Technology is one ofthe focal points in the promotion evening of the school: 
... I speak from the platform toward the visitors, er, I say something about 
each area of the curriculum, but, you know, music and technology 
obviously I'm able to state quite clearly where we have advantages over 
others. 
The headteacher seems to expect much from the eye-catching equipment: 
... I think that's very attractive to parents, because they see it is very 
important for future careers, and when the parents go to that area, they see 
all our excellent machinery, they are very impressed. 
The headteacher's description does not imply that this strategy has been adopted 
with particular effects on either regulative or prescriptive rules, and therefore the 
strategy is identified as neutral. 
(A2) To introduce setting earlier in mathematics, science and languages: 
Prescriptive visible strategy in pedagogy 
At the time of the interview, the school was introducing setting earlier in the 
subjects of mathematics, science and modem languages: 
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I 
I would say where it's changed, for example, in maths, we now try to set 
in Year 8 rather than leave it to Year 9 or 10. So the setting has come 
down earlier. 
In languages, French, Spanish, are also trying to set earlier, and science 
again we're setting earlier. 
Although the policy was to set earlier in mathematics, the introduction of the 
earlier setting was interrupted by the tight budget: 
There has been a problem this year on the staff, and we won't be able to do 
it. But we're trying to make that the norm so that normally in Year 8, the 
second year into the school, the girls will be set .... 
The problem was that, I'm, I'm, our budget is very tight and I just didn't 
have enough teaching in Year 8 maths to enable us to split the girls into a 
set group which needed seven teachers, we only had six available at that 
time. But we see that more as a hiccough. The year before we set them, 
and we are planning to do so next year. So the general policy would be to 
set earlier in maths now. 
The headteacher explains that the earlier setting is a strategy targeting more able 
pupils: 
Right, we now try to do that because we feel that the more able girls have 
better chance of getting the very top results if they're set earlier. 
Obviously you have to balance with the average girls and the less-than-
average girls, because we don't want label children, but we definitely feel 
that in most subjects the higher ability girls have a chance of getting, say, 
the starred A grade or the A grade if they are set earlier and targeted more, 
the work is targeted more. 
The strategy stratifies pupils on the basis of their performances, and therefore 
makes prescriptive rules, criteria rules in this case, more explicit in pedagogic 
relations. It is a prescriptive visible strategy in pedagogy. 
(A3) More differentiation of work for pupils: Prescriptive visible strategy in 
pedagogy 
According to the headteacher, more differentiated work is provided than 
previously and that is a policy of the school: 
What's been done already is mainly in the provision of differentiated work, 
more challenging work. 
That is the policy that each area must meet the needs for 
differentiation. . .. There used to be, there's been a shift, for example, it 
used to be the staff just looking for differentiation by outcome, setting the 
same work, looking for different outcome, but we've moved away from 
that, it's got to be differentiated input to the students that will then assist 
differentiated outcome. 
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As a part of the differentiation, more able pupils are provided with extension 
work: 
Well, what we, our policy tends to be that we would in each of the areas 
have extension work for the more able. So they would be given additional 
work, harder work, as an extension to the normal so that everyone would 
do the normal but then some students would be given the extension work. 
This strategy focuses on and encourages stratifying differences between pupils' 
performances, and therefore is a prescriptive visible strategy in pedagogy to make 
criteria rules more explicit in pedagogic relations. 
(A4) Teaching hours increased from 23.20 to 25: Neutral strategy in pedagogy 
Eighteen months before the interview, the school increased the teaching hours 
from 23 hours 20 minutes to 25 hours. The reason, according to the headteacher, 
was that they felt that more time was necessary to teach the national curriculum 
and other areas: 
The purpose of that was we felt that the 23 hours 20 minutes didn't give us 
enough time to teach all that had to be taught, with the national curriculum 
plus the other areas outside the national curriculum that we felt important. 
So we felt we needed that increase to be able to teach everything. 
This strategy only refers to amount oftime for teaching, and does not imply 
particular effects on either regulative or prescriptive rules. Therefore it is 
identifies as a neutral strategy. 
(AS) Firming-up of homework: Prescriptive visible strategy in pedagogy 
The headteacher states that there has been more firming-up of homework policy 
and more close monitoring of the implementation of the policy over the last four 
years in response to examination performance tables or league tables: 
We've had always had a homework policy, so that's always happened. 
However, I think that what's happened is, with the increased focus on the 
examination achievement, there has been more firming-up of the policy 
and more monitoring .... 
I think it's happened as there has been more focus on the publication of the 
results. I think that's definitely, I think that's had an effect, so it takes 
gradually, probably over the last four years, yes, it is that sort of period, 
has things become more public. 
The headteacher is conscious of the parent viewpoint on homework: 
Parents on the whole are very keen on homework, er, of a good quality. Er, 
so it is important to parents. 
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This strategy of firming up homework policy implies more explicit prescriptive 
rules in pedagogic relations, and therefore is a prescriptive visible strategy in 
pedagogy. 
(A6) Detailed analysis of examination results: Prescriptive visible strategy in 
pedagogy and management 
The headteacher explains that the school has been doing more detailed analysis of 
examination results in the last two years than before, comparing them between 
subjects and with expected results, in order to improve the results: 
Er, we can analyse their average score in all their other exams. So this 
teacher can tell whether her students have achieved their expected or 
they've done better in her subject than the norm or whether they haven't 
done as welL And if they haven't done as well, then we have to look why 
not in order to improve it in the following year. So very detailed in-depth 
analysis of each student and each teacher's result in order to try to keep 
improving our standard . 
. . . examining the results of the public examination in detail against their 
expected .... 
Based on the past achievement at the mock, the practice examination, the 
homework, the coursework, based on all that .... 
Last two years. Before then it was more basic and straightforward. Much 
more detailed now. 
The above analysis targets not only each pupil but also each teacher, and aims at 
getting a clearer picture of their performance in terms of examination results. 
This strategy is to make criteria rules more explicit in both pedagogic and 
organisational relations, and therefore is a prescriptive visible strategy in both 
pedagogy and management. 
(A 7) Examinations Officer: Prescriptive visible strategy in pedagogy and 
management 
About four years before the interview, the headteacher initiated the post of the 
Examination Officer as one of the three senior teachers, who helps the 
headteacher to monitor each curriculum area's performance in terms of 
examination results: 
Right, I have an Examination Officer, and one of his main roles is to 
monitor with the heads of the curriculum areas on their students' 
achievements, and he will prepare the analysis for me that I would then 
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look at, and I meet regularly with the head of each curriculum area. We 
would look at their results in detail at the meeting, trying to identify where 
praises due and where there are areas for improvement. 
For this headteacher, examinations work is a priority to put money from the 
limited budget into: 
But that post is quite an expensive salary. So it means you have to make a 
decision to put money into a person doing that work. So it's a question of 
priorities. 
The appointment of the Examination Officer means the headteacher' s 
commitment to rasing examination results through comparing and analysing 
performances of pupils and those of curriculum areas, and therefore is a 
prescriptive visible strategy in both pedagogy and management to make criteria 
(prescriptive) rules more explicit in pedagogic and organisational relations. 
(A8) More frequent assessment: Prescriptive visible strategy in pedagogy 
The headteacher states that there has been more frequent assessment over the last 
two or three years: 
The change over the last, er, two stroke three years is that there has been 
more assessment and more frequent assessment. So, er, that could be, that 
would be depend on the individual subject area, but it would include short 
test, half-term test, and set questions in set time, time to question, so the 
assessment throughout the school has increased without any doubt. 
The increased assessment is mainly through written tests: 
But obviously some spoken as well where it's appropriate, languages, the 
spoken English, the presentation skills, but the majority will be written. 
The frequent assessment mainly through written tests makes criteria (prescriptive) 
rules more explicit in pedagogic relations, and therefore is a prescriptive visible 
strategy in pedagogy. 
(A9) Detailed and technical reporting to parents: Prescriptive invisible strategy in 
pedagogy 
Eighteen months before my interview with the headteacher, the school introduced 
very detailed reports to parents, whichwas subsequently criticised as too technical 
by parents: 
... we have tried very detailed reports to the parents which we tried in the 
last year, eighteen months, to try to give them more information, then we 
found some parents for saying to us, "This is too technical and we want 
228 
I 
I 
some more straightforward, such as 'good', 'average', 'below average'." 
So we are looking again at that. 
... we had these very detailed reports, and they are getting feedback from 
our parents through the governors' curriculum group, the parents 
association . 
. . . for example, in the technology department, they would write all about 
their course and some of that was very technical and really not what 
parents wanted to hear. And then there would be, for most subjects too, a 
general paragraph, saying the child works hard, and has done quite well in 
this but not enough in this and needs to aim for this , but in the end the 
parents are saying, "That's all very nice, but it's not saying to us, so they 
are, our girl is excellent at science and poor at English." They wanted 
something more direct with results, with the result of, say, any test, you 
know, seventy percent on this paper. So they are more into the very clear 
information, er, which they can take in at a glance. 
The parents' criticism means that the detailed and technical reporting included 
many descriptions of absolute nature and only ambiguous information on 
comparative performances. It is a prescriptive invisible strategy in pedagogy to 
make criteria (prescriptive) rules more implicit in pedagogic relations. 
(AlO) The review of the reporting in response to the parents' criticism: 
Prescriptive visible strategy in pedagogy 
In response to the parents' critical viewpoint, the school was going to review and 
modify the reporting to parents: 
... what we're going to do is then, modify again, and then, "Is this 
better?", "Is this what you want?" 
The head teacher emphasises the importance of parents' viewpoint to the school 
policy: 
So this year we're still more experimental and we hope to firm up on, on 
sort of the whole school policy for next year, but this is the first time that 
we've really considered the parents' viewpoint as much. Before, it was 
the school decision, but it's only been in this, last year that we've had been 
this policy of getting feedback from parents . . . . So the reporting to 
parents is for the parents' benefit and the girls' rather than just the school 
benefit. 
The review is based on the parents' view that reporting to parents should provide 
clearer information on comparative performances, and therefore is a prescriptive 
visible strategy in pedagogy to make criteria (prescriptive) rules more explicit in 
pedagogic relations. 
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(All) Written policy on bullying: Neutral strategy in pedagogy 
The school introduced a written policy on bullying two or three years before the 
interview and has updated it. The necessity of clarification and the parents' 
concern were the reasons why the written policy was introduced: 
... I think there were two main reasons. One was that, although we had 
an unwritten way of dealing with it, because it's unwritten and there would 
be a team of teachers, a number dealing with incidents, if the policy wasn't 
written, there was a danger of differential approach and the policy not 
being applied constantly .... And it was necessary too because of parents' 
concern to show quite clearly what would happen if there was an incident. 
The headteacher implied that the way of dealing with bullying had not been 
changed by introducing the written policy. Therefore the policy does not seem to 
have particular effects on either regulative or prescriptive rules. It is a neutral 
strategy. 
(Al2) Absence policy being planned: Regulative visible strategy in pedagogy 
The headteacher was working on absent policy and was very conscious of 
published figures ofunauthorised absence: 
... I'm working on improving the figures for the school and form 
groups. . .. I wrote to all the parents in my news sheet last week, saying, 
"It's quite good but it isn't good enough, and there are too many occasions 
of girls having a day off and parents not writing a note, and therefore it's 
seen as a unauthorised absence .... " ... as you know, the, the absence 
figures are published now as well. 
Not as important as exam results, but it's still important. ... it's making 
the schools like myselflook at it to tighten up. It's the publication that is 
draw my attention to it to see how it can improve. 
The headteacher' s initiative aims at tightening up the control of absence to 
improve the published figures, and therefore is a regulative visible strategy in 
pedagogy to make regulative or hierarchical rules more explicit in pedagogic 
relations. 
(A13) Monitoring of teaching performances: Regulative visible strategy in 
management 
The headteacher introduced a monitoring scheme two years before the interview. 
The teacher's performance related to the children's performance is monitored at 
two levels of the headteacher and the heads of faculty: 
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... it's over the last two years that I've introduced the monitoring policy. 
Before then, there was just ad-hoc monitoring by me, walking around the 
school, popping into classrooms through four to five minutes, totally 
unsystematic .... and by myself, whereby, er, teachers' classes are visited 
without prior notice. And I will go at the beginning of the lesson, and I 
will monitor the whole lesson, the teacher's performance to children's 
performance, to resources, the methods of curriculum delivery. All those 
aspects, the behaviour, all those aspects are, will be monitored. And the 
teacher will then come to me for feedback and a discussion and can bring 
items to my attention. And I see every member of staff throughout the 
year, without prior notice .... And also the head of their subject has the 
responsibility to go to each of their teachers, monitor, monitor the books, 
monitor the marking, .... 
The monitoring process seems to have confusing relations with the appraisal 
process in which threatening elements are avoided: 
... the teacher's performance related to the children's performance comes 
under monitoring, not appraisal .... And it's the monitoring they would 
pick up any underperformance by the teacher ... It could come upon 
appraisals as well, but we are trying to make appraisal non-threatening. 
The headteacher states that staffs objections to the monitoring scheme have been 
overcome as follows: 
Originally there were objections and this was discussed in the union 
meetings. And I spoke at several staff meetings, trying to explain the 
reason for it, that it was to aim to improvement, you know, make sure 
we're looking at .... It's like quality checks, and it's not just looking at 
the teacher. It's looking at the students' attitude, "Are they carrying up the 
students' responsibility?" It's looking at the resources, "Has this teacher 
been given sufficient resources to teach this topic?" It's in order for me to 
find out more about the national curriculum, more about the modes of 
delivery. And although people were suspicious at first, I supposed it's got 
to happen, so it's started to happen. But because the feedback interviews 
are made optional, not compulsory, but almost every member of the staff 
has come, and they have then gone back and they've found it useful and 
important. They had my entire attention. I could give helpful points to 
them, and they had an opportunity of bringing to my attention, any issue 
they wish, such as they felt they're given insufficient resources, they felt 
their line manager wasn't treating them appropriately. So now this is 
accepted by the school and actually even enjoyed. People are now 
speaking in favour of how helpful they have found this at the union 
meetings. So by the dialogue and the presentation of the policy and 
reasoning, er, people have accepted this and seen it as part of the normal 
life of the school to, to, you know, help us to achieve this quality 
education. So I haven't now had any resistance. 
The above statement shows that the headteacher has emphasised the benefits to 
the teachers, such as the attention to pupils behaviour and resources and the 
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optional feedback with helpful advice, and minimised the threatening nature of 
monitoring teachers' performances. The headteacher's endeavour has been made 
to prevent the essentially hierarchical or regulative nature of the monitoring 
scheme from standing out. The scheme is a means of making school 
management's hierarchical control over teachers' performances more explicit. 
Therefore it is a regulative visible strategy in management to make regulative 
rules more explicit in organisational relations between teachers and school 
management. 
(Al4) Deputies decreased from 3 to 2: Neutral strategy in management 
According to the headteacher, because of the financial difficulty, the number of 
deputies were decreased from three to two two and half years before the 
interview: 
... we find finance very difficult. So there was a restructuring two and 
half years ago where I removed one deputy head person from the structure. 
There used to be three, but now there are two deputy heads, and then there 
are other three senior teachers, and then there are, er, curriculum heads, 
eight. 
There is no indication that this strategy has a partucular implication for regulative 
or prescriptive rules, and therefore it is a neutral strategy. 
(Al5) Delegation to deputies, senior teachers and heads of faculty: Prescriptive 
visible strategy in management 
The headteacher says that she has delegated more responsibility to two deputies, 
three senior teachers and eight heads of faculty: 
So, I, I think that possibly the change is that I have delegated, er, specific 
items to the two deputies and made them totally responsible rather than me 
to try to do it all. And, er, that has made, then given them more job 
satisfaction. And it's enabled those particular areas to have better in-depth 
management. ... And again the senior teachers' job descriptions have 
been reviewed and altered. And the heads of faculty have been given 
more responsibility. So, as I talk through, the major change is an emphasis, 
each of these management posts in quality work, er, and looking, you 
know, even more detail, you know, the whole thing's got to be about 
quality. 
The headteacher, according to herself, has chosen the centre of interactions as her 
role: 
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And my role, er, what I've chosen for my role is I very much, er, do a lot 
of the interacting, the parents, the governors, the officers, the finance, and 
the children. So I am a knocker, high-profile people person. Er, but it's so 
that every area of management is done in detail. 
The headteacher' s purpose in delegating managerial responsibility is to realise 
quality management in detail with clear accountability lines, and therefore the 
delegation should be regarded as a prescriptive visible strategy in management to 
enhance the explicitness of prescriptive rules in organisational relations. 
(A16) To try to get more public attention in the media: Neutral strategy in 
management 
The headteacher points out that the school has been trying, as a marketing 
endeavour, to get more public attention in the media for about three years: 
I would say that one endeavour has definitely been, over the last three 
years or so, to try to get more, er, public attention for the school in the 
media. So we have consciously tried to do that. We send our press 
releases, we keep in touch with the television, and we've been quite 
successful. ... So we try to be, er, involved in the initiatives and then we 
try to publish our initiatives to keep our name in the forefront. 
When they approach the media, the school tries to promote unusual things 
including Internet, arts, music and links with industry: 
So I try to promote the unusual so that the parents will see that we do 
unusual things .... So people say, "Ah, this is the forward-looking school, 
new initiatives." 
There is no indication that the marketing is focused upon either explicitness or 
implicitness of regulative and prescriptive rules. Therefore it is a neutral strategy. 
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(B) Roundham Catholic College: voluntary-aided; co-educational; 11-18 
Standard number: not much below 200 
GCSE results: just above the borough average. 
Date of interviewing the headteacher: 7 December 1994 
(B 1) Developing vocational courses: Neutral strategy in pedagogy 
The school introduced vocational courses about three years before the interview 
with the headteacher: 
... in recent years we have, er, put some emphasis on vocational education 
at fourteen to sixteen and at sixteen plus, and we're in a process of trying 
to develop new vocational courses, GNVQ courses at sixteen plus. 
The headteacher thinks the vocational courses are particularly beneficial because 
the school has a sixth form: 
... many of the other schools are doing similar things, maybe not, not 
exactly the same, and also they are limited in a sense that they, they 
obviously are restricted to eleven to sixteen .... the big thing about, I 
think, vocational courses is linking them throughout the school, er, so that 
you provide, er, a sort of two tier system to further education. That's what 
I hope is .... 
The school first introduced the vocational courses into the sixth form and then 
into fourteen to sixteen year olds. The headteacher explains that the school 
introduced the vocational courses because they wanted to stop missing the 
students who did not fit into academic courses: 
... if I start for the sixth form first, er, originally when we, when we began 
in 1988, we simply provided academic courses. And the, the problem was 
that you're asking the people to come back, er, for two years to do A levels, 
basically that was all. . .. but we felt that we were, we were missing out, 
there were a lot of our students who didn't fit into that academic, er, 
pattern. So we had to, we had to make sure that we put, er, fine courses 
that would suit them. And really that's what, what we do. And again the 
other thing is that, er, we, we also felt that it would be useful to have some 
vocational input, er, in the fourteen to sixteen age group as well. And, er, 
we set up a City and Guilds course there, er, which has been quite 
successful. 
The school introduced two GNVQ courses in the sixth form in the year of the 
interview and intended to extend GNVQs further: 
Er, we have, this year, we've started two new GNVQ courses in the sixth 
form, one in health and, er, one of business studies. And they have been 
quite successful. They look very positive. Er, we offer them at present at 
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Level2. We would eventually like to extend to Level3, and I would talk 
on that. That would, would happen in next couple of years. 
Although the headteacher feels that the vocational courses are beneficial to the 
students, he is not sure whether the courses have contributed to the school's 
popularity among parents: 
I don't know. I'm not sure about that. I don't know whether I could make 
that clear. But I think, er, I think, er, from the, the point ofview of the 
students, I feel that, er, that the introduction of vocational courses for the 
first time, we're actually looking more the individual and trying to fit the 
individual with the course that they require rather than just offering a very 
narrow, a limited, er, curriculum in a, in a sixteen to eighteen. I think it is, 
it's much more effective, and I feel that if, that if, you know, obviously if 
you're developing things, er, ifthere is clear developing taking place, I 
think, one would hope that parents and so on would, would see those 
things and, er, er, you know, and value them and, and the, er, the sort of 
public image of the school would, would be enhanced by that. 
As discussed in Chapter 7, vocational education itself is not a modality of 
pedagogy, and its implications for visible/invisible pedagogies are complex. On 
one hand, vocational education often have progressive elements, such as 
experimental and process learning, which are in favour of invisible pedagogies. 
On the other hand, the differentiation between academic and vocational courses 
implies the stratification of pupils on the basis of their performances which makes 
criteria rules more explicit. Therefore, if a strategy of vocational education has no 
apparent implication for the explicitness/implicitness of regulative and 
prescriptive rules, it should be regarded as a neutral strategy. 
There is no particular indication that the above strategy of developing 
vocational courses leans towards either more explicitness or more implicitness of 
regulative and prescriptive rules. Therefore it is a neutral strategy. 
(B2) SMILE scheme of mathematics: Regulative and prescriptive invisible 
strategy in pedagogy 
The school introduced a mathematics scheme called 'SMILE' five years before 
the interview. Under the scheme, pupils work at their own level through sheets 
and cards without textbooks, and a teacher's role is a facilitator moving around 
and encouraging pupils. The headteacher describes the scheme as very child-
centred: 
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But, er, I would say that, er, when the school was set up, er, again, it's, it's 
something that, that happened in the past, I think there was, there was a, a 
very great stress laid on a child-centred education, and on the idea of 
children taking responsibility for their own learning. And for example, 
one of the, the other things that we have done here is a mathematics 
scheme which is called 'SMILE', which is, er, a very child-based. The 
children, er, sort of, control their own sort of learning to some extent and 
they can all work at their own level. 
... the idea is that it's, er, the children work, er, they, they work to their 
own ability. And a teacher is more a person who comes around and, and 
so then encourages them and shows them, and . . . . But they take, they 
take a lot of responsibility for their own learning. The, there are no 
textbooks, the, er, the scheme is, is taught through work sheets and cards, 
and there is a, a very complex system of progression and assessment. And, 
er, actually, to be honest, the logistics of introducing the scheme is very 
difficult, you know. 
The SMILE scheme was controversial. There were quite a few parents, according 
to the headteacher, who were quite negative about the scheme at the beginning. 
He perceived that very many parents liked a very traditional approach: 
That has been very controversial. And ironically, although it was 
introduced, er, I suppose to, er, to encourage, er, parents to see a more 
positive aspect of the school and so on, er, quite a few parents, I think, 
probably at the beginning, were, were quite negative about it. 
Parents were, parents were not, not supportive of our, er, I think parents, 
parents at that time were, would have preferred a more traditional 
approach. And, er, it was, we've had a difficult, er, time introducing this, 
this new scheme, because it is very new and it is very innovative. . .. But 
I think, again, parents in Catholic schools, I have to say, and in county 
schools presumably as well, er, curriculum innovation is not always, er, 
applauded by parents. Parents, very many parents like a very traditional 
approach. In some ways, Catholic schools always had a, a reputation as 
being very traditional, and that was one of the, the, things that, er, the 
parents found attractive about them, er, especially in the areas of discipline 
and behaviour and those sorts of area. 
Some mathematics teachers also had difficulty in adopting themselves to the 
scheme, and the in-service training was provided for the transition to the scheme: 
And again we had here, er, people who were trained in a very traditional 
teaching style. So it, it took a while for them to adopt, er, to the new 
system and for it to be effective. 
But, but let me say it was very, very difficult for logistics of moving from 
traditional mathematics to a new system which involves cards and filing 
cabinets and children moving about the classroom and things like that. 
And the training and, er, in-service training for staff, that was involved. 
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The introduction of the SMILE scheme implies a strategic change from visible to 
invisible pedagogy to improve the school's performance in mathematics as 
follows. The reasons for the introduction of the SMILE scheme was that the 
senior management including the headteacher identified a clear problem in terms 
of performance in mathematics and that it was suggested that a child-centred and 
dynamic scheme might be more suitable for the pupils in the school than 
traditional types of mathematics teaching: 
Er, but the headteacher and senior management, I mean, obviously, er, 
right from the start, we were looking at performance, and we were looking 
at performance indicators. And we could recognise very early on that 
mathematics was the area which needed very significant improvement. 
Well, first of all we identified that there was clearly a problem and, er, it 
had to be resolved, something had to be done. And, er, it was suggested 
that, er, perhaps one of the reasons why children were failing was because 
that they were not suited to, er, to the traditional types of courses that had 
been taught, and that, er, mathematics as a subject within the school had 
been taught in a very, er, uninteresting, steeled, boring sort of way, and 
that perhaps, er, if we encouraged children to take some responsibility for 
their own learning and if we introduced the very dynamic new scheme, er, 
which was child-centred, that perhaps we could tum things around. And 
that has proved to some extent to have been the case. 
The senior management took the initiative in introducing the scheme, guided by 
the head of mathematics, the LEA inspector and other consultancy services: 
Well, the initiative was taken, er, taken by the senior management. ... 
And, er, we looked at a various, er, sort of ways of improving performance. 
We sought, er, advice of expertise from the local authority advisory 
service, er, from, you know, other consultancy services. And it appeared 
to us that to time after, you know, examining, the situation of SMILE 
would be, er, a good opportunity for, for us. 
Er, the London University, er, King's College, we are very closely linked 
with them, with their PGCE course. They are, because, er, the 
mathematics, er, group in, in King's, actually, er, they, they do a lot of 
SMILE work. So they have good links with our school, because we are a 
SMILE maths school. 
Well, I have to say the, the input of the scheme from the senior 
management, but it was very much guided by the head of mathematics, 
and very much guided by the, er, inspector, er, the person in charge of 
mathematics within the local, er, the London Borough of Roundham. 
The headteacher stated that parents and governors were beginning to convinced 
that the SMILE scheme was good because the GCSE results had shown a 
significant improvement: 
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And it's only this year when we can see a very significant change in our 
mathematics results and performance at the GCSE level that, I think, 
parents are, have become, er, beginning to be convinced that, er, you know, 
this, this scheme is, is a good idea and has worked. Er, for example, last 
year we had got about nineteen percent of the children who passed 
mathematics at the A to C level, and this year that one got to thirty-four 
percent. And this year was the first year who had come through the new 
SMILE system. 
But, er, I think we have managed to convince both governors and parents 
that, you know, there, there has been some progress. And certainly did the 
results themselves at performance indicators, you know, scream out that, 
you know, for the, we can, we can clearly show that, that the children 
who've come through this SMILE system have performed much better, er, 
than those who have not. 
According to the above descriprion by the headteacher, the introduction of the 
SMILE scheme loosened the mathematics teachers' directive control over the 
pupils and the prescription of what and when the pupils should learn, and 
therefore made regulative and prescriptive rules more implicit in pedagogic 
relations. It is a regulative and prescriptive invisible strategy in pedagogy. It is 
interesting to notice that a form of invisible pedagogy can be adopted to improve 
examination results despite the conception that visible pedagogy is more exam-
oriented than invisible pedagogy. 
(B3) The introduction of a fast-track group in science: Prescriptive visible strategy 
in pedagogy 
The school had had a fast-track group in science for two years by the time of the 
interview. The initiative was taken by the science department: 
Sciences recently approved to, er, to have one group which is, er, a kind of 
fast-track group, and mixed ability elsewhere. 
And that has come from the science department itself. 
And science [department] thought that, er, that in particular they would 
like to focus one group out of three, which would be, er, the more able 
students. And the other two groups would be sort of mixed. Now as I said, 
too early, er, for us to see ifthere is any significant, er, change. But, er, 
it's an area that obviously we're looking at with great interest. 
The headteacher described the school as a whole and himself as very committed to 
mixed-ability teaching. However, he stated that he was pragmatic and prepared to 
accommodate this kind of new developments by departments in certain autonomy: 
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I mean, we, we have allied most of our departments in certain autonomy, 
er, with an reason. I mean, the school itself is very much committed to 
mixed ability. But at the same time, we are happy to, er, accommodate 
opportunities for, you know, for departments to try, er, a new sort of 
developments. 
And, er, I, I have to say personally I'm very committed to mixed ability, 
and, er, I will take some convincing about, er, about introducing, er, you 
know, er, a very structured level of setting throughout the school. But at 
the same time, I haven't got a closed mind on it, and I don't think staff 
generally have. I think we're quite pragmatic and we would, er, we would 
look at things and, er, make decisions, er, based on information. 
The introduction of a fast-track group in science stratifies pupils on the basis of 
their performances, and therefore is a prescriptive visible strategy in pedagogy to 
enhance the explicitness of criteria (prescriptive) rules in pedagogic relations. 
(B4) Beginning setting in Year 8 in modern languages: Prescriptive visible 
strategy in pedagogy 
The school was beginning to have setting in Year 8 in modern languages at the 
time ofthe interview: 
... we begin to, er, to set students, er, in Year 8. If we cannot, it varies. 
Er, generally speaking, they will be mixed ability in Year 7, in the first 
year, but after that we will try and, and put them into sets. 
The headteacher' s attitude to organisation of teaching, expressed in the above 
topic about science, is evident here about languages as well: 
Whether those sets are, I mean, I don't think we're into rigid setting. I 
think they're, in languages in particular, they're quite flexible. But at the 
same time, er, they would argue that languages in particular is the subject 
area where one has to, er, has to have some sort of setting. And I can, I 
can live with that. 
Beginning setting in Year 8 in modern languages means more stratification of 
pupils on the basis of their performances, and therefore is a prescriptive visible 
strategy in pedagogy, which makes criteria (prescriptive) rules more explicit in 
pedagogic relations. 
(B5) Listing very able pupils: Prescriptive visible strategy in pedagogy 
One or two years before the interview, the school began to make a list of very able 
pupils across the curriculum who should be targeted for more demanding task. 
The heads of year took the initiative to introduce the listing: 
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Er, but what the heads of year have done over the last year or two is they 
have tried to identify, they have tried to make sure that there is a list, a 
clear list of pupils who they believe, er, you know, er, very able and, er, 
who are pupils who require high level of work and, and so on, and that 
information has been fair to departments and to subject areas. And their 
hope is that those pupils who have been identified will be targeted in, er, 
different subject areas and, er, teachers will, for example, when they're 
giving homework and so on, will, will ensure that the more able student 
has got, er, a much longer task to do than perhaps somebody who is, er, is 
a bit on the, er, on the weaker side. 
The headteacher's ambivalent feeling towards this kind of differentiation is 
evident in the following statement: 
... it's a very positive thing and I'm very pleased about it, and, er, you 
know, something that, that we need to develop in the future. I mean, I 
think the difficulty, the difficulty is, I mean, again, I think, the more able 
students are catered for in other ways. Because for example, er, we 
provide music lessons and so on for students here, and many of our, our 
able students would be the students who take up those lessons. . .. So, er, 
I think, I think that does happen but there's no specific bias apart from, er, 
trying to ensure that the people are targeted and identified. And I think 
that is certainly important. 
The strategy of listing very able pupils focuses on and encourages stratifying 
differences between pupils' performances, and therefore is a prescriptive visible 
strategy in pedagogy to make criteria (prescriptive) rules more explicit in 
pedagogic relations. 
(B6) Study clubs organised by the SEN coordinator: Prescriptive invisible strategy 
in pedagogy 
Four or five years before the interview, the special educational needs coordinator 
started organising study clubs on two evenings in every week, where pupils can 
study any subjects and staff voluntarily help them. The headteacher stated that the 
students in the clubs were very often less able: 
Er, he has organised, he has two homework clubs after school, er, for 
students. And very, very often they are, er, students who, er, who are less 
able . 
. . . Mr Smith [the pseudonym of the SEN coordinator] might say, "Oh, 
I've got, er, such and such a person who is coming to me on, er, 
Wednesday afternoons", and, you know, they're, they're working 
humanities really very far behind, and one of the humanity teachers, he 
would speak to them, and maybe they'll be coming along and give some 
extra help to, to that child. It's very informal, but I have to say it works 
very effectively, and quite well attended by various students. 
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... they're in both study clubs in the library areas and you would have 
staff working there themselves and, you know, obviously, you know, if, if 
they see children, er, who need support or help, they would come and help 
them .... it's a good, good situation, and it's very informal. 
The headteacher describes this informal scheme as a restoration of the goodwill 
which existed before the major teacher strikes in 1980's: 
The problem with, with these sort of things in British education is they, 
they happened a lot until the government actually decided to impose a 
contract on teachers. And as soon as they set any actual number of hours, 
the teachers had, we began to have great difficulty getting teachers to do 
those, you know, "My hours are such and such." You know, there was a 
tremendous amount of goodwill before. And to some extent the, the so-
called governmental reforms undermined the good practice that had taken 
place, and it's taken the school a long time to re-establish that. And I 
think, you know, that's basically what's happening here. 
This scheme is expected to provide less able pupils with remedial assistance and 
therefore decrease stratifying differences between pupils' performances. It is a 
prescriptive invisible strategy in pedagogy, which makes criteria (prescriptive) 
rules more implicit in pedagogic relations. 
(B7) Study clubs run by departments of English, mathematics, science and 
modem languages: Prescriptive invisible strategy in pedagogy 
More recently than the start of study clubs organised by the SEN coordinator, 
departments of English, mathematics, science and modem languages began to 
have their own study club after school on one evening a week: 
... very many subject areas, science, for example, rnaths, er, languages, 
have a day after school where they have a homework or study club in the 
library as well . 
. . . you know that if you go on a Thursday, there's going to be a science 
teacher there because it's the science study club. You know that if you go 
on a Tuesday, there's going to be a rnaths teacher .... 
The headteacher highly appreciates staffs commitment to the voluntary work: 
... it's very positive because, you know, er, I mean, we are always very 
pleased where we can get staff to, er, you know, to get extra to time and, 
and energy and so on on the students. 
Again the headteacher emphasises the benefit to less able pupils: 
And you've got to remember very many of our students would not 
necessarily have, er, the facilities at horne where they have quiet and peace 
and so on where they can get a bit of work done. And so it is very useful. 
I have to say that, er, the people who benefit most from this would still be 
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the less able, which are, it's not, not a bad thing but, er, I would say it is 
more geared to less able students at present than it would be to the average 
or to the, the, er, sort of, er, the top level. 
This scheme of departmental study clubs is also a prescriptive invisible strategy to 
enhance the implicitness of criteria (prescriptive) rules in pedagogic relations. 
(B8) Structuring homework with a diary, a timetable and monitoring: Prescriptive 
visible strategy in pedagogy 
The headteacher stated that the school had been structuring homework for the two 
years before the interview and that it was an on-going thing. The school has a 
homework diary and timetable, and homework is supposed to be monitored 
closely: 
We, we have clear policies on homework. We, we expect all our students 
to do homework. Er, they are supposed to have a homework diary, and 
they are supposed to, to write on what homework they have. Er, the 
homework is supposed to be followed up and monitored very closely . 
. . . I think there's always been an attempt to structure the thing. There is a 
homework timetable. And, er, there's been, I suppose, much more effort 
put into monitoring over the last two years, perhaps that wasn't in the past. 
The head teacher is conscious of the pressure from some parents who want more 
homework, and feel that more work should be done on homework: 
Er, some parents who suggest that it isn't, er, it isn't as much as, er, they 
would like. But, er, I would say we're fairly, fairly strong on homework. 
Er, there are one or two areas that we can obviously improve on, but .... 
. . . personally it's an area that I feel I would like to have more work done 
on. 
The more structured or tighter control of homework implies stronger pacing for 
pupils and teachers, and therefore is a visible strategy to enhance the explicitness 
of prescriptive rules in pedagogic relations. 
(B9) Special schemes of homework for less able pupils: prescriptive invisible 
strategy in pedagogy 
The SEN coordinator recently developed special schemes of homework for less 
able pupils: 
And he has, er, developed, er, you know, er, special schemes of work 
which parents can use with children at home for the less able. 
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The development of the schemes can be expected to provide less able pupils with 
remedial assistance and therefore decrease stratifying differences between pupils' 
performances. It is a prescriptive invisible strategy, which makes criteria 
(prescriptive) rules more implicit in pedagogic relations. 
(B10) Meeting time on Wednesday mornings: Neutral strategy in management 
Three years before the interview, the school started to have a meeting time of an 
hour and half from 8.45am to 10.15am on every Wednesday morning, decreasing 
teaching hours accordingly: 
Basically we, we work from a quarter to nine until half three but an hour 
for lunch. But on Wednesdays the children do not come into school until a 
quarter past ten. So we have a late start on Wednesday. Staff come in at a 
quarter to nine, and we have, we use that an hour and a half for staff 
meetings and for organisation and so on and so forth. . .. it suits staff very 
well. 
The headteacher mentions parents' negative attitude to this change: 
Parents were not tremendously happy about it, but again, I think they 
realise that it was innovative and slightly different. 
The head teacher justifies the meeting time, which he thinks allows his staff to feel 
fresh and be efficient in dealing with organisational businesses: 
... the headteacher of the time believe that, er, very many meetings were 
after school. And people had been working all day and when I came to 
meetings, they were tired and they weren't very effective or efficient. And 
that would be a much more interesting idea perhaps to try and toughen the 
people's energy enough when they were fresh and they were, you know, 
ready to go in the mornings. So, er, that was a good opportunity to, er, to 
set up a meeting time from a quarter to nine to a quarter past ten on a 
Wednesday morning and, you know, concentrate, er, a lot of, er, the sort of 
whole school business and departmental business and pastoral business 
into that period of time. And I have to say it has been quite effective. 
The above change is solely about time management, and does not imply particular 
effects on either regulative or prescriptive rules. Therefore it is a neutral strategy. 
(B 11) Replacing the faculty system by the department system: Neutral strategy in 
management 
At the time of the interview, the school was going to replace the faculty system by 
the department system from the next term. According to the headteacher, there 
were two reasons for the change. One reason is that the faculty system did not 
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work well because different subject teachers in a faculty do not have much to 
discuss in common. The other reason is that the department system would create 
more middle-manager posts and give staff more opportunities of promotion and 
more motivation: 
Well, the faculty idea didn't work for us. I mean, for example, the 
communications faculty that we had here prior to this change, it had 
modem languages, English, drama, physical education and, and art. They 
were all in that one group. And when they came together to meet, they 
didn't necessarily have a tremendous amount to say to each other. It was 
an unnatural, er, sort of grouping of subjects. So we felt, rather than doing 
that, we would try to have a head of department group, which represented 
all the heads of department. 
And we hope to create more posts at the bottom end to, er, retain staff and 
to promote people from within. 
There, there was very little middle management because you had five 
senior teachers who were heads of faculty controlling everything. So there 
was very little happening below that. And there was very little 
encouragement. 
There is no indication that this organisational change enhances either explicitness 
or implicitness of regulative and prescriptive rules. Therefore it is a neutral 
strategy. 
(B12) Beginning to market the school: Neutral strategy in management 
According to the headteacher, they were beginning to market the school. They 
had not publicised even important events for the school: 
... we're really only beginning, er, to market the school in any real sense. 
For example, I think, er, whereas in the past events took place and, you 
know, very often quite important events, and they wouldn't even got 
mentioned in the local press. They would barely got mentioned in the, in 
the sort of parents newsletters. Er, for example, this, we have a very good 
tradition here in drama. Er, the school play here is, is always very good, 
and twice in the last three years the school play has been, er, the students 
and staff have taken the school play to the Edinburgh Festival and 
performed it at the Edinburgh French Festival, er, in August, er, you know, 
in a, in a proper professional venue .... And, er, certainly we have not got 
publicity for those sorts of things that we really should have. 
The headteacher states that there has not been so strong competitive pressure on 
the school as a Catholic school as on county schools and that it is part of the 
reason why the school has been slow at marketing. However, the situation is 
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changing, and the senior management and the governing body are going to 
develop marketing: 
... we're not a school that, that is into, er, into publicity or into, er, sort of 
projecting as image, something that we do very badly. And I think partly 
the reason why that, er, has happened is because there hasn't been the 
extreme pressure on us as a Catholic school to compete in the way that 
there has been for other county schools. But even for us, in recent years, 
we are beginning to take it a lot more seriously. 
I think, I think we need a much, er, a much higher profile. I think we need 
to celebrate and publicise very much the good things that we do, and I 
think we, er, we need to get away from sort of complacency that there is. 
Because we are now slightly privileged position in a sense of not chasing 
people so much as some of the other schools. Er, I think we've got to, er, 
we've got to market the school in a much more professional way. And, er, 
it's an area that the senior management are taking on board. And certainly 
it's an area that the governing body want developed. 
On recent example was the bishop's visit to the school which they tried to 
publicise in a way that previously they wouldn't do: 
... for example, on Friday we had, er, the bishop, er, visited the school 
and we had quite a high profile for that and, you know, parents were told 
about that and parishes were told about that, and we hoped that the local 
press would cover it and so on and so forth. You know, er, whereas in, er, 
in the past we wouldn't need such a big deal of that. Now we will, we will 
try and look at it for, for all these works . 
. . . as I've said, we had a bishop visiting the school on, on Friday, and, er, 
it was a very high-profile thing. We had, er, we'd all our governors here, 
we'd all priests from all the local parishes. Er, we had a very large number 
of, er, people from our, from a kind of Catholic community involved. And, 
er, it will be very heavily, er, reported and very sort of significantly 
reported in the Catholic press at least and also presumably in the local 
press. 
The Catholic community is one of the focal points for the school's marketing 
endeavours: 
Our main link, one of the areas that we need to develop is a link with our 
local parishes, our local churches. And what we try to do is we try to 
prepare newsletters that go to the parish every couple of months, once a 
term, say, that tells people who are not necessarily parents of children at, 
at Catholic, at, at a Catholic school, but who may have children who could 
be going to or who may have children who did go in the past, er, that's tell 
them a little bit about the school and make the school more a focus for the 
Catholic community in the area. 
While the above statements show an orientation towards distinction within the 
Catholic community, there is no indication that the strategy of beginning 
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marketing is oriented to the enhancement of either explicitness or implicitness of 
regulative and prescriptive rules, and therefore it should be regarded as a neutral 
strategy. 
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(C) George Square School: county; co-educational; 11-16 
Standard number: not much above 100 
GCSE results: below the borough average. 
Date of interviewing the headteacher: 7 December 1994 
(Cl) From integrated humanity to separate history, geography and religious 
education: Prescriptive visible strategy in pedagogy 
At the time of interview, the school was moving from the integrated humanity to 
separate history, geography and religious education: 
... in the humanities area, because now again we, having moved to 
integrate the humanity situation, we are now actually sorting out the other 
way again now and moving into, to gain separate history, geography and 
RE. 
Asked what was the purpose of that change, the headteacher answered as follows: 
One is the response to what we are required to do. And two is also 
obviously the point we are trying to get the, what can I say, the best 
system that, you know, that we can actually envisage, you know, we can 
actually develop. 
Obviously, as implied by the headteacher, the change is the school's response to 
the national curriculum and the RE syllabus, but legally the school is still able to 
teach history, geography andRE in the integrated humanity subject if they wish to 
do so. Therefore, as pointed out by the headteacher, the change is a strategic one 
to develop the best way to teach the humanities. The separation should be 
regarded as a prescriptive visible strategy in pedagogy because it enhances the 
explicitness of selection and sequencing (prescriptive) rules in pedagogic relations. 
(C2) Introducing setting in science: Prescriptive visible strategy in pedagogy 
At the time of the interview, the school was introducing setting in science for the 
first time. In that academic year, Year 10 pupils were grouped into sets including 
top sets, and Year 11 above were still in mixed-ability groups: 
Er, maths still sets, French sets, science is now setting for the first time in 
Year 10 . 
. . . we are implementing at the moment. So Year 10 has got accelerated, 
got top sets. They are setted [sic] to, you know, we are looking in fact to 
see, you know, how that actually works. Year 11 above are still in mixed-
ability groups. And so, yeah, we are actually changing from that sort of 
point of view, I suppose really. 
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Asked for the reason for the change, the headteacher described it as an innovative 
trial to improve science teaching and mentioned the competitive pressure from 
league tables: 
One, that was trials as the innovation to seek for the improvement and 
what we are actually offering. And it becomes the reason really. And the 
science [department] had been talking about it sometime, "Should they 
keep mixed-ability groups through the five years?" And this was the 
school decision that for this year we in Year 10 start the two-year course 
that we will actually try a setting and to see what effects it'll have 
really .... Is that a response to league tables? Possibly so. Possibly so 
actually. 
The headteacher expected that top sets would stretch more able pupils: 
... through creating a sort of top sets, I mean, therefore, the more able 
children can work at a, hopefully, at a faster pace. 
The introduction of setting means stratifying pupils on the basis of their 
performances, and therefore is a prescriptive visible strategy in pedagogy, which 
enhances the explicitness of criteria (prescriptive) rules in pedagogic relations. 
(C3) Monitoring each pupil's performance: Prescriptive visible strategy in 
pedagogy 
Asked what strategies the school had in order to improve the examination results, 
the headteacher mentioned that the school had recently started the close 
monitoring of each pupil's performance in terms of examinations: 
Er, hard work really. Er, hard work identifying those areas that need 
improvement, and monitoring those subject areas to during their final year, 
11, that's the final year, to actually see really how the children are actually 
performing. I mean, you know, we've done something on that recently. 
Because tomorrow on a study leave, there are mock GCSE, just before the 
holidays. So we'lllook at the mock GCSE results obviously after the. 
holidays, in January, follow that the parents evening, and so on, you know, 
then we have a, hopefully we have a very clear picture of level of 
performance, you know. 
The above monitoring of examination performances, enabling the comparison 
between pupils and between subjects, enhances the explicitness of criteria 
(prescriptive) rules in pedagogic relations. Therefore it is a prescriptive visible 
strategy in pedagogy. 
(C4) The profile of a pupil to the parents: Prescriptive invisible strategy in 
pedagogy 
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According to the headteacher, the school's reporting to parents had been changed 
from simple reports to detailed profiles: 
Well, I think we've actually developed actual profiling side. I mean, 
we've worked on that side quite a bit. 
I mean, the old reports were basically put down 50% and then the teachers 
wrote a comment, which basically is the same format, but now there is 
much more structure, I think, in what is actually put in. 
Asked how structured it was, the headteacher answered as follows: 
Well, I mean, it depends how the department has actually the details the 
department put in there. And the science [department] may put in, for 
instance, percentages of different sorts of units, units they've actually 
tested, and they need to take an average from that, you know, they've 
come from the final result, something like that. ... But obviously the 
parents who used to more traditional, er, '50 over 100', 'satisfactory 
effort', I mean, that's quite different, because obviously for many years 
that's basically what it was. We've come a long way from that. 
It seemed that the assessment group took the initiative in developing the profiling, 
and that the headteacher a little distanced himself from the profiling when he 
pointed out the difficulty parents had in understanding their child's profile: 
And the assessment group within the staff, you know, have been 
responsible really for amendments and installations to that. Hopefully we 
are more efficient, you know, etcetera, etcetera. Whether the parents 
actually understand them as well is another matter. 
So I mean that parents basically do get much more information about each 
subject area, much more information. If they're wanting it or not, it 
doesn't matter. 
Although the new profiling scheme seems to have certain criteria, because of the 
technical complexity of the structure, it should be regarded as having less 
explicitness of criteria (prescriptive) rules in pedagogic relations than the previous 
reporting with simpler and more clear-cut information. Therefore the change 
should be identified as a prescriptive invisible strategy in pedagogy. 
(C5) Hierarchical merit system of awarding gold, silver and bronze certificates: 
Prescriptive visible strategy in pedagogy 
Two years before the interview, the school introduced a merit system to award 
gold, silver and bronze certificates for achievements in all aspects of the school 
life: 
And so we have a merit system. Gold, gold certificates, er, silver and 
bronze. So they get so many commendations in a journal, it goes the head 
249 
of year, the head of year presents the, no, the form tutor presents the 
bronze, the head of year sends or presents the silver and, lucky enough to 
get gold, the headteacher will present the gold. 
Asked what kind of activities are rewarded, the headteacher answered as follows: 
That is down, that is down to the individual teachers' judgement. So if a 
child brings in what they've considered a very good piece of work, they 
may well get a merit for that and that will be recorded as such. If a child 
suddenly, say, their behaviour hasn't been too good, their behaviour in fact 
suddenly gets a lot better, that is then recorded, you know, the child gets a 
sort of, you know, benefit right as well. It seems to work with children. 
The above hierarchical merit system highlights stratifying differences between 
pupils with gold, silver and bronze certificates, and nothing, and therefore is a 
prescriptive visible strategy in pedagogy, which enhances the explicitness of 
criteria (prescriptive) rules in pedagogic relations. 
(C6) Awards evening: Prescriptive visible strategy in pedagogy 
In the year of the interview, for the first time, the school gave the certificates to 
the pupils in the awards evening. Previously the evening had been the ceremony 
where the ex-pupils got the GCSE certificates: 
It's a very nice evening, so very pleasant. ... Basically what is the awards 
evening? It's the celebration of achievement. 
This celebration of achievement also should be regarded as a prescriptive visible 
strategy in pedagogy for the same reason as the above merit system. 
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(D) Fertile Land School: county; co-educational; 11-16 
Standard number: not much above 100 
GCSE results: below the borough average. 
Date of interviewing the headteacher: 22 November 1994 
(D 1) Open and honest sex education programme: Regulative invisible strategy in 
pedagogy 
The headteacher mentioned an open and honest sex education programme as a 
part of the school's personal and social education programme, which had been 
developed two years before the interview and then implemented, as a strategy in 
curriculum: 
Well, we've done, we won an award this week, we went to collect last 
Saturday for our sex education programme, and that was regarded as 
something that was quite courageous because there is, there is a difficult 
climate nationally at the moment for open and honest sex education 
programmes to take place .... Er, we were on a TV last week .... 
Well, we spent all oflast year developing the sex education programme, er, 
within a broader personal and social education programme. So we did 
quite a lot of training slots throughout the whole year, er, and that was two 
years ago, and the actual programme has been running for a year now, we 
are on second year of it now. 
The sex education programme has adopted discussion and open-ended questioning 
techniques as its major methods: 
So the whole thing about, you know, questioning techniques and open-
ended tasks and that sort of things has had a lot of promotion in the last 
couple of years. Er, and also that goes hand in hand with our sex 
education programme, because a lot of that is discussion-based. 
A positive initiative on sex education, generally regarded as progressive, implies 
respecting and encouraging independent thinking and behaviour by pupils, and 
this programme of sex education is particularly so with its emphasise on 
discussion and open-ended questioning techniques. Therefore it is a regulative 
invisible strategy in pedagogy, which enhances the implicitness of hierarchical 
(regulative) rules in pedagogic relations. 
The techniques will be explained in the following paragraphs. 
(D2) Discussion and open-ended questioning techniques: Regulative invisible 
strategy in pedagogy 
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According to the headteacher, two years before the interview, the techniques of 
discussion and open-ended questioning had been developed in the personal and 
social education (PSE) programme including the sex education programme: 
Well, the whole PSE programme, the personal and social education 
programme. And that's where we put a lot of emphasis two years ago in 
our planning, preparation and training. So it's, you know, it's actually 
been functioning properly for a year and a term. But we did a year's 
planning. 
The headteacher argues that the use of the techniques is not limited within the 
PSE programme but is spread over other curriculum areas: 
No. it isn't only that, but that's where we focused at that time, because this 
was, the PSE programme was a new development for the school. ... So it 
was focused particularly on the PSE programme, but it has knock-on 
effects on the rest of the curriculum, too. 
The techniques are targeted on more able pupils: 
We've done a fair bit of work on teaching and learning styles and 
techniques and methodologies, er, because we want to make sure that 
we're pitching our material at a range of levels because we've got a lot of 
different ability levels here. So stretching the more able is very important. 
So the whole thing about, you know, questioning techniques and open-
ended tasks and that sort of things has had a lot of promotion in the last 
couple ofyears. 
Well, it's to do with this business about differentiation and having 
appropriate materials, appropriate delivery, and that's where the open-
ended questioning and the open-ended tasks are so important. Er, so, 
that's been developed for everybody, but particularly targeted on the more 
able. 
Some teachers especially in heavily content-led subjects were not very 
comfortable with the techniques when they were introduced: 
And a lot of them, no, not a lot, some teachers weren't feeling very 
comfortable with that. So we did some training associated with that as 
well. 
That is, basically it's discussion. And if you are a teacher of a heavily 
content-led subject like science or history or something, then you may not 
be so accustomed to teaching in a discussion or sort of way like that. 
The promotion of the techniques seems to have a complex effect on prescriptive 
rules in pedagogic relations. It may enhance the explicitness of criteria rules by 
focusing on stratifying differences between pupils' performances on one hand, but 
may make selection and sequencing rules more implicit on the other hand. It 
enhances the implicitness of regulative (hierarchical) rules because it respects and 
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encourages independent thinking and behaviour by pupils. Therefore it is a 
regulative invisible strategy in pedagogy, which makes regulative rules more 
implicit in pedagogic relations. 
The headteacher regards it as a new teaching method added to existent methods 
including teacher-led and child-centred ones rather than an antithesis to teacher-
led methods: 
They would be more, more accustomed to group work and pair work 
combined with teacher-led activities, er, which is quite different from 
being able to chair a discussion with a group of students. So, and this 
whole thing about questioning styles and providing, you know, making 
sure you've got open-ended questioning techniques, that kind of things, 
are very important. 
The headteacher states that the school has had a mixture of various teaching 
methods including individual, group and didactic work and that the new method 
of questioning and discussion will not undermine other methods but enrich the 
mixture: 
Well, it's all of these things have to be part of a package. Er, there isn't 
one teaching style that happens in Fertile Land School. There's a whole 
range of ones. But we identify that the whole area of questioning and 
answering was the one that needed more development in Fertile Land 
School. So that's why we concentrated on that. But it's not at the expense 
of the others. There are still a lot of group work , a lot of pair work, a lot 
of individual work, and there're still a lot of didactic work as well. So it's 
just a part of bigger .... 
(D3) Maths master classes on Saturdays: Prescriptive visible strategy in pedagogy 
About two years before the interview, the school started the maths master classes 
on Saturdays, which were targeted on more able pupils: 
And we've also got some, you know, we started the chess club targeted the 
more able, and the maths master classes on Saturdays that was targeted the 
more able .... 
This strategy focuses on and encourages stratifying differences between pupils' 
performances, and therefore is a prescriptive visible strategy in pedagogy to make 
criteria (prescriptive) rules more explicit in pedagogic relations. 
(D4) Assessment and reporting towards clearer description of achievements: 
Prescriptive visible strategy in pedagogy 
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According to the headteacher, at the time of the interview, the school was 
developing a hard-edged way of assessment and reporting with clearer 
descriptions of achievements. The existent way of assessment and reporting was 
encouraging one with many identifications of efforts and less clear descriptions of 
achievements: 
Assessment is one of our key points of focus this year. And what we are 
doing is changing our reports to parents so that we are reporting 
achievements in a much more hard-edged way than we have done before. 
In the past, we've, we've done a lot of, er, we've, we've had very 
encouraging reports, and we've identified all the efforts that they put in, 
but the achievement hasn't been there so clearly. So this year we've 
started doing that, putting in the achievement, estimated grades and so on. 
Well, the staff at the moment are developing, er, a grading system that we 
can use both in our marking and for reporting to parents. And at the 
moment we are just, er, trying to work out how, exactly how it will, er, 
link with the national curriculum levels. 
The headteacher pointed out three reasons why the school started changing the 
assessment and reporting. They are the necessity for the staff to know pupils' 
achievements, some parents' concern, and the inspectors' comment in the Ofsted 
inspection of the school: 
Well, because, er, for a number of different reasons. We often felt that we 
didn't know what the child is achieving. Because, unless we taught them 
ourselves, reading the reports, we couldn't determine what they'd actually 
achieved. And then some parents were concerned that they didn't know 
what their child achieved as well. Er, and the combination of those two 
made us realise that, you know, that we'd got to focus on it. We had the 
inspection in September, and the inspectors said the same sort of thing. 
We just hadn't been clear enough about the attainment part of it. 
The change is based on the view that assessment and reporting should provide 
clearer information on comparative performances, and therefore is a prescriptive 
visible strategy in pedagogy to make criteria (prescriptive) rules more explicit in 
pedagogic relations. 
(D5) Prize-giving for high achievers only: Prescriptive visible strategy in 
pedagogy 
At the time of the interview, the school was changing their award system from the 
celebration of the achievement of everybody to the prize-giving just for high 
achievers in subjects: 
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... this term, we have a prize-giving for the first time which is targeted 
just to the high achievers, nothing else. In the past we celebrated the 
achievement of everybody regarding, you know, for their effort, 
attendance, something else. This year we don't .... 
The headteacher regards the change as one of those strategies which are targeted 
on more able children: 
... it's just part of our wider focus at the moment which is on promoting 
the more able and promoting the school as the place where high-ability 
children are going to be taught well. That's a current sort of strategy. 
The award system highlights stratifying differences between pupils, and therefore 
is a prescriptive visible strategy in pedagogy, which enhances the explicitness of 
criteria (prescriptive) rules in pedagogic relations. 
(D6) Chess club: Neutral strategy in pedagogy 
About two years before the interview, the school started the chess club, which 
were targeted on more able pupils: 
And we've also got some, you know, we started the chess club targeted the 
more able .... 
Although a strategy targeted on more able pupils may seem to focus on stratifying 
differences in performances, the chess club for amusement should not be regarded 
as a strategy to enhance the explicitness of criteria (prescriptive) rules on what 
learning should be assessed against. Therefore it is a neutral strategy. 
(D7) Bullying policy of forefront: Neutral strategy in pedagogy 
The bullying policy of the school has been, according to the headteacher, of 
forefront of national thinking: 
Our bullying policies have been very much of forefront of national 
thinking, and we were on a TV for that as well a few weeks ago. 
The headteacher points out some characteristics of the policy including creating 
the climate where the pupils feel comfortable about telling the staff of bullying, 
responding very quickly, counselling as well as punishing the bully, excluding the 
bullies in serious cases: 
When we have, last week, we had the promotion evening when we recruit 
for next year, have five hundred people here, and in my speech, I 
specifically said that we have bullying like every other school in the 
country because it happens everywhere. So I think the first thing is to be 
open and honest about it. And then, er, then it's to do with creating the 
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right kind of climate in the school so that disclosure by children is 
accepted, they feel comfortable about telling. . .. And then responding 
very quickly when it is reported. Er, er, what we do is we do take a 
punitive action against the bully if that's appropriate, but we also counsel 
because we believe that the bully has got something going wrong in their 
life as well and they need support and counselling to get through it. ... So 
we try and support them as well. But if none of that works, then I will 
exclude them from the school. Er, especially if it involves physical 
violence or racial or sexual harassment of any sort, if those are the things, 
we think really serious. 
The policy seems to be balanced in terms of hierarchical rules and not to lean 
towards either the visible or invisible end. Therefore it is a neutral strategy. 
(D8) Uniform developed: Regulative visible strategy in pedagogy 
The headteacher, who arrived in this school four years before the interview, 
changed the school uniform. The former uniform was a navy-blue V -neck jumper 
with a very light blue name of the school. The present one is a navy-blue sweat 
shirt with a round neck and the school logo in green, a bright green polo shirt 
underneath with the navy-blue school logo, navy-blue trousers or skirt, and black 
shoes. The headteacher explains the reason for the change as follows: 
It, it just looked old-fashioned and sloppy. It didn't look up-to-date and 
crispy and modem. So it's got, I mean, it's got to look businesslike, it's 
got to look as if something, you know, they are associated with the school. 
She emphasises the significance of the present school uniform as a visible symbol 
ofthe school identity: 
... when they are all in the assembly and they are all in the uniform, it 
looks very smart, and you can see that it's, they are associated with Fertile 
Land School straightaway. So that's important, we think, because they, 
we stress they are ambassadors for Fertile Land School, you know, they 
are representing us when they go outside. 
This strategy of uniform seems to be a visible one because it explicitly symbolises 
the school's control over pupils and enhances the explicitness of hierarchical 
(regulative) rules in pedagogic relations. Therefore it is a regulative visible 
strategy in pedagogy. 
(D9) Monitoring ofthe curriculum and the staff performance through written 
reports from curriculum areas: Prescriptive visible strategy in management 
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At the time of the interview, the school's management had just completed the 
planning of a new monitoring scheme which was to start to be implemented from 
the following year. Under the new scheme, all curriculum areas are required to 
submit a written annual report with certain evidence to the headteacher, and the 
school management monitors the curriculum and the staff performance. The 
headteacher emphasises the importance of the monitoring scheme in terms of clear 
accountability: 
Er, in terms of accountability, we've set up very clear lines now, with a bit 
confusion for a while, but we've got very clear lines of accountability now. 
And all curriculum areas have to, starting for next year, we've just done all 
the draft work for it, starting from next year, they will have to report to me 
in a written form on annual basis, er, and it will, the report has to cover 
certain evidence. So the evidence will be collected from now. That's, 
that's where we've developed it now. So the evidence collection will be 
very much to do with monitoring the curriculum and the staff performance. 
The headteacher declares her style of monitoring and management to be formal 
and open. Asked if the monitoring is becoming more formal, she answered as 
follows: 
Yes, very, yes, very much more formal. At the same time, my personal 
style is to be as open as possible. I've, I'm very, er, conscientious about 
providing as much information as possible to everybody. Er, and they can 
determine how much they need to use. But I think it's important to be 
open and honest to people. And I consult as widely as possible, but I also 
make it clear that I'm the one that takes the final decision wherever it's 
necessary. 
The monitoring is intended to formalise the assessment of staff performance, and 
therefore enhance the explicitness of criteria (prescriptive) rules in organisational 
relations. It is a prescriptive visible strategy in management. 
(DIO) Structuring the management with development teams: Prescriptive visible 
strategy in management 
The first thing that the headteacher did after her arrival in the school was to 
develop a structure of the school management with development teams 
responsible for particular issues: 
Er, when I first came here four years ago, the first thing I did was 
developing the new staffing structure. Er, and that has in it, er, 
management levels for the curriculum, management for the pastoral side of 
the school, and also, er, development teams which are responsible for 
developing key issues within the school on annual basis. Er, and the 
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development team leaders form the senior management team with myself 
and my deputy. So that was a very important development, because that's 
what facilitated everything else in the school. 
The headteacher's purpose in developing the management structure with 
development teams was to make accountability lines clearer, and therefore it 
should be regarded as a prescriptive visible strategy in management to enhance 
the explicitness of prescriptive rules in organisational relations. 
(D 11) More aggressive PR: Neutral strategy in management 
The headteacher describes her school as having become more aggressive in terms 
of the public image: 
Er, in terms of, er, being much more aware of our image, since I've been 
here four years, in that time, we've concentrated a lot on things like 
uniform and behaviour outside the school gates, and, er, promoting 
ourselves through the local press wherever possible, that sort of things. 
So we've been more, much more aggressive in terms of the public image 
that we represent. 
Uniform and behaviour should be dealt with in pastoral care rather than in 
marketing. The more aggressive PR through the local media, etc. should be 
regarded as a strategy neutral in terms of visibility. 
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(E) Seymour Field School: grant-maintained; co-educational; 11-18 
Standard number: not much above 200 
GCSE results: more than 10% higher than the England average. 
Date of interviewing the acting headteacher: 28 April 1995 
(El) From a teacher-led style to a variety ofteaching styles with the emphasis on 
independent learning: Regulative invisible strategy in pedagogy 
The acting headteacher states that the school has done a lot of analysis work on 
teaching styles which has been helped by the Technical Vocational Education 
Initiative (TVEI) and that, as a result, the school now has more variety of teaching 
styles with the emphasis on independent learning than previously when there used 
to be one teaching style of chalk and talk: 
Er, I, I would put that down to, er, the staff really, and the way that they've 
been prepared to take on continuity, er, the way they've prepared to, to 
take on, er, issues of learning styles and motivation of children, er, 
carefully analysing how children learn in relation to how they teach. And 
we've done quite a lot of work on, on that side. We've had a TVEI 
programme when, er, .... 
So you had this, er, about 360,000 over five years. That's enabled us to 
put money into, er, you know, the vocational side of education and also to 
look at, er, helping staff develop more flexible teaching styles and more 
variety of teaching styles. And so I think that there has been a lot of 
adaptation in terms of the way the classrooms are managed .... 
Well, there used to be one teaching style, he stands in front of the 
classroom with a piece of chalk, and you tell the children to do this. And 
now that's just one, one of many styles that you '11 see enacted. Children 
take a far more active role in what they are doing. In most areas of the 
school, er, they take much more responsibility. Er, this kind of 
independence is something that TVEI, I think, has featured and promoted. 
He also thinks that the national curriculum has been encouraging pupils to be 
responsible for their own learning: 
But also I think the, the style, in order to cope with the national curriculum, 
children had to become, say, more aware of self-assessment. And if 
they're doing self-assessment, they are automatically taking more 
responsibility for their, er, their own learning and have been encouraged to 
do so. 
According to the acting headteacher, the teachers are encouraged to make their 
classrooms interesting in order to keep the pupils' motivation high and encourage 
them to become independent learners. The change has been gradual, however, 
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because the staff includes a high proportion of experienced teachers who are 
accustomed to traditional styles with strict discipline and have difficulty in 
adapting themselves to more open and maybe more noisy classroom environment: 
... the teachers are encouraged to vary things, make things as interesting 
as possible for the children to keep their motivation high, encouraging 
them to become independent learners. Er, but it's been hard going, 
because, er, our staff profile indicates quite a high proportion of people in 
their 40s. The staff have been here some time. And, er, moving people 
who are very experienced and very good at, say, disciplining children, er, 
moving attitudes toward more open, maybe more noisy kind of classroom 
environment, because it's better for their learning activities, er, is qu-, has 
been quite difficult one to confront. Er, but, you know, over a period of 
years, er, those things are, er, I think the way to move things in schools 
slowly, inchmeal, then things do gather pace, you know. 
The above description of the change implies that the change is a regulative 
invisible strategy in pedagogy, which reduces the explicitness of hierarchical 
(regulative) rules in pedagogic relations. 
(E2) From banding to setting: Prescriptive invisible strategy in pedagogy 
The acting headteacher has changed the organisation of teaching in the school. 
Under his predecessor, the lower years (Years 7, 8 and 9) of the school had a 
banding system where some subjects were taught in ten banded groups, two tops, 
six middles and two bottoms, which were based on the general ability, whereas 
other subjects were taught in eight mixed-ability tutor groups. The acting 
headteacher has changed the system for Years 8 and 9 to a setting system where 
each of mathematics, science, humanities and French has its own grouping of ten 
sets, two tops, six middles and two bottoms, based on the ability in each subject. 
The new system started in the academic year when the acting headteacher was 
interviewed. The reason for the change was that the old system did not benefit 
pupils good at a particular subject but not good at other subjects: 
... that has occasionally caused problems, because a child might be good 
at maths but not good at science or humanities or French but they couldn't 
be moved. 
Well, we free that up now .... 
The Year 7 still has the banding system because there is not enough information 
on their academic ability to introduce setting: 
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So, we keep the banding system for Year 7, er, unless there is a particular 
case, special case they're moving for a subject, but for Years 8 and 9 each 
subject then will create its own grouping. 
A problem, a problem with Year 7 is getting high quality assessment 
information on their academic ability. 
The change from the banding system to the setting system makes the stratification 
of pupils on the basis of their performances more complicated and ambiguous. 
Therefore, it should be regarded as a prescriptive invisible strategy in pedagogy, 
which makes criteria (prescriptive) rules more implicit in pedagogic relations. 
(E3) Teaching hours increased from 23 to 25: Neutral strategy in pedagogy 
One year before the interview, the predecessor of the acting headteacher increased 
the number of teaching hours from 23 to 25. This strategy only refers to amount 
of time for teaching, and does not imply particular effects on either regulative or 
prescriptive rules. Therefore it is regarded as a neutral strategy. 
(E4) Homework increased and tightened up: Prescriptive visible strategy in 
pedagogy 
The headteacher said that the school had increased homework and tightened up 
the homework policy: 
Once or twice, we, we actually pushed it up to twice a week, yes. There, 
there has actually been, er, we review the policy and tighten it up and, er, 
yeah, trying to maintain and monitor homework policy. 
The increase in and tighter control of homework implies stronger pacing for 
pupils and teachers, and therefore a prescriptive visible strategy in pedagogy, 
which enhances the explicitness of prescriptive rules in pedagogic relations. 
(E5) Using external services to analyse examinations: Prescriptive visible 
strategy in pedagogy and management 
The school is using more and more external services to do detailed analyses of 
examination results and value-added measuring: 
... we, er, monitor the GCSE results by, er, we, we usually do graphs 
subject by subject. Er, in such a way, if you average the child's GCSE 
results, then, er, then compare that individually. If you do that subject by 
subject, then you can see, er, you know, if they're underneath the line for 
themselves there, then they're underperforming in that subject or doing 
better in that subject. That gives quite good information, and you can do 
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gender breakdown as well. Because quite good information for 
departments, you know, break that down teacher by teacher. 
We've got an exam officer and, er, she usually does the, the main exams. 
But we also use the service which has a computer system which produces 
these graphs, which we find very helpful. ... When we get them in Year 7, 
we're going to give them NFER non-verbal reasoning tests, so that we can 
do value-added measuring in time. 
Other local authorities, er, do administer those tests .... the neighbouring 
borough, that we've got good relations with, we've got good relations with 
every local authority except Roundham, er, has, has a year-on-year value-
added data. So we could actually tap into that to, to give some kind of, er, 
information in that aspect. We also subscribe to 'ALICE', the A level 
information system, which, which matches correlation, GCSE results to A 
level results. 
The above detailed analyses assisted by the external services enhance the relative 
evaluation of pupils' and teachers' performances, and therefore should be 
regarded as a prescriptive visible strategy in both pedagogy and management, 
which makes criteria (prescriptive) rules more explicit in both pedagogic and 
organisational relations. 
(E6) Quality assurance initiative to monitor teaching in classroom: Prescriptive 
visible strategy in management 
According to the headteacher, at the time of the interview, the school was in a 
process of developing a quality assurance initiative to monitor effectiveness of the 
curriculum and quality oflearning in classroom: 
Well, that [monitoring] , that wasn't happening, but it is happening more. 
Er, we've got a quality assurance initiative going, er, to set up systems of 
monitoring the curriculum. It's always basically what you're doing. It's 
monitoring effectiveness of the curriculum and quality of learning in a 
classroom. 
We've got a, we've got an evaluation phase coming up at the end of the 
summer term and out of that will come, you know, the next developments 
towards it. 
An informal collegial approach to monitoring did not work very well, and then a 
relatively formal approach has been tried: 
So, you've got an initiative which would again, we try and start off in a, in 
a non-threatening friendly way. Teachers find it very threatening to have 
something walking into their classroom. That doesn't always happen 
here. . .. So by building it up, er, in such a way that, er, it becomes a 
common place for staff to walk in and out of other people's classrooms 
and to have common feedback. I think that was a good idea that though 
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didn't work very well. What about trying this kind of idea, er, but also 
putting it on a, a, a relatively formal basis? Then, er, that's one way. We 
are trying to prove, er, the quality of what goes on and the monitoring of 
what goes on. 
The approach needs certain criteria but the criteria will be qualitative rather than 
quantitative: 
A problem with monitoring, anything, I think, is that you've got to have 
yardsticks to monitoring. You see, you know, you can walk into anywhere 
and you get perceptions of what places, what's going on, er, but how you 
can make any other judgement on a purely subjective, like-or-dislike 
judgement, without having clear understanding of what criteria are 
important for what level is, er, I don't know. So, so, it's setting up, er, 
really, er, quality characteristics and monitoring. The main thing we 
sought was to think about what quality characteristics and some measures 
we could be working towards. By building the means to a planning of 
activities in the classrooms and, you know, sharing what these things are, 
that we are trying to achieve this today or that today, then, er, we feel that 
is a more effective way of monitoring than sending somebody in with a 
tick sheet and keep a check on how many children are paying attention or 
how many good at their sheet. 
The above initiative of quality assurance or monitoring is intended to assess 
teaching in classroom with more explicit criteria, and therefore enhance the 
explicitness of criteria (prescriptive) rules in organisational relations. It is a 
prescriptive visible strategy in management. 
(E7) Devolution of decision-making to pastoral managers: Regulative visible 
strategy in management 
The acting headteacher, who subsequently became headteacher, expressed his 
plan of devolving decision-making and responsibility especially to pastoral 
managers. He believes that decision-making closer to classrooms is better and 
that there are many horizontal working groups on various issues but there is not 
enough vertical organisation for pastoral staff: 
... I would make the pastoral staff, head of lower, head of middle, head of 
sixth form, more responsible for curriculum areas so that the monitoring of 
curriculum can be more systematic and more effective and that the 
communication of problems or issues can be dealt with. I take the view 
that, er, you have to make decisions based upon the needs in the classroom. 
And more levels of management you've got back to where the decisions 
are made, the more difficult it is to respond to the decisions because things 
dilute when they get through there. So I think we need closer, er, links to 
the classroom level so that you can understand their response, problems, 
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clear overview. That's what I'll be saying in my interview [for the 
headship] . 
. . . there have been some moves to devolving, er, say, budget, increasingly 
giving people budget to manage. Er, er, er, therefore giving people more 
empowered decision-making facilities, then responsibilities. . .. there are 
different levels of these decisions. So we've got some, er, cross-
fertilisation groups like, er, the staff development group committee or the 
learning resources committee, er, there is the quality assurance group, you 
know, groups linking everything really, and too many groups. Er, but 
what I think we are lacking is, er, we, we've got a very horizontal system, 
we, more vertical, we need the two really to get, to get them, er, everybody 
properly consulted, fully aware of what's going on. 
His plan seems to be intended to enhance the explicitness of vertical lines of 
accountability through pastoral managers including heads oflower, middle and 
sixth form. Therefore his plan of devolution should be regarded as a regulative 
visible strategy in management, which enhances the explicitness of regulative or 
hierarchical rules in organisational relations. 
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(F) Riverside Street School: grant-maintained; co-educational; 11-16 
Standard number: not much below 200 
GCSE results: higher than the borough average but lower than the England 
average. 
Date of interviewing the headteacher: 13 March 1995 
(Fl) Student planner to organise learning: Prescriptive visible strategy in 
pedagogy 
In 1994, the headteacher introduced the 'student planner', a booklet for each 
student in which school rules are written and the student can fill their own 
attendance record, calendar, homework record and comments, and so on. His 
intention was to give teaching and learning a higher status and make them more 
organised: 
... what I've done is to shift the focus of attention to the quality of the 
teaching in the classroom. It's important that the teacher prepares their 
lessons, marks the work, returns it quickly and insists on high standards 
from the children. You might say, "Sure, all schools must do that." This 
school wasn't doing it. Let me show you something. . .. I felt, er, that, er, 
the children needed to realise, we needed to give some status to the 
learning in the school. So, er, I've invested money in these for the 
children. All the children get a Riverside Street School Planner, student 
planner. ... This gives learning a higher status. . .. this is for the children, 
say, "Look. Learning is important. This organises your day. Take that." 
The introduction of the student planner is expected to make pupils more aware of 
the organisation of their learning, and therefore is a prescriptive visible strategy in 
pedagogy, which enhances the explicitness of prescriptive rules in pedagogic 
relations. 
(F2) Providing parents with more information on the curriculum: Prescriptive 
visible strategy in pedagogy 
The headteacher, who was appointed in 1993 when the school became grant-
maintained, has started to give more information on the curriculum to parents. 
This strategy also is aimed at raising the status of teaching and learning: 
I wanted to give much more information about what their children are 
learning. So, this is the parents information booklet, the Key Stage 3, Year 
7 to 9, and these details, each subject, who the teachers are, what they are 
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going to be learning. So, in that your question again, another strategy for 
me was to raise the status of teaching. 
The strategy seems to enhance the explicitness of prescriptive rules in pedagogic 
relations, and therefore is a prescriptive visible strategy in pedagogy. 
(F3) To employ staffwith the teacher-led teaching style: Regulative and 
prescriptive visible strategy in pedagogy 
The headteacher makes it clear that he has a policy to employ staff with the 
traditional teacher-led teaching style which he believes to be the best: 
I like to employ teachers who have a more traditional approach to work. I 
want to see all the children in rows facing the teacher with the blackboard 
behind them. I want to see teachers directing the learning. I don't have 
much faith in people who say to me children learn from each other. Yes, 
children learn bad things from each other as well. Children should be 
learning most of what they learn from teachers who are skilled at what 
they are doing, who know and understand their subject. 
If, if teachers come into my school for interview and they don't agree with 
this, there is no point in appointing, I won't appoint them. So, I explain all 
this that goes out in information. 
What I insist on is I ask, I ask in all interviews, "What is your classroom 
management style like? What, what is it that you want to teach and pass 
on to children, and how do you do it?" And teachers tum round to me and 
say, "Well, we, we get together in groups and give them a theme and they, 
they .... " I'm not interested. 
A good example is the appointment of the head of English whose approach is very 
much in tune with the headteacher's belief: 
I have employed an En-, a head of English who is far more in tune with 
what I believe in which teaching should be. I don't want children in 
English forever writing poetry. Yes, that's important, creative work is 
important. I want children using proper English grammar, full stops, 
capital letter sentences, and I want children reading a lot of English 
literature. Er, and, so, when I employed my new head of English, I was 
very keen to employ somebody who agreed with this. 
Although he admits that there are people who do not agree with his belief, he 
argues that he as the headteacher of the school can make decision based on his 
belief: 
I think teachers direct, the best, the most effective way is for teachers to 
direct learning. I think a lot of time can be wasted otherwise. Not 
everybody agrees with me. I, I perfectly accept that. But then again, 
everybody's head of this school, therefore its' up to me to, to determine 
what I want. 
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He acknowledges that the teaching methods in the school did not radically change 
since he became headteacher or the school became grant-maintained. What they 
do for existing teachers is to focus their attention on the quality of pupils' work. 
I, er, it will be wrong for me to suggest that since I became head or, or 
we've got a new senior management team or since we became grant-
maintained, then we radically altered the methods of teaching. I think 
what we've done is to focus attention on the quality of the children's work. 
I don't want teachers accepting poor quality work from the children. 
The headteacher also emphasises the importance of discipline in classroom 
management regarding employing new teachers: 
Er, but every time I have an opportunity to appoint new teachers, I make 
sure that they, they understand and accept this system and are willing to 
work in that system and have a view of classroom management where 
there is discipline in control. If there is not discipline in the classroom, 
there is not much that's to go on. 
This strategy is a regulative and prescriptive visible strategy in pedagogy, which 
is intended to enhance the explicitness of both regulative (hierarchical) and 
prescriptive rules in pedagogic relations. 
(F4) Banding system introduced: Prescriptive visible strategy in pedagogy 
The headteacher has been introducing a banding system since September 1994. 
Previously pupils were taught in mixed-ability tutor groups all subjects except 
mathematics which had setting for Year 7 and above and French which had setting 
for Year 8 and above. Under the present system with banding, pupils are put into 
three broad bands of ability. The top band children form three classes, the middle 
band three, and the bottom band two. 
These children are very able, they work very fast. ... These groups, the 
middle band, a few less children, and they work perhaps a little slower. 
And these children are children who've got special needs, these children 
who've got reading difficulties, language difficulties and so on. 
English, Science, history, geography, and religious education are taught in those 
band groups. Mathematics is taught in set groups within each band for Year 7 and 
above, and French also for Year 8 and above. Physical education, music, art, and 
technology are taught in mixed-ability tutor groups. Therefore pupils belongs to 
three or four different classes, depending on the subjects, mixed-ability tutor 
group, banded group, mathematics set group, and for Year 8 and above French set 
group. 
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So, let's say a child, if a child comes in, called 'John', John comes in, and 
he goes into Tutor Group C and he register, you know, they take his name, 
and John is in a class 7C for music, for art, PE, design, but he is in also 
Band E, and so he goes into E 1 for English, but he could also be a very 
good mathematician and so he is in Set 1 for maths. So, John could be in 1, 
2, 3 different classes, depending on the subject. 
The new system is replacing the old system year by year: 
So, I've only had this in place since September 1994 in Year 7 and 8. 
September 1995, in a few months time, it will be in 7, 8 and 9. And over 
the next few years, it will be in 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11. 
The children coming to the school, who are offered a place in the school, sit 
NFER mathematics and English tests about in June, and they are put into bands 
based on the results of the tests. 
The headteacher regards the introduction of the banding system as one of the 
most important strategies which he has initiated. He states that the strategy was 
the second thing he did, and the first thing was raising the status of teaching and 
learning. This strategy is based on his firm belief in the necessity of 
differentiation: 
One of the most important strategies that I've put in place in this school 
for the parents of this area is to not completely sweep away mixed-ability 
teaching but to reassure them that their children will be working with 
children who are ofthe same ability in those classes in those subjects. 
Now, I think, this is a way of differentiating, er, the curriculum to suit 
levels of ability. I ask you a question. Do children all learn maths at the 
same pace? No. Do they, are they all of the same ability in English? No. 
Well, why put them in the same class? ... Now, that is a strategic plan 
that I put in place, a strategic procedure I put in place to, er, improve the 
quality of teaching and learning that goes on in the school. So, that's, that 
was the second thing that I did. 
The headteacher seems to think that parents tends to prefer differentiated-ability 
groups to mixed-ability groups: 
... I say to parents we will give them a test, and the parents, well, they are 
quite happy. They know that their children are not now going to be in a 
mixed ability situation. 
He mentions that teachers were not necessarily in favour of the banding system 
when it was going to be introduced, and that there are still some teachers who do 
not like it because they regard it as elitist: 
The first year [from September 1993], I had to plan it all, talk to my staff, 
er, not everybody was keen on it. There are even now people who, not 
particularly, don't like it, because they think it's, it's a bit elitist . . . . You 
must have heard of it in England a lot of people are concerned about equal 
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opportumties. Well, equal opportunities to me means treating children 
according to their differences. 
Asked what percentage of teachers agree with the banding system, the 
headteacher answers that it was 50% when he suggested the system but now 90% 
of teachers like the system although some of them might have reservations about 
the philosophy: 
When I first put it, I would say 50%, but I made sure that my heads, my 
deputy headteachers, senior teachers, and heads of faculty understood the 
system. Now it's, now it's operating, I would say 90%, easily 90% of the 
teachers like this system. They might have reservation about the 
philosophy, but this is the practicality of this, are [sic] much easier to teach. 
You can set work more easily. 
He states that the practicality has persuaded some teachers into accepting the 
banding system, and implies that the examination results have also contributed to 
the persuasion: 
... some of them are very, very keen on this, some of them have accepted 
this as being a more realistic, practical way of teaching children, and all of 
them were very concerned that in 1993 the examination results in the 
school were the worst in this borough. Er, they are not now. 
He even emphasise the merit of the banding system for less able children. In the 
system, the class size of the bottom band classes is smaller than that of the middle 
band classes, which is smaller than that of the top band classes: 
This is not to say that these children will be getting a poorer quality 
education. Far from it, I think, these children will be getting a better 
education because they're in smaller classes. In these classes, specialist 
teachers of English and maths teach them. 
The introduction of the banding system stratifies pupils on the basis of their 
performances, and therefore is a prescriptive visible strategy, which enhances the 
explicitness of criteria (prescriptive) rules in pedagogic relations. 
(F5) Teaching hours increased from 23 to 25: Prescriptive visible strategy in 
pedagogy 
Before the school became grant-maintained, pupils were taught 23 hours a week. 
It has been increased to 25 hours: 
The timetable has changed. We teach more. Before we are a grant-
maintained school, we taught 23 hours a week. Now we teach 25. There 
are five lessons a day, each of one hour. Er, there used to be four lessons a 
day of an hour and 1 0 minutes. 
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In this school's case, the increase in teaching hours implies strengthened pacing in 
pedagogic relations, and therefore is a prescriptive visible strategy in pedagogy. 
(F6) Extra classes at lunchtime and after school: Prescriptive visible strategy in 
pedagogy 
As one of the endeavours which have raised the examination results, the 
headteacher mentions extra classes at lunchtime and after school: 
And the teachers themselves worked very, very hard, extra classes at 
lunchtime, after school. Every, everything was put aside and all attention 
was focused on, "Please this year we will work hard on the exam results." 
When in the past what had happened was we came in, we taught and we 
hoped for good exam results. The examination results that we got in 94 
were the best that this school has ever got GCSE. 
The extra classes scheme implies strong pacing in pedagogic relations, and 
therefore is a prescriptive visible strategy in pedagogy. 
(F7) Homework lists: Regulative visible strategy in management and prescriptive 
visible strategy in pedagogy 
According to the headteacher, he has made his staff more accountable for 
homework to him through homework lists which he can ask the staff to submit: 
... I've increased the accountability in a sense that if a parent rings me up 
and says, "I don't think my child is getting enough homework", I did it on 
Friday, I will write to that teacher or the head of faculty and I will say, 
"Please supply me with a list of homeworks [sic] that have been set since 
September. They have to write now what they set. I do, I do it in my, I've 
got, I've got one of these, and I write my homework in. So, I think it's up 
to managers in a school to make teachers accountable. 
This strategy is to enhance the explicitness of regulative (hierarchical) rules in 
organisational relations as well as that of prescriptive (pacing) rules in pedagogic 
relations, and therefore is a regulative visible strategy in management and 
prescriptive visible strategy in pedagogy. 
(F8) Introduction of academic reviews in addition to examinations: Prescriptive 
visible strategy in pedagogy 
Every year pupils get a set of examinations and an academic review both of which 
are reported to parents. Although different year groups have different schedules 
of examinations and a review, approximately every six months pupils' academic 
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performances are assessed and reported to their parents. Before the school 
became grant-maintained, there were only examinations and no review, and 
therefore parents got a report only once a year: 
What we are keen on is that every six months, approximately every six 
months, children's academic performances are assessed and monitored. 
On one of those occasions it is formal testing, and on another it is the 
teacher's reporting to parents on effort, attainment, behaviour in the class. 
So, no more than six months goes by without the children having had 
some kind of monitoring or assessment reported to parents . 
. . . there was a exam that was reported to parents. There were no reviews, 
there was no analysis of reviews, there was no posting of results to parents. 
Based on the review results, pupils might move from one band to another: 
If they are not working very well, they might come out of Band E and go 
to Band L. Children in Band L might go into Band E. 
The introduction of reviews in addition to examinations is a prescriptive visible 
strategy in pedagogy, which enhances the explicitness of prescriptive (criteria) 
rules in pedagogic relations. 
(F9) Simplified reports to parents: Prescriptive visible strategy in pedagogy 
According to the headteacher, the forms for reporting on examinations to parents 
have been simplified: 
... we have simplified our procedure, and they are all like this. School 
badge, name of the subject, name of the pupil, tutor group, punctuality: 
good, number of attendances and its lesson, attainment: excellent, good, 
average, below average, and in between them, so, this child is, his 
attainment is average to good, effort: average, then there is a course 
description telling the parents what they are learning, and then it's my 
comment. And all the reports are exactly like that, maths, English, science, 
history, geography, Year 7, Year 8, Year 9, Year 10. Year 11 is slightly 
different. 
He states that the simple reports are in accordance with what parents want to see: 
But all the reports, I think, if you are a parent, you want to know very 
quickly, "Is your child attending?", and what level, and what effort they 
are putting in, what is the course they are doing, and then you want to see 
what the teacher says. That is very simple. Attendance, effort, 
achievement, course description, teacher comment. 
The reporting form for reviews is even simpler: 
Er, the review is name of pupil, and it has a list of all subjects that they are 
taking, and it has a space for the teacher to comment. And the teacher 
simply in English has to say 'good', 'not so good', English, maths, history, 
geography, er, and one sheet you get a quick review of all subjects. 
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After the examination, one sheet for a subject. For the review, all subjects 
on one sheet. 
The simplification of the reporting forms is based on the view that reporting 
should provide clearer information on comparative performances, and therefore a 
prescriptive visible strategy in pedagogy, which is to enhance the explicitness of 
prescriptive (criteria) rules in pedagogic relations. 
(FlO) System to award pupils prizes for their attainment and effort: Prescriptive 
visible strategy in pedagogy 
The headteacher introduced an awards system in 1994. Under the new system, he 
awards a trophy to pupils who have showed the best academic achievement. The 
first prize was awarded to two pupils who had achieved the best results in their 
GCSE. 
Well, I just, that's my prize for the most outstanding achievement. They 
got nine grade As each. So I shared the prize between them. 
As a part of the system, he has also introduced a lower school presentation 
evening when books are awarded to pupils who have shown very good attainment 
or effort in each subject: 
And the maximum number of prizes that a child can receive is two, and 
last July we gave prizes to around about eighty children and, er, I gave 
them book prizes to the value of eight pounds each. 
So, we had Year 7 history prize, boy and girl, Year 8 history prize, boy 
and girl, Year 9 history prize, boy and girl, and that's the same for all 
subjects, and then we get, er, effort prizes in history, maths, science, er, so, 
we, what we do is to reward attainment and effort. 
The awards system highlights stratifying differences between pupils, and therefore 
is a prescriptive visible strategy in pedagogy, which enhances the explicitness of 
prescriptive (criteria) rules in pedagogic relations. 
(Fll) Colours for very good sport players: Prescriptive visible strategy in 
pedagogy 
The school also introduced colours for very good sport players: 
And we introduced, er, what we call colours. Er, if you are a very good 
footballer or netball player and you play for the school team, you get a 
little badge to sew on to your blazer. 
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As a part of the awards system, this is also a prescriptive visible strategy in 
pedagogy, which enhances the explicitness of prescriptive (criteria) rules in 
pedagogic relations. 
(F12) Introducing a house system: Neutral strategy in pedagogy 
At the time of the interview, the head teacher was trying to introduce a house 
system where pupils would involve themselves in extracurricular and pastoral 
activities through their house: 
I want to introduce into the school a house system and, er, I'm explaining 
that, I've already explained it to governors already, and now, now just 
about to explain to the staff what I want. I want children involved in 
competition, I want them involved in doing things in their school as much 
as possible. 
The house system does not particularly seem to have an orientation towards 
increasing or decreasing the explicitness of regulative or prescriptive rules, and 
therefore is a neutral strategy. 
(F 13) Clearer and stricter policy of permanent exclusions: Regulative visible 
strategy in pedagogy 
The headteacher has made it clear that consistently misbehaving pupils will be 
excluded permanently although the official procedures have not been changed. 
He had excluded permanently four pupils, and was going to exclude another pupil 
at the time of the interview: 
The procedures are the same, but the children now know that if they 
misbehave consistently in this school, I will remove them from the school. 
But where children consistently, persistently misbehave, I think, it's my 
responsibility to say, "Unless you behave properly, you will not jeopardise 
the chances of the other children in your class." 
He argues that his policy of exclusions is supported by parents and governors who 
regards it as a deterrent: 
Now, because a lot of my governors and parents, they want to see 
discipline as a deterrent, in other words, if I stand in front of all my Year 
10 children for example and say, "You will behave properly or I will put 
you out of this school", that frightens them. And if they know that the 
threat is real, then, generally speaking, they behave better. 
He mentions, as a merit of the GM status, that the LEA cannot make the school 
admit disruptive children who have been excluded from other schools: 
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And what has changed on the GM is that the LEA cannot send other 
children from other schools who are disruptive to this school. They cannot 
do that. Er, I won't take into this school children who've been disruptive 
in other schools unless they have a particular special need. 
The clearer and stricter policy of permanent exclusions is a regulative visible 
strategy in pedagogy, which increases the explicitness of regulative (hierarchical) 
rules in pedagogic relations. 
(F14) Departmental review: Regulative and prescriptive visible strategy in 
management 
The head teacher has introduced a departmental review, a review of performance 
of each curriculum area. Once a year, in October, every head of department has to 
report to and discuss with the headteacher and the deputy head in charge of 
curriculum. It is focused on examination results. After examination results come 
out in August, each head of department writes a report in September. According 
to the headteacher, he and the deputy ask heads of department very hard questions 
in review meetings: 
Every year, once a year, we have what's called a departmental review. 
Every head of department has to come in this room with the deputy head, 
curriculum. They have to write a report on their examination results, who 
took the exam classes, and we ask some very, very hard questions about 
the quality of teaching. "Are your teachers setting homework regularly? 
Are they marking it regularly? Who are the best teachers teaching 
examination groups? Why did your results go down last year? How have 
you spent your money and resources?" 
With regard to the introduction of the departmental review, the headteacher's 
intention is to make his teaching staff accountable to him and the deputy in terms 
of examination results and make their control over the staffs performance more 
explicit and tighter: 
We set them targets. We set, we make them accountable to us. It's not 
good enough to teach all year and say, "Our exam results weren't very 
good last year." 
Er, we now insist on proper departmental reviews. Teachers are made 
accountable. If you went to a maths teacher now and said, er, "What 
happens if you don't get good examination results?", their answer would 
be, "Well, I have to explain to somebody what I have been doing." We 
make the teachers accountable, put some pressure on the teachers. 
Review meetings are recorded and minuted, and the headteacher reports on the 
reviews to the governing body. The procedures seem quite formal. The 
274 
consequences of the reviews can be very serious. In the interview, the 
headteacher mentioned a particular teacher whose performance does not satisfy 
him and the head of department and he said that, unless the teacher improve, he 
would not let the teacher teach any exam classes in the following year. He 
regards the threat to the job as a necessary part of the quality control which the 
management impose on the teaching staff: 
Now, I think that comes a time when it's up to the headteacher and the 
deputies to impose on teachers a form of quality control. If you thought 
you were going to loose your job because you were doing it, you're not 
doing it properly, that, that is a motivater. In this country, there isn't 
enough of that in my opinion. 
The departmental review can be regarded as a formal kind of monitoring scheme 
to tighten not only prescriptive but also directive control by the school 
management over the staff based on examination results as a particularly 
important criterion. Therefore it is a regulative and prescriptive visible strategy in 
management, which enhances the explicitness of regulative (hierarchical) and 
prescriptive (criteria) rules in organisational relations. 
(F15) More in-service training: Neutral strategy in management 
The headteacher states that he and one of his deputies have increased in-service 
training of the staff, and that it has been possible because the school is grant-
maintained and therefore has enough budget: 
Er, I worked very hard with one of my deputies to do what we call a lot 
more in-service training. I have to be honest with you in saying that a lot 
of this is not possible unless you have financial resources. And being a 
grant-maintained school, I had access to more money to do this than 
perhaps other schools had. 
This strategy of staff training does not imply any leaning towards the explicit or 
implicit end in regulative or prescriptive rules, and therefore is neutral in terms of 
visibility. 
(F 16) Larger management team with clear role of each member: Regulative and 
prescriptive visible strategy in management 
Before the school became grant-maintained, the senior management team 
consisted ofheadteacher and two deputies. Now the team includes four senior 
teachers and a senior administrative officer as well. Therefore the number of the 
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team members has been increased from three to eight. It has been coinciding with 
the increase ofthe school size: 
... it's not a massive school, it's big, and it's getting bigger. And the 
management structure in the school was, before grant-maintained status, 
head, two deputies, that's it. Now head, two deputies, four senior teachers, 
senior administrative officer who doesn't teach, she is an administrator. 
Now my senior management team is eight. 
Each member of the team has a clear role and, according to the headteacher, the 
management structure is much stronger than it was previously. He intends to 
make the management businesslike in a sense: 
One of them is head of upper school, Year 10 and 11. One of them is head 
oflower school, Year 7, 8 and 9. One ofthem does all the day-to-day 
administration, if teachers are absent, cover, diary and timetable. One of 
them is the head of careers and, er, that's basically all he does. I have to 
say he might be leaving soon and, if he leaves, I won't replace him on the 
senior management team. He is a senior member of staff historically, he is 
a senior member of staff. So, head of upper school, head of lower school, 
head of administration, careers teacher. My two deputies, one is in charge 
of staffing, staff appraisal, INSET and duties, and one is in charge of 
finance and curriculum. My responsibilities are governors, outside liaison 
with agencies, all issues to do with staffing and policy-making. I make all 
the policies. My senior administrative officer does all day-to-day finance. 
Er, she used to be the school secretary, but now she is much more than that. 
She is also clerk to the governing body. So, I have a management 
structure of eight, and it's a lot stronger than it was. 
Er, I'm very keen that people have a clear view of their own role. Mr 
Ohmori, you see, I, I, I would say to you that this school is like a 
business .... our job is to provide a quality service. If we don't provide 
the service, parents will choose to go to other schools. 
Larger management team itself does not have particular implications in terms of 
visibility, but the above expansion of the management team is intended to provide 
the management with more hierarchical structure and clearer responsibility. 
Therefore the above change is a regulative and prescriptive visible strategy in 
management, which increases the explicitness of both regulative (hierarchical) 
and prescriptive rules in organisational relations. 
(F 17) Clear agenda for a meeting of the management team: Regulative and 
prescriptive visible strategy in management 
The management team has a meeting for three hours every week, and the 
headteacher provides a clear agenda with every meeting: 
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We meet here around this table every Wednesday afternoon at 2.30, 2.30 
to 5.30, three hours. Er, we go through the diary for four weeks. We go 
through all staffing issues. . .. I produce an agenda for every meeting. 
Last week, diary, four weeks, next two weeks, two weeks, diary request, 
bulletin, caretaking, staffing, in-service training, and then various issues 
that are important to us. That takes place once a week. And there are 
eight people around a table. They've all got various responsibilities. 
According to the headteacher, previously there was no agenda and no real 
structure: 
A regular meeting every week, but no agendas, no real structure. I didn't 
like it. 
His intention is to make the school organisation tighter and more explicit: 
Er, and that happens once a week. So, the organisation and administration 
is hopefully all very tight, very clear. 
This is a regulative and prescriptive visible strategy in management, which 
increases the explicitness of regulative (hierarchical) and prescriptive 
(sequencing) rules in organisational relations. 
(F18) To publicise positive aspects of the school through the local newspaper: 
Neutral strategy in management 
He approached the local newspaper to seek positive reporting on the school's 
activities: 
I, I indicated to the local newspaper in September that I was keen for us to 
be seen in the community as doing things. The whole of my wall there, 
most of those pictures, photographs come from what's happened, 
newspaper reports of good things going on in the school. We've set up a 
bank. we have a famous footballer who is an ex-pupil. Er, we have 
entered a maths competition. We've got a school magaz-, school 
magazme. 
There is no indication that the above strategy has an orientation towards the 
explicitness or implicitness of regulative or prescriptive rules, and therefore it is 
neutral in terms ofvisibility. 
(F19) Newsletters to parents full of information: Neutral strategy in management 
The school sends a newsletter to parents every six weeks, and it includes much 
information on positive aspects of the school: 
... every six weeks, I send a newsletter home to parents, full of 
information. . .. lots of, lots of information, it goes home toward parents, 
about what's happening in the school, mathematics competition, we went 
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to the House of Commons, visits, school magazine, anything that goes on, 
that markets my school amongst my parents. 
Again this strategy does not have any particular implications in terms of visibility, 
and therefore is a neutral strategy. 
(F20) Brochure ofbetter quality: Neutral strategy in management 
The quality of the school's brochure has been improved: 
That's, that's the brochure that parents get. It's a better quality, it's not 
perfect yet, but it's better than it was. And, er, so, marketing my school, 
the quality ofthe brochure is important. 
This does not seem to lean to the visible or invisible end, too. Therefore it is a 
neutral strategy. 
(F21) Fostering the links with the industry: Neutral strategy in management 
The school is trying to foster more links with the industry: 
So, marketing, I'm doing more of it. We have a governing body's 
subcommittee called Community and Public Relations. We are very keen 
at the moment to begin fostering relations ... in the industry. And, er, in 
July I'm going to speak to the local chamber of commerce, which is local 
groups of businessmen, and I shall be basically putting our school on the 
map, and say this is what we're doing in the school, these are the links 
we'd like to have with the industry. We've just started, er, a link with 
Midland Bank, we've got links going with, er, a local car manufacturer. 
Er, there is a lot to do on that, yes. 
This is also a neutral strategy which does not show any leaning towards the visible 
or invisible end. 
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